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PREFACE
The topic for this investigation has grown out of a longstanding
commitment to the importance of intellectual freedom to democracy and
to education. The point of view taken is deeply rooted in the liberal,
democratic tradition a tradition which has historically been committed
to the betterment of social and individual life through education and
schooling, and to a process of social change achieved through the
laborious and incremental restructuring of institutions. It expresses
a belief in human dignity and in the possibility of the full develop-
®®nt of individual capacities through intelligent and free inc^uiry.
And it is consonant with the idea put forth by John Dewey that the dis-
tinguishing feature of a democratic society is its dedication to social
change that leads to growth or improvement. Implicit in the idea of
grovrth is an underlying conception of democracy as a way of life. As
Dewey said, "A democracy is more than a form of government; it is pri-
marily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience."
The case around which much of the work for this project has focused
is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District . It is a
case which reaffirmed that students and teachers retain their constitu-
tional rights while in school at a time when the hierarchical nature of
educational institutions and an attitude of paternalism toward students
had led many people to ignore or forget our basic societal commitment to
the principles of freedom, equality, and human dignity. Despite the
uniqueness of their respective vocational positions, both teachers and
students are people. They are also citizens who are entitled to a full
panoply of rights while in school.
V
The purpose of the present investigation was to discover how the
Tinker case has been used to promote or hinder the development of a
climate of intellectual freedom in the public school setting. More gen-
erally, the purpose was to discover if the spirit of Tinker is thriving
in the schools and in the courts as seen from cases where issues of intel-
lectual freedom have arisen and been resolved.
Chapter I provides information on the purpose and importance of
free speech from a historical perspective. Chapter II suggests the re-
lationship between intellectual freedom and education in a democratic
society; and it describes and analyzes the Tinker case and some of the
means courts have used to implement free speech. Chapters III, IV, and V
present the results of an investigation of how the state and federal
courts have dealt with intellectual freedom in public schools in the post-
Tinker period. And Chapter VI presents conclusions which can reasonably
be draim from the investigation and recommendations for the more effec-
tive realization of the ideal of freedom of intercommunication in public
schools.
I would like to acknowledge and thank John Brigham of the University
of Massachusetts Political Science Department for the advice and encour-
agement given to me on this project. And I would like to thank my advir
sors Louis Fischer and David Schimmel, lawyers and professors of education
at the University of Massachusetts, for their support and friendship over
the last several years. In addition, I would like to thank A1 Sorenson—
typist, supporter, and friend.
vi
ABSTRACT
Intellectual Freedom in the Public Schools:
An Assessment of Tinker and Its Progeny, 1969-1979
September, 1980
Gail Paulus Sorenson, B.S., Kent State University
J.D., Western New England College School of Law
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Louis Fischer
In the famous black armband case of Tinker v. Des Moines
,
decided
in 1969, the Supreme Court declared that students were persons and that
both students and teachers were entitled to exercise their constitutional
rights while in school. It is generally believed that this case helped
to usher in a new era of judicial protection of the fundamental consti-
tutional rights of teachers and students. The purpose of this disser-
tation was to discover whether the propositions and the philosophy of
Tinker have been used by state and federal courts to support intell-
ectual freedom in public schools.
The philosophical framework of this project is derived from the
liberal, democratic tradition, with its belief in human dignity and in
the possibility of the full development of individual capacities through
intelligent and free inquiry. The first two chapters survey various
interpretations of the purpose and importance of free speech and examine
the special importance of intellectual freedom for education in a
democratic society.
Against this background, cases involving issues of intellectual
vii
freedom for teachers and stiidents in public schools were analyzed.
Consideration was given to how the courts have balanced the preferred
right of free speech with the unique needs and purposes of public
schools. The student’s right to speak and not to speak; to know and
not to know were examined in a wide variety of situations involving
oral and written speech. The scope aind limits of the teacher's
freedom to speak and not to speak in school and classroom situations
were considered.
From the above analysis it was concluded that the major importance
of the Tinker case has been its recognition and reassertion of a phil-
osophy toward children which respects their individuality and uniqueness.
Students, despite their special role, are people who retain their consti-
tutional rights wherever they go. To curtail those rights—especially
the fundamental right of free speech so important to education itself
—
requires extraordinary justification, not merely reasonable justifica-
tion. By analogy, teachers, too, are people who retain their consti-
tutional rights while in school. While the right of free speech which
students and teachers retain must be adjusted to the special character-
istics of the school environment, it must also be especially protected
and promoted in order to facilitate the educational process.
Judging from the relevant cases which have arisen and been reported
from 1969- 1979
,
school officials often act to promote institutional
order at the expense of freedom of expression. In resolving these
conflicts, courts have shown a relatively speech-protective approach
in about half of the cases considered and a relative lack of speech-
protectiveness in about a quarter of the cases considered. If it is
viii
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Assiunod, Es SGcms likely, thst the contosticd &nd repoTTod c^ses repTo*
sent particularly egregious instances of institutional repressiveness,
the degree of support that intellectual freedom has been given by the
courts does not appear outstanding.
There is still much to be done to protect intellectual freedom in
educational settings. Neither educators nor judges have fully realized
that while the public school is a place where speech occasionally may
have to be curtailed to advance important educational objectives, it is
also a place where it should arguably be protected and promoted more
than in any other. A school is a unique place primarily because it is
dedicated to teaching and learning. Intellectual freedom not only ad-
vances this purpose, but it is the principal end of education in a
democracy as well.
ix
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CHAPTER I
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA
If there is any principle of the Constitution that more
imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is
the principle of free thought--not free thought for those
who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
U.S. V. Schwimmer (1928)
Introduction
The definition of freedom of speech, intellectual freedom, or, as
it is sometimes called, tolerance— its scope, limits, purposes and inm
portance and the means for its realization— is a vital matter of social,
political, and legal philosophy. It is a definition that has evolved
historically and which continues to evolve, so that it will vary depend-
ing upon the culture and time in which it is discussed. Even cultures
which place high value on the principle of intellectual freedom can
implement that principle according to very different understandings of
its importance and purpose. This can be illustrated by the example of
the second Moscow International Book Fair which took place in September
of 1979. According to the conditions for participation, books which
advocated war or racial or national exclusiveness, were offensive to the
national dignity of other exhibitors, were anti-Soviet in character, or
were considered pornographic or incompatible with public morals were not
to be admitted. Pursuant to this policy, Soviet censors confiscated
more than forty books from the exhibits of American publishers. In
defense of the official action of Soviet authorities, the chairman of
1
2the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Boris Stukalin,- argued:
"Books of that nature do not bring people closer together and do not
serve the cause of detente. Instead, they stir up hatred and hostility
between people and hamper the process of detente."^ Mr. Stukalin fur-
ther elaborated that book censorship of this sort was not a violation
of the principle of free speech: "This is the highest affirmation of
freedom of speech, since freedom to propagandize fascism is the kind of
freedom that all honest people in our country and in other countries
2
must oppose." The implication appears to be that peace and preserva-
tion of the Soviet way of life are overriding values, and further that
they are values which must be protected as practical and moral necessi-
ties to the effective realization of freedom of speech itself. Suppres-
sion is thus justified as a means to the end of freedom.
In 1923, C.E. Ruthenberg, the National Secretary of the Workers'
Party of America, explained that while the principle of free speech was
not opposed by Communists, it was first necessary to bring about the
conditions which would give epual opportunity for freedom of speech to
all. Those conditions would exist when the educational system and the
means of communication were no longer controlled by the dominant capi-
talist class. "We believe that in our fight for Communism we are also
fighting for those conditions which will, for the first time, make real
freedom of speech, through putting on a basis of equality all groups
and
individuals in the social order.
This point of view, which seems somewhat paradoxical to the
mind
nurtured in the liberal tradition, is not new but is on the
ascent in
contemporary political philosophy. It has been elaborated
most recently
3in the United States by the late professor and philosopher Herbert
Marcuse who argued that because we are ’’enslaved by institutions that
vitiate self-determination,” pure tolerance must not be permitted.
Freedom of expression must not be allowed to ’’protect false words and
wrong deeds which demonstrate that they contradict and counteract the
possibilities of liberation.” Because of the emergency situation pre-
sently faced by our society, Marcuse would allow the inevitably small
groups who have attained ’’maturity of [their] faculties” to decide on
what would be tolerated for all. Marcuse argued that, given present
conditions, censorship is necessary to bring about the development of
conditions that would be liberating and humanizing.
The Marcusian philosophy was adopted by one student member of the
committee which examined freedom of expression at Yale University in
1974. The committee, which was chaired by the noted historian C. Vann
Woodward, was formed after an incident in April of 1974 where Professor
William Shockly of Snanford University was physically prevented from
speaking at Yale because of his controversial views concerning genetic
differences between races. KOnneth J. Barnes, a law student and gradu-
ate student in economics, argued that free speech cannot become a possi-
bility until we are liberated from unequal power relations, an oppres-
sive ideology, and irrational factors which condition knowledge. He
concluded that ”[u]nder certain circumstances, free expression is out-
weighed by more pressing issues, including liberation of all oppressed
people and equal opportunities for minority groups.”^ Like Marcuse,
Barnes assumed that liberation can plausibly be brought about through
temporary suppression of certain ideas.
4These attacks on the traditional liberal notions of free speech which
emmanate from the political left are joined by perhaps more virulent
attacks from the political right—more virulent because they question
the basic value of intellectual freedom as well as the means used to
implement it. The most violent incident of attempted censorship of
ideas that has taken place in recent years occurred throughout the *
summer and fall of 1974 in Kanawah Coxmty, West Virginia. A local
school board member, various fundamentalist religious groups and an
organization called Christian American Parents mounted a crusade against
three hundred different language arts textbooks. Although the attempted
censorship was eventually unsuccessful, there were picketing, strikes,
boycotts, and violence which led to the closing of the public bus system,
a trucking terminal, mines, and several stores and factories. One ele-
mentary school and several cars were bombed. It has been reported that
many of the same national groups which were active in the attempted cen-
sorship in Kanawah County— including the Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch
Society, Citizens for Decent Literature, and Citizens for Decency
€
Through Law—were involved in incidents in several other states as well.
These illustrations are not given to suggest that incidents such as
the one in Kanawah County are likely to become everyday occurrences, or
in order to advocate the adoption of a radically different perspective
on the function, importance, and means of securing freedom of speech and
intellectual freedom in our society. They are meant only to illustrate
that the philosophical issues surrounding the theory and methods of in-
tellectual freedom continue to be debated. Although freedom of speech ..
may not appear to be the most pressing issue of the present decade, it
5is certainly always an issue of importance. I would agree with Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., one of the most prolific defenders of civil liberties in
American jurisprudence, that, ”[l]iberty of discussion must itself be
constantly discussed.”^ Is liberty of discussion valuable? Is it
useful to conceive of freedom of speech as an absolute value? If not,
what are its limits? Should it be a value which is prefenred in our
society? If so, how is this preference to be promoted, and what are the
limits of the preference? Is intellectual freedom valued as a means, as
an end, or as both?
The remainder of the first chapter will selectively survey some
recurrent themes in the literature of freedom of speech from Plato to
various English and American antecedents. Special emphasis will be
placed on the purposes and means that have been expressed for the pres-
ervation and encouragement of intellectual freedom. In Chapter II the
interrelationship of these social and individual purposes with the
purposes of contemporary education in the United States will be suggest-
ed. It will be argued that freedom of speech and intellectual freedom
are fundamentally intertwined with the purposes and methods of education.
If free speech can be said to be a necessary requisite to education, it
is also true that behavior that has educative consequences will broaden
and deepen the ability to inquire intellectually and to speak freely and
intelligently.
Freedom of Speech: "Invaluable Sources”
The recorded tradition of the censorship of thought, belief, and
speech begins in the West with the death of Socrates in 399 B.C.
6Socrates was officially condemned for corrupting the youth of Athens and
for believing in new divinities, but his death was surely as much a
result of the fact that he disturbed the intellectual complacency of
the Athenian population with his method of cross-examination and his
scientific approach to issues of human concern. He called himself a
gadfly to the state—arousing and testing the ideas of the populace.
Although he might have saved himself, Socrates refused to give up his
teaching, affirming that "daily to discourse about 'virtue,' and of
those other things about which you hear me examining myself and others,
is the greatest good of man, and that the unexamined life is not worth
8living. ..." Socrates did not defend or justify the importance of
the search for virtue (or excellence) and truth as much as he extolled
and affirmed it by his willingness to "die many times." It is here in
Plato's account of the trial of Socrates that an early indication of the
notion of truth-getting as a process can be found. Virtue and truth,
according to Socrates, arise through continual discourse and questioning.
Just as Socrates believed that the unexamined life was not worth
living so John Milton believed that the freedom to know and to speak
freely was the most important freedom: "Give me the liberty to know,
to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all
liberties."^ In "A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,"
the Areopagetica , composed in 1644, Milton made an eloquent plea to
redress what he saw as the evils of censorship. In one of the most
strilcing passages, Milton personifies books and analogizes their censor-
ship and destruction to the killing of reason itself.
7We should be wary therefore what persecution we raise
against the living labours of public men, how we spill that
seasoned life of man, preserved and stored up in books; since
we see a kind of homicide may be thus committed, sometimes a
martyrdom, and if it extend to the whole impression, a kind
of massacre; whereof the execution ends not in the slaying of
an elemental life, but strikes at that eternal and fifth
essence, the breath. of reason itself, slays an immortality
rather than a life.
But censorship, according to Milton, kills more than reason, it also
kills truth. Viewing truth more perhaps as a thing to be got once and
for all rather than as something in the process of redefinition, Milton
uses his famous battle metaphor to argue that licensing is "weakness and
cowardice in the wars of Truth" and to argue that truth will be victor-
ious if allowed to fight freely:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play
upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously
by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let
her and Falsehood grapple; who ever toew Truth put to the
worse, in a free and open encounter?
In addition to allowing for the development and expression of
reason and the discovery of truth, Milton believed that freedom of
communication was instrumental in the development of a shared though
diverse culture and the promotion of progressive change. He believed
that a nation was a harmony of differences that come about through
natural interaction of individuals within a culture and not through an
imposed unity which would lead to "a gross conforming stupidity, a stark
and dead congealment of wood and hay and stubble, forced and frozen
together. . . With mocking irony, Milton speaks of the kind of
unanimity that would be wrought by a cessation of learning: "How goodly
and how to be wished were such an obedient unanimity as this, what a
fine conformity would it starch us all into! Doubtless a staunch and
8solid piece of framework, as any January could freeze together.
But for Milton, as for Socrates before him, the virtue of intell-
ectual freedom was more than its instrumental service to the discovery
of truth for social purposes. Just as Socrates believed that every
good of human beings both public and private derived from virtue, so
Milton believed that knowledge was a "flowery crop," a "new light" and
that the lack of intellectual freedom was an affront both to learning
itself and to individual human dignity. Censorship is "the greatest
displeasure and indignity to a free and knowing spirit" as well as an
"undervaluing and vilifying of the whole Nation. Learning, discourse,
the use of human reason--these are things to be valued for themselves
and as an affirmation of respect for human dignity as well as for their
role in social change and cultiiral evolution.
It was left to John Stuart Mill in his 1859 essay "On Liberty" to
fully express the cardinal principle of the liberal tradition. That
principle is expressed in a quote by Wilhelm Von Humboldt with which
Mill chose to introduce his essay. The selection demonstrates that
for Mill the "absolute and essential importance of human development in
its richest diversity" is the primary goal of all liberty. Like
Milton and Socrates before him. Mill believed that the liberty of first
importance was that of thought, speech and writing. He presents what is
widely considered to be the classic liberal argument for freedom of
expression. Since hiiman beings are fallable, intellectual freedom is
needed to discover, enlarge, and affirm an understanding of truth.
Mill believed that we need to allow our most warranted beliefs to be
open to challenge and correction of error. Although perhaps too
9simplistic by modem standards, expression of opinion was to be abso-
lutely privileged, according to Mill, unless it would directly harm
specific individuals.
Just as for Socrates and Milton, the truth-seeking function of
intellectual freedom is of major importance for Mill. Unlike Milton,
however, who felt that truth emerged from a battle. Mill believed that
the more common case was that conflicting doctrines "share the truth
between them." "Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so
much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites. . .
Truth is not so much ready-made as synergistically created. Mill was
also somewhat more realistic than Milton, who felt that truth needed
merely to be stated to be seen for what it was, at least if one looked
at least twice. Milton said that truth might be prohibited accidentally
because "its first appearance to our eyes is more unsightly and unplaus-
17
ible than many errors. ..." Mill, on the other hand, felt that
truth did not always triumph naturally or survive despite censorship,
but that it was discovered and rediscovered over the course of time.
In addition to the truth-seeking function of intellectual freedom,
for Mill this liberty also provided protection against tyrannical gov-
ernments and led to the improvement of the htoman condition. Mill saw
more clearly than others the function of intellectual freedom in allow-
ing for the interpretation of experience, thereby deepening understand-
ing and making individual human experience more meaningful. In this
regard Mill presaged those twentieth century psychologists and philos-
ophers who have concluded that self, mind, and personality develop
18
through a process of social and environmental interaction.
As for t
10
wider social importance of intellectual freedom, there is evidence that
Mill felt that diversity of opinion—especially religious and philoso-
phical sectarianism--was an evil which would lessen with greater oppor-
tunities for freedom of speech. That Mill hoped for the day when a
higher state of intellectual development would lead to stability and
make diversity of opinion unnecessary suggests that he felt the social
world could arrive at some fixed truth once and for all. This truth
would then only have to be reaffirmed through continued freedom of
speech so as not to be held as ’’dead dogma." Although this latter
belief may be controversial, its acceptance or rejection does not de-
tract from Mill’s general argument that expression of opinion is to be
absolutely protected absent personal or public harm, and that the ulti-
mate goal of liberty is the development of individual human beings.
Fourteen years after the appearance of Mill's "On Liberty," James
Fitzjames Stephen, a former student of Mill's, published a critique
which illustrates several controversies that have continued to the pre-
sent day.^^ Stephen, who was influenced by Thomas Hobbes, felt that
Mill formed "too favourable an estimate of human nature" and that the
result of txnlimited freedom of speech was usually scepticism.
The real difference between Mr. Mill's doctrine and mine is
this. We agree that the minority are wise and the majority
foolish, but Mr. Mill denies that the wise minority are ever
justified in coercing the foolish majority for their own
good, whereas I affirm that u^ger circumstances they may be
justified in doing so. ..."
The first controversy thus concerns the nature of human nature, and the
limits of liberty. It echoes the book censorship controversy that open-
ed the chapter.
11
The second controversy appears when Stephen mounts a more general
attack on what he perceives as Mill’s absolute stand in favor of freedom
of expression of opinion, and asserts in contrast that whether or not
liberty should be allowed is dependent on the situation.
If, however, the object aimed at is good, if the compul-
sion employed such as to attain it, and if the good obtained
overbalances the inconvenience of the compulsion itself I do '
not understand how, upon utilitarian principles, the compul-
sion can be bad.^^
Of course, Stephen is correct that an unrefined utilitarianism is not
consistent with the assertion of absolute principles such as liberty
of thought and discussion, A utilitarian ethical theory would require
that all principles be amenable to adjusted implementation depending
upon the good sought and the means necessary to acheive it. I don't
think Mill would disagree except perhaps with the limits of adjustment.
But more generally, the argument that liberty, including intellectual
liberty, is necessarily limited by the particular context in which it is
exercised has been an important and controversial issue to the present
time.
Some modem jurisprudential scholars have argued that the importan-
ce of free speech places it in an invulnerable position, where it cannot
be defeated and where its force and power are absolute, especially when
matters of political importance are concerned. Justice Black has
argued forcefully that when the abridgement of speech is direct it
should be absolutely protected. Others have argued that although
free
dora of communication deserves a special place in our hierarchy of
values
which is something that Stephen did not argue in 1873, it is not
possi-
ble to say in advance of any particular situation that it
should be
12
absolute. But among the Supreme Court Justices at least, the position
of the absolutists has never commanded majority support. A principled
balancing of various values and interests in context, because it is
pragmatic and empirical, continues to be the dominant philosophy.
The essay by Stephen just discussed along with the ones preceding
it are mentioned in Zechariah Chafee's 1920 and 1941 bibliographies on
freedom of speech as ’’invaluable” in developing an understanding of the
political and philosophical bases of such freedom. This is a prereq-
uisite, he feels, to the full understanding of the legal meaning of
freedom of speech. To the essays discussed above, Chagee adds one
other, ’’The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration” by Walter BAgehot, pub-
27lished in 1874. In this essay some themes previously considered are
repeated and some new themes appear for the first time.
Like Socrates, Milton, and Mill before him, Bagehot puts major em-
phasis on the truth-getting function of toleration, which he defines as
the legal protection of the public expression of opinion. Discussion
’’promotes the progressive knowledge of truth, which is the mainspring of
28
civilization.” Although it is not clear whether he means to say that
truth is something we come closer to getting the more we engage in dis-
cussion or whether he means that what is considered true changes, there
is at least some indication that truth-getting is an active process
rather than something to be accepted as a given. Like Milton, Bagehot
believes that truth has an advantage against error if the human mind is
left free to do its logic. ’’Strong and eager minds” play the part of
advocates of opinion, some true and some false. Meanwhile the ’cooler
people” serve as ’’quasi-judges” in the court of centuries where ’ truth
13
has the best of the proof, and therefore wins most of the judgments.
So, Bagehot adds one more metaphor to truth-getting as a search, a
battle, and a reconcilliation in collision--that of a courtroom drama.
Bagehot is more like Mill's critic Stephen insofar as he shares
Stephen's rather Hobbesean view of human nature. Bagehot believes that
the desire for persecution or censorship is deeply rooted in human na-
ture and that it is perpetuated more to stop political danger than to
arrest intellectual error. Although Bagehot does not mention it, this
appears to have been the case with Socrates
,
whose greatest sin was
perhaps that he was a gadfly to the State. More recent examples of the
desire to arrest political dissent can be illustrated by the appearance
of laws against seditious libel— laws aimed at preventing political div-
isiveness and strife by prohibiting certain categories of speech. Even
if Bagehot is wrong and the major motive for censorship is not to stop
political danger, the maintenance of law and order in the state and in
society has been a recurring justification for suppression of speech.
Although Bagehot argues for freedom of opinion and discussion in
all matters, he does admit that there should be two conditions or limi-
tations to that freedom. The conditions he presents concern issues of
continued importance, the first to free speech in general and the second
to intellectual freedom in the context of the education of children.
The first limit that Bagehot states if that "[n]o government is bound to
permit a controversy which will annihilate itself: it is a trustee for
many duties, and if possible it must retain the power to perform those
duties."^® In contemporary jurisprudence, the limit of free speech cri-
tical of government would be precisely where that speech presented a
14
a ’’clear and present danger." In the language of the most recent defin-
itive Supreme Court case on the issue, advocacy which is 1) "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and which is 2 ) "likely
to incite or produce such action" can be prohibited or prevented con-
sistent with the Constitution. So that while it is true that govern-
ment must not permit a controversy that will annihilate itself, in order
to prevent speech the threat of that annihilation must be intentional,
immediate, and serious.
The second condition to complete liberty of expression that Bagehot
states is that free speech cannot apply to the uncivilized and to child-
ren because such people are incapable of engaging in rational discussion.
Bagehot also believes that before there was a common national character
that a "coercive despotism" was necessary, and that coercion should be
ended only when the rulers determine that the citizens are mature enough
to engage in enlightened interchange. Although our present liberal
philosophy would deny the necessity of such paternalism with regard to
adults, the argument that Bagehot makes has been much more readily
accepted with regard to children, whom Bagehot analogizes to intellec-
tually immature citizens.
The case is analogous to that of education. Every parent
wisely teaches his child his own creed, and till the child has
attained a certain age it is better that he should not hear
too much of any other. His mind will in the end be better ..
able to weigh arguments because it does not begin to weigh
them so early; he will hardly comprehend any creed unless he
has been taught some creed: but the restrictions of childhood
must be relaxed in youth and abandoned in manhood. One object
of education is to train us for discussion; and as that train-
ing gradually approaches to completeness, we should gradually
begin to enter into and to take part in discussion. The
restrictions that are useful at nine years old are pernicious
at nineteen. "32
IS
Just as citizens need the coercive despotism of their rulers, so child-
ren need that of their parents. This is an idea that has been accepted
almost without question with regard to the treatment of children and
incompetents in the legal system of twentieth century America. We are
only now beginning to sort out the illegitimate issues of paternalism
from the legitimate and genuine concerns for the mentally disabled and
for children who are in the process of maturing developmentally. This
question of the proper balance between education and indoctrination,
between freedom of inquiry and socialization will be seen to be at the
heart of many of the free speech cases presented in the later chapters.
There is one more idea of immediate concern which Bagehot raises
that
,
although generally discredited by contemporary legal scholars,
continues to appear in legal opinions. Bagehot tries to draw a dis-
tinction between speech and action analogous to John Stuart Mill’s
attempted distinction between the self and others illustrated by the
assertion that one is at liberty to do anything that does not affect
another adversely. Bagehot states: "It is plain, too, that the argu-
ment here applied to the toleration of opinion has no application to
that of actions." Just as Stephen, the poet John Donne, and others
have made the point that no man is an island, so contemporary legal
scholars have discussed the difficulty or impossibility of determining
whether symbolic behavior, for example, should be classified as speech
or action. To the extent that one realizes the difficulty of making
absolute distinctions between speech and action, the distinction may
continue to be useful in understanding free speech cases containing
elements of both. The problem is that speech is expressive behavior and
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some action is, as the Supreme Court has realized, very close to pure
speech. It is at least necessary to understand that this distinction
has been relied upon heavily in past free speech cases. Whether or not
it will be relied on in the future is debatable. Bagehot is not the
first nor the last person to assume that such a distinction could be
made easily and effectively.
Freedom of Speech; Old and New Themes
The truth-getting function of free speech that had been of primary
importance since the time of Socrates, continued to be thought of as a
principal concern for centuries. Not only were such writers and scholars
as Milton, Mill, and Bagehot expressing this purpose, but the thought
that the whole truth results from a variety of opinions continued to be
colorfully expressed by commoners and popularizers. A good example is
Wendell Phillips, a nineteenth century minister and social reformer:
No matter whose the lips that would speak, they must be
free and ungagged. Let us believe that the whole of truth can
never do harm to the whole of virtue. . . . The community
which dares not protect its humblest and most hated member in
the free utterance of his opinions, no matter how false or
hateful, is only a gang of slaves.
If there is anything in the universe that can't stand
discussion, let it crack. 35
In the first year of the twentieth century, the English philosopher
Herbert Spencer reaffirmed freedom of discussion as the agency of truth.
In his Principles of Ethics he states that "regard for experience may
reasonably prevent us from assuming that the current beliefs are wholly
true. We must recognize free speech as still being the agency by
which
36
error is to be dissipated. ..."
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Founding fathers, too, expressed their high regard for freedom of dis-
cussion. Thomas Jefferson, in his 1801 inaugural address, invokes the
battle metaphor of Milton:
If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this
Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undis-
turbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion
may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. 37
And the famous writer and Supreme Court Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
updated Milton's metaphor of a battle to a "marketplace of ideas"— an
analogy more suited to the twentieth century.
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market. . . .38
Zechariah Chafee, as well, reaffirmed the truth-getting function of
freedom of speech in his two seminal works on that subject appearing in
39
1920 and 1941 respectively.
The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this.
One of the most important purposes of society and government
is the discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general
concern. This is possible only through absolutely unlimited
discussion. . . .^0
For Chafee, however, freedom of speech was not a romantic, wholly rela-
tive method whereby the truth would emerge unaided by the application of
intelligence: "The tolerance I propose involves no mushy latitudinar-
ianism. Willingness to hear all views does not mean that we should,
after hearing them, treat them all as of equal value. Chafee was
also well aware of the obstacles to the "automatic emergence of truth
from the contest" presented by inequalities of power, prejudice, and a
multiplicity of issues and arguments. He might have been thinking
of
I
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Milton when he allowed that the great writers had misled us somewhat by
encouraging us to expect the truth to emerge too easily from discussion.
Chafee, however, follows fundamentally in the same liberal tradition by
his staunch advocacy of the method of freedom of discussion, though
imperfect and slow, as the best means available to discover and dissem-
inate worthwhile ideas,
Zechariah Chafee was one of the first judicial scholars to argue
that the provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the guarantee of
freedom of speech could not be absolute. He urged that one must look
to history, to social purposes, and to the human facts behind the rules
of law in order to balance this preferred right with other important
yf
values. In other words, one must look to the context.
[T]here are other purposes of government, such as order, the
training of the young, protection against external aggression.
Unlimited discussion sometimes interferes with these purposes,
which must then be balanced against freedom of speech, but
freedom of speech ought to weigh very heavily in the scale.
Along with Ernst Freund, Chafee felt that the limit of free speech was
45
at that ’’point where words will give rise to unlawful acts.” As
Freund put it in 1904: ’’Freedom of speech finds, however, its limit
45
in incitement to crime and violence.” This limitation is similar to
the governmental self-preservation condition proposed by Bagehot. And
although the scholars have suggested some possible limitations on free-
dom of discussion, the troubling question of just how to accomplish this
process of balancing while preserving intellectual freedom remains.
The purposes of freedom of speech which have been surveyed up to
this point have been very largely instrumental in nature—the primary
purpose being to discover truth and to promote social progress. There
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are, however, additional English and American antecedents which show a
concern for intellectual freedom as an affirmation of personal human
dignity. In addition to his belief that "the greatest liberty of
discussion" leads to social betterment, Robert Hall, an English divine,
wrote in 1845:
Freedom of thought being intimately connected with the happi-
ness and dignity of man in every stage of his being, is of so
much more importance than the preservation of any Constitution,
that to infringe the former under pretense of supporting the
latter, is to sacrifice the means to the end. 47
The American naturalist and writer, Henry David Thoreau, asks for free-
dom of thought and personal integrity above all else: "Must the citizen
even for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the
48legislator?" For Thoreau personhood precedes citizenship and a sense
of justice precedes respect for law. Chafee, in addition to expressing
the social interest of free speech as the attainment of truth, also
realized that there was an important individual interest in "the need
of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life
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is to be worth living. ..." More recently, the philosopher Sidney
Hook, in the context of asserting that some rights are more important
than others, says that the "right to pursue the truth has a prima facie
validity because of its inherent qualities of delight and dignity as
well as its beneficial consequences. . . And Laurence Tribe, the
preeminent contemporary constitutional law scholar asks whether freedom
of speech is to be regarded as a means to an end only or also as an
"end in itself, an expression of the sort of society we wish to become
and the sort of persons we wish to be."^^
There is a growing realization and reaffirmation of an idea that is
20
not new but whose antecedents can be seen in the thinking of Socrates,
Milton, Mill, and beyond— intellectual freedom is valued both for its
political and social importance as well as for the role it plays in
individual development and delight. It is valued as a means to the
discovery of truth and to effective self-government, and as an affirm-
ation of the value of human dignity and personality— it is valued
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because ’’the unexamined life is not worth living.”
CHAPTER II
FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AMERICAN EDUCATION, AND THE COURTS
It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate.
Justice Abe Fortas
Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)
Introduction
Since freedom of speech is regarded as significant both to the
development of intellectually and emotionally capable individuals and
to the development of a democratically constructed society, to say there
is an intimate connection between intellectual freedom and education may
easily be regarded as a truism. Before looking at the specific imple-
mentation of the principle of free speech in the public school setting
as exemplified by the landmark decision in Tinker
,
the connection
between the principle of intellectual freedom on the one hand and educa-
tion and schooling on the other will be briefly reviewed.
I have chosen to draw liberally on the writings of John Dewey who,
apart from having had perhaps the greatest influence on educational
practice in this century, is widely considered to have been America's
foremost philosopher and educational theorist. I have chosen to use
Dewey's writings for two reasons. Dewey believed in the fundamental
importance of intellectual freedom as a means and as an end; and he
believed fundamentally in the power of human intelligence to resolve the
complex personal and social problems that have beset modem societies
such as our own. In fact Dewey considered individual liberty and the
21
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use of intelligence to be the best elements of the liberal tradition.
If we strip its creed from adventitious elements, there are, how-
ever, enduring values for which earlier liberalism stood. These
values are liberty; the development of the inherent capabilities
of individuals made possible through liberty, and the central
role of free intelligence in inquiry, discussion and
expression.
1
Dewey echoes what for many is the heart of the liberal tradition—
an: abiding respect for individual human dignity, what one modem legal
philosopher has called the individual's right to "equal concern and
2
respect," and a belief in the possibility of the full development of
individual capacities through intelligent and free inquiry. The defini-
tion and elaboration of these values and their connection to education
will begin with a consideration of the nature of freedom in a general
sense.
The Relationship of Intellectual Freedom and Education
John Dewey has pointed out that true freedom consists in more than
the elimination of constraints— it is more than the negative freedom of
the old liberalism. For Dewey the essential problem of freedom was to
relate individual choice to effective action. He was not so naive as
to think that choice was meaningful without an ability to effect mater-
ial change. And choice could accomplish an increase in effective action
only to the extent that it was intelligent.
There is an intrinsic connection between choice as freedom
and power of action as freedom. A choice which intelligently
manifests individuality enlarges the range of action, and
this enlargement, in turn confers upon our desires peater
insight and foresight, and makes choice more intelligent.
There is a circle, but an enlarging circle, or, if you please
a widening spiral.
3
To the extent that choice is informed by intelligence, it makes for
I
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"better choice" and "better doing" on successive occasions.
Dewey was very critical of both the orthodox theory of free will
and the classic theory of liberalism for conceiving of freedom as some-
thing antecedently given. For Dewey, freedom was a possibility—
a
potentiality to be realized through intelligent action. As Dewey puts
it:
Our idea compels us. . .to seek for freedom in something
which comes to be, in a certain kind of growth; in consequence,
rather than in antecedents. We are free not because of what we
statistically are, but in as far as we are becoming different
from what we have been.^
The potentiality of freedom can be realized through the medium of
freedom of thought or intellectual freedom which, although not a suffic-
ient condition, was for Dewey "the very heart of actual freedom."^ But
freedom of thought is not separable from freedom of speech and writing.
Nor is the idealistic notion that freedom of thought could exist, even
theoretically, without free speech a reasonable one. Dewey explains the
connection between speech and thought and how thought develops through
interaction:
It has often been assumed that freedom of speech, oral and
written, is independent of freedom of thought, and that you
cannot take the latter away in any case, since it goes on
inside of minds where it cannot be got at. No idea could
be more mistaken. Expression of ideas in communication is
one of the indispensable conditions of the awakening of
thought not only in others, but in ourselves. If ideas
when aroused cannot be communicated they either fade away
or become warped and morbid. The open air of public dis-
cussion and communication is an indispensable condition of
the birth of ideas and knowledge and of other growth into
health and vigor.
6
As the term "intellectual freedom" is used in this paper (sometimes
interchanged with freedom of speech broadly considered) , it is meant to
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be understood as an active process which includes the ideas of freedom
of discussion, writing, and thought. It includes the possibility of
manifesting the results of these activities in intelligent choice,
observing the consequences, and choosing better the next time. Intel-
lectual activity which is free does not simply emerge with the removal
of restraints. It is an active accumulation of power to act in accord
with reasoned choice. And it is facilitated by material conditions
which encourage this freedom.
John Dewey, among many others, was well aware of the importance of
social institutions in promoting or hindering the development of free-
dom, and felt that the most important problem of freedom was whether
social conditions effectively promoted the development of judgment and
insight. As far as public schools were concerned, Dewey said that "even
our deliberative education, our schools, are conducted so as to indoc-
trinate certain beliefs rather than to promote habits of thought."^
Since for Dewey the possibility of freedom has to be actualized through
interaction with material conditions, he says that the "question of
political and economic freedom is not an addendum or afterthought" but
vitally necessary to personal freedom. He felt that this was also the
case with other social conditions and institutions, especially education-
al ones.
A genuine energetic interest in the cause of human freedom
will manifest itself in a jealous and unremitting care for
the influence of social institutions upon the attitudes of
curiosity, inquiry, weighing and testing of evidence. I
shall begin to believe that we care more for freedom than we
do for imposing our own beliefs upon others in order to
subject them to our will, when I see that the main purpose
of our schools and other institutions is to develop powers
^
of unremitting and discriminating observation and judgment.
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It is important to note here that Dewey often draws a distinction
between education and schooling that will be generally accepted through-
out this paper. Education is much broader than schooling, aiding the
process of cultural transmission and reconstruction in many informal
ways. Formal education or schooling, on the other hand, is always a
purposive and hence moral undertaking. Dewey considered schooling
necessary to aid cultural transmission and reconstruction in complex
societies, but felt that its power was relatively small when compared
to informal methods of education. As far as intellectual freedom is
concerned, the position taken here is that it is equally necessary to
education considered in this informal sense as it is to the more formal
enterprise of schooling. For most purposes, therefore, no distinction
will be made between schooling and education. When it is made, the
reason will be clear from the context.
At this point it is appropriate to turn from the nature of freedom
in general and intellectual freedom in particular to the connections
that can be drawn between them and the avowed purposes of education,
both formal and informal, in the United States. It will be assumed that
intellectual freedom, following Dewey's analysis, is understood as free-
dom of thought, speech, writing, and action that enables individual growth
and social evolution or betterment. If the purposes of schooling are
consonant with this process, then at least one connection will have
been made.
It easily could be argued that a major goal of public schooling
(whether accomplished or not), as well as the primary justification for
compulsory education in our society, is that it prepare students for
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intelligent participation in a democratic society. This is reflected in
the language of leading Supreme Court cases where the purposes and
values of education are discussed. In Brown v. Board of Education
.
for example, the Court stresses the importance of education and gives
some ideas as to the avowed purpose and justification of education.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both demon-
strate our recognition of the importance of education to
our democratic society. It is required in the performance
of our most basic public responsibilities. ... It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. 11
Education is important to oiir society because to maintain freedom
and independence, it is thought that individuals need to be educated for
intelligent and independent participation in community life. This idea
is elaborated in a relatively recent Supreme Court case, Wisconsin v.
Yoder .
[A]s Thomas Jefferson pointed our early in our history,. . .
some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to
participate effectively and intelligently in our open political
system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. Further,
education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-
sufficient participants in society. 12
And in order to accomplish this goal of open, active, intelligent citizen
participation in political and social life, constitutional freedoms for
the individual student and teacher must be protected. Thus, education
for citizenship is accomplished, in part at least, through practice.
The Court in Board of Education v. Barnette discusses the importance of
protecting student rights.
That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason
for scrupulous protection of constitutional freedoms ^ for
the individual , if we are not to strangle the free mind at
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its source and teach youth to discount important principles
of our government as mere platitudes.
Education for citizenship is stressed in these decisions primarily
because the state has the right to act for the general welfare and not
merely for the welfare of an individual. But, although education for
social participation is emphasized, it is nevertheless implicit that
individual development is a necessary concommitant . The argument made
in this paper is that individual growth and social evolution are insep-
arable and proceed together. As Dewey has said:
Social cannot be opposed in fact or in idea to individual .
Society is individuals-in-their-relations. An individual
apart from social relations is a myth—or a monstrosity.
If we deal with actual individuals, and not with a con-
ceptual abstraction, our position can be also formulated
in these terms: Education is the process of realization
of integrated individualities. For integration can occur
only in and through a medium of association.^^
It is at this point that Dewey's thinking is again relevant for the fur-
ther elaboration of the nature of education and for its connection to
intellectual freedom.
Dewey believed that education was a necessity of life. It provi-
des for social and individual adaptation to the world as well as for
control and adaptation of the environment to meet human needs. Dewey
felt that education had no end beyond itself. "Since in reality there
is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there is noth-
ing to which education is subordinate save more education."
Dewey says
that the "educational process is one of continual reorganizing,
recon-
struction, transfiguring."^* His technical definition of
education is
an elaboration of this theme. "[Education] is that
reconstruction or
reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning
of experience.
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and which increases the ability to direct the course of subsequent exper-
ience." Although it may seem that Dewey conceives of education and
growth here in formal terms
,
their moral nature--the requirement of
betterment, progress, and ever-greater human meaning—can be seen in the
entirety of Dewey's educational philosophy.^® Dewey makes clear that a
society which values betterment—change that will improve social and in-
dividual life—will have different purposes, materials, and methods of
education than a society which strives to maintain the status quo.
Deliberate, purposive education is especially necessary to democra-
tic comumnities
,
according to Dewey, precisely because they are inter-
ested in intelligently directed growth. Dewey said that "[i]f we are
willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dis-
positions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellowmen, phi-
19losophy may even be defined as the general theory of education." The
office of philosophy, of education, and of democracy as a way of life
is continual reconstruction and renewal.
Openness and intellectual exchange are necessary to renewal. Ac-
cording to Dewey, language and communication are particularly impor-
tant in this process because they effectuate a sense of community and
allow, in turn, for individual growth. "To be a recipient of a com-
munication is to have an enlarged and changed experience. . . . Nor is
20
the one who communicates left unaffected." This process of renewal is
both individual and social, and freedom of communication is an end and
a means in turn. As Dewey says, "A progressive society counts indiv-
idual variations as precious since it finds in them the means of its own
growth. Hence a democratic society must, in consistency with its ideal.
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allow for intellectual freedom.
.
. in a society professing demo-
cratic values, freedom of intelligence is not only a vital means in the
project of deliberative education but an end in itself and a moral im-
perative, As Dewey concludes: ’’The only freedom that is of enduring
importance is freedom of intelligence. ..." In the section which
follows the contemporary Supreme Court case which serves as the water-
shed for intellectual freedom in public schools will be considered.
The Case of Tinker v. Des Moines
It was not until 1969, in the case of Tinker v. Des Moines Indepen-
dent Community School District
,
that the Supreme Court of the United
States declared that students are persons and that both students and
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teachers retain their constitutional rights while in school. It was
a few years earlier, in 1965, that John Tinker and several other students
were suspended for peacefully and symbolically protesting the war in
Vietnam by wearing black armbands to school. Almost fifteen years
later, John Tinker recalled how he had felt about the issue of students'
constitutional rights in the mid-1960's. "I didn't realize before we
wore the armbands that it wasn't established that we were citizens and
would have all the constitutional freedoms. ..." The freedoms that
John Tinker had taken for granted certainly and most fundamentally incl-
uded the full range of First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, writ-
ing, and association. In fact, the Tinker case affirmed the right to
engage in symbolic acts for communicative purposes—the right to free
symbolic speech, sometimes thought to have been a less protected form
of speech than so-called pure speech. And while the Tinker case did
not
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develop in a vacuum, it was a particularly forceful assertion of rights
that may indicate a new approach to thinking about the rights of young
people in general and about the purposes and methods of pre-collegiate
education. A bit of historical background will help to place the Tinker
case in perspective.
It was not uncommon in the early part of the century to think of
children as mere creatures of the state or as simple possessions of
their parents. This was the result of a trend which began three centur-
ies earlier and which has had an influence that is still evident. Al-
though today we live in a world where the notion of a long childhood is
commonly accepted, the concept of childhood probably did not come into
being for western societies until the seventeenth century. Before that
time there was a short period of infancy after which the child entered
directly into the affairs of the adult world. In the seventeenth cen-
tury, religious orders began to teach parents to care for and protect
their children. The family took on a moral and spiritual function and
the modem concept of schooling began to develop. As the historian
Philippe Aries says, ’’Henceforth it was recognized that the child was
not ready for life, and that he had to be subjected to special treatment,
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a sort of quarantine, before he was allowed to join the adults."
In addition to whatever beneficial consequences the idea of child-
hood might have produced, it is perhaps this protective, paternalistic
notion that has contributed to the tendency, until recently, to dismiss
the rights of the child completely or to subsume the child’s rights under
those of the parent or the state. Whether for humanitarian motives or
for socio-economic reasons, the notion of the child’s incapacity,
J
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inadequacy, and dependency has been the rule rather than the exception
throughout most of the twentieth century. And in addition to dependency,
there is the additional notion that the child is duty-bound to the
parent. Blackstone wrote that ”[t]he duties of children to their parents
arise from a principle of natural justice and retribution. For to those,
who gave us existence, we naturally owe subjection and obedience during
our minority, and honor and reverence ever after. . .
These twin notions of dependency and duty led to the development of
a legal philosophy which places great emphasis on parental and state
power vis-a-vis the child. This power is reflected in a much quoted
nineteenth century Pennsylvania case: ’’The basic right of a juvenile is
not to liberty but to custody. He has the right to have someone take
care of him, and if his parents do not afford him this custodial privi-
27lege, the law must do so,” The idea that the state must step in if
the parents do not protect the child is an early American reiteration of
the idea of parens patriae
,
which developed in the English common law
and was applied to children in the case of Eyre v. Countess of Shafts -
bury . The case analogized the dependency of children to that of luna-
tics, saying that the king had a duty to protect both.
Although it is certainly true that children do need variable , amounts
of care and guidance depending upon their level of development and matur-
ity, until very recently it has been thought that the legal rights of
children have been severely limited or non-existent as a consequence.
Even in 1972, Justice Douglas had to disagree with a majority opinion of
the Supreme Court which held that the only interests at stake in a lead-
ing case concerning students were those of the state and the parents.
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In considering whether the state could compel the high school attendance
of Amish children against the wishes of their parents, Douglas says:
"Where the child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting
desires, it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such
an imposition without canvassing his views. That this expression of
entitlement for children was confined to a dissenting opinion is one
indication of why the earlier Tinker case can be considered a watershed
not only for pre-col legiate intellectual freedom, but for the rights of
children in general. But even in Tinker the vindication was not com-
plete. Justice Black, in a devestatingly sarcastic dissent, envisions
students all over the land exercising their newly won freedom by
"running loose, conducting break-ins, lie-ins, and smash-ins.
The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is yet
abandoned as worthless or out of date, was that children had
not yet reached the point of experience and wisdom which
enabled them to teach all of their elders. It may be that
the Nation has outworn the old-fashioned slogan that "children
are to be seen not heard," but one may, I hope, be permitted
to harbor the thought that taxpayers send children to school
on the premise that at their age they need to learn, not
teach.
From this passage, it can be inferred that Justice Black's educational
philosophy is relatively traditional. As the Tinker case is examined
in more detail it will become increasingly clear why Justice Black,
whose constitutional philosophy often had the effect of expanding the
protection of civil liberties, appears here in a dissenting role.
The actions of John Tinker, fifteen years old, his sister Mary Beth,
thirteen, Chris Eckhardt, sixteen, and other students took place against
a background of war and in the middle of a decade that is noted for its
social turbulence. President John Kennedy had been assassinated, the
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civil rights movement was well underway, and the nation was deeply in-
volved in the increasingly unpopular, many said immoral, war in Vietnam.
According to John Tinker, the idea of wearing armbands occurred to a
small group of people from the Des Moines area who were returning from
an antiwar rally in Washington in November of 1965.
On the way back on the bus there was a discussion of what
we could do to express our concern with the war in Vietnam. It
was agreed that we should write our senators and congressmen.
We also decided to hold meetings at churches, bring in informed
speakers, and provide literature so that people could find
information otherwise not easily available. It was also
suggested that we could wear black armbands as a constant public
statement that we were against the killing in Vietnam. 32
When school principals in Des Moines heard about the intentions of
some students to wear armbands to school, they met and adopted a rule
against such actions. According to John Tinker, it was his father, a
Methodist minister who worked for the American Friends Service Committee,
who felt that any move to defy the authority of school officials should
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be a "most considered action.” Perhaps because of his father's in-
fluence John Tinker was not among the first group of students to be
suspended—he was waiting to discuss the new rule with school officials.
It was only when school authorities refused to talk with him about the
situation that John felt justified in wearing his armband in contraven-
tion of the rule. He, too, was suspended.
It was not long after John Tinker’s suspension that the Iowa Civil
Liberties Union became interested in the issues involved and filed suit
alleging that the students' right to freedom of speech had been violated.
The United States District Court upheld the suspensions, echoing a
phil-
osophy of education and an attitude toward children that is
protective
and paternalistic. It is also a philosophy that values order above
the free speech rights of children.
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School officials must be given a wide discretion and if,
under the circumstances, a disturbance in school discipline
is reasonably to be anticipated, actions which are reasonably
calculated to prevent such a disruption must be upheld by the
court. 34
Although the District Court recognized that the wearing of armbands for
expressive purposes is the type of symbolic act that is protected by
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, it expressly declined
to follow the reasoning of a case decided in the same year by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In that case, Burnside
V. Byars
,
high school students were permitted to wear "freedom buttons"
unless evidence showed that the action would "materially and substanti-
ally interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.
Following initial defeat, the Tinker case was appealed. The lower
court decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for
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the Eighth Circuit. More than three years after the original student
suspensions, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decisions of
the district and appeals courts in the Tinker case. The Supreme Court
chose to use the words of the Burnside case in' protecting student speech.
It held that imless evidence is presented that the speech would material-
ly and substantially interfere with ordinary school functions or with
the rights of others, it must be protected.
The mode of constitutional analysis that produced the Tinker decis-
ion is generally referred to as balancing. It involves weighing or bal-
ancing the rights of the plaintiff in situations where various rights
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have come into conflict. This mode of analysis varies greatly from a
very permissive, non-structured, ad hoc approach, where no particular
rights or values are presumptively preferred, to balancing within a
particular framework or with certain explicit guidelines. It has been
said in many cases that freedom of speech occupies a preferred position
among other rights and values because of its importance for the contin-
uation of a democratic system. But even though freedom of speech may
be preferred in a general sense, this does not mean that other important
rights and values, such as the right to privacy, for example, might not
override the right of a particular person to express his opinions in a
given situation or context.
Balancing the values of free speech with other important values can
also occur with the aid of tools which help to implement the values in a
more orderly fashion. The tool which has had the longest history of
continuous use in resolving issues of freedom of speech, especially in
situations where public order or national security are threatened, is
the clear and present danger test, introduced in 1919 by Justice Oliver
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Wendell Holmes. The understanding of what is necessary to prove a
clear and present danger sufficient to prohibit or prevent speech has
evolved over a period of fifty years to its present doctrinal synthesis.
In 1969, in the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio , the criminal conviction of
a Ku Klux Klan leader who had spoken at an organizers meeting was re-
versed. The Court said:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free ^eech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.
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The opinion of the Supreme Court makes it clear that one must look to
the words of advocacy to see if they are, in fact, couseling lawless
action. But, even if that be the case, a harmless inciter cannot
properly be convicted under this test. The contextual situation in
which the advocacy occurs must be examined to see if there is evidence
that the unlawful action is imminent.
In 1969, the year of the modem formulation of the clear and pres-
ent danger test, an analog to that test appeared in the Tinker case. As
the cases which have followed Tinker are examined, comparisons and con-
trasts will be made between the use of the clear and present danger test
and the material and substantial interference test. Does the material
and substantial interference requirement of Tinker protect the harmless
inciter? Will speech that does not threaten imminent and serious inter-
ference with school activities be protected? And can speech be prevented
if it poses a material and substantial interference even though the
speaker is in no way attempting to incite disorder? These questions and
others will be dealt with in the three chapters which follow, but before
leaving the Tinker decision, several important dicta which are necessary
to a more complete understanding of the case will be considered.
The first substantive point that the Supreme Court makes in the
Tinker case is that when the students wore black armbands in order to
publically express their views, they were engaging in the ’’type of
symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment.”'^® This makes the point that actions which are intended to com-
municate ideas are, as the Court put it, ’’closely akin to 'pure
speech'. They are therefore entitled to protection that, if not
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exactly the same, is at least nearly as comprehensive as the protection
afforded pure speech.
It has been very popular historically in free speech cases to try
to make the difficult, or perhaps impossible, distinction between speech
and action. This grew out of the absolutist (and literalist) mode of
constitutional interpretation that is generally thought of as an alter-
native to the balancing approach. Justice Black's name has been most
closely associated with this strict constructionist position that would
interpret the words and the meaning of the First Amendment literally.
Since the First Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law. . .
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. . . the words of the
amendment themselves account for Justice Black's famous assertion that
"no law means no law." He might have added that "speech means speech"
and not action. This position, if accepted, would not only abrogate
what are generally considered to be reasonable laws against defamation,
for example; but it would also prohibit the kind of expressive behavior
that occurred in the Tinker situation. Neither wearing armbands nor
picketing would be protected by the First Amendment free speech provi-
sion, according to Justice Black. "Marching back and forth, though ut-
ilized to communicate ideas, is not speech and therefore is not protect-
ed by the First Amendment." It is ironic that one of the greatest de-
fenders of civil liberties has been so inflexible in the application of
his absolutist philosophy that it is made to seem unduly conservative
instead of the progressive, protective tool that he undoubtedly desired.
It can be argued, based on the previous discussion, that the major-
ity opinion in the Tinker case is relatively progressive in at least two
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ways. First, while recognizing that the rights of many different people
were implicated in the particular situation, something more than a per-
missive, ad hoc balancing was employed to resolve the conflict of rights.
The material and substantial interference test was developed as a tool,
and speech was held to be entitled to comprehensive (one might even say
preferred) protection. The burden was placed on school officials to de-
monstrate not a reasonable need but a compelling need to justify the
prohibition of speech. Secondly, the absolute distinction between speech
and action was implicitly rejected. The lines which separate pure speech,
symbolic speech, speech plus (speech plus action), and action are extra-
ordinarily difficult to draw and perhaps not as useful or speech-
protective as had been assumed. The focus has now appropriately shifted
to the communicative impact of the speech and to the nature of the sur-
rounding circumstances.
In addition to the general type of constitutional analysis employed
in the Tinker case, several statements were made by the Court from which
a progressive general philosophy vis-4- vis education and constitutional
values can be inferred. The dictum that students and teachers do not
"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate" indicates a freedom-promoting educational philo-
sophy as well as reaffirming that all citizens, including students in
school, retain their constitutional rights despite the various roles they
A ^
may assume. And this is not merely stated, but stressed. Neither an
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" nor a "desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopu-
lar viewpoint" are sufficient to overcome the right to freedom of
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expression. The Court emphasized that students are "persons'* and that
they, too, possess "fundamental rights" which must be respected by school
and state officials. They may not be regarded as "closed-circuit recipi-
ents*’ of whatever the state decides to communicate but must be free to
®^r®ss their own opinions both inside and outside of the classroom.
Freedom of speech is an important right that must be cultivated and not
merely tolerated in principle.
On the other hand, the Court realized in its process of weighing
and balancing that students should not be allowed to exercise their
rights in a way that would substantially interfere either with the
rights of others or with normal school operations. It could be argued
that the Court was interested in school order and proper decorum per se
and not in the fact that a material and substantial interference would
burden the rights of other students. The entire focus of the opinion
seems to contradict this conclusion, however. From the Court's emphasis
on the importance of free speech, one might infer that order is necessary
becaiise it facilitates the purposes of education, one of which is intel-
lectual freedom. Justice Fortas, who wrote the majority opinion in
Tinker
,
uses a long quote from Justice Brennan’s opinion in Keyishian v .
Board of Regents to demonstrate the importance of free speech and educa-
tion to the discovery of truth and to the future of the nation.
"The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."
[citation omitted] The classroom is peculiarly the "market-
place of ideas." The Nation’s future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
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Which discovers truth “out of a multitude of tongues
,
[rather!
through any kind of authoritative selection. "^5
than
The Court stresses that the school is a ’’public place" a free,
open, non-authoritarian "marketplace of ideas." But there is no sugges-
tion that the Court conceives of school as a place for break-ins and
smash-ins, as Justice Black feared. It is a place where state and school
officials have "comprehensive authority" to act within constitutional
limits, i.e., to act consistently with the fundamental constitutional
rights of students and teachers. It is a place where freedom of speech
is comprehensively protected when applied with due consideration given
to the important purposes of education—one of which is the development
of intellectual freedom—and to the unique characteristics of the educa-
tional setting. The spirit of Tinker is not permissive, but it is pro-
gressive. It is not activist in the sense of greatly increasing the
evolutionary pace of constitutional analysis, but it is an important
reaffirmation of the basic commitment of our society to the dignity of
the individual and to the basic value of intellectual freedom. It does
not represent an ad hoc, valueless approach to constitutional adjudi-
cation but a relatively careful weighing of competing claims in a con-
text where important constitutional rights and educational purposes are
at stake. Given the modesty of the opinion, it is to be expected that
the progressive aspects of the Tinker decision will be found to be
thriving in the Tinker progeny from 1969-1979. The three chapters which
follow will examine cases which have arisen in this ten year period
which are directly relevant to the issue of intellectual freedom in
public schools.
CHAPTER III
THE STUDENT’S RIGHT TO SPEAK AND TO KNOW
The First Amendment involves not only the right to speak and
publish, but also the right to hear, to learn, to know. And
this Court has recognized that this right to know is "nowhere
more vital" than in our schools and universities.
Justice William 0. Douglas, dissenting
from the denial of certiorari in
Presidents Council v. Connnunity
School Board (1972)
Introduction
The previous chapter was largely devoted to an explication of why
First Amendment rights are important in public schools. Once educa-
tional institutions are recognized as a special marketplace of ideas, it
becomes necessary to take a closer look at how First Amendment rights are
"applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
ment," as the Tinker case adminishes they must be.
These special characteristics can be reduced to two propositions
—
one looking toward the school as a learning environment and the other
toward the student. The school has a unique purpose. Unlike the home,
a public library, or a park, its purpose is neither recreation nor re-
laxation but rather teaching and learning. The first proposition,
therefore, is that the school environment must be maintained so as to
promote teaching and learning. The second proposition derives from the
fact that the school has a unique clientele—students. Students are
most surely citizens, but at the elementary and secondary level they are
a captive audience, compelled by law to attend school. Students are
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also less mature than most adults physically, emotionally, and intel-
lectually, Thus, the second proposition is that the developmental
level of students must be considered in order to provide optimal educa-
tional opportunities.
Because of the avowed educational purpose of public schools and
because of the captive, immature clientele, the state in the person of
local school officials owes a duty to these students which demands
special knowledge and extraordinary powers of judgment. School offic-
ials must actively seek to promote a climate where freedom of expression,
learning, and growth can flourish; and yet they must discourage or pro-
hibit licentious speech and other behavior that interferes with the
educational purpose or with student constitutional rights. School
officials can neither be overly permissive nor can they unduly censor
or impede. Everyone who is active in public education, whether students,
teachers, school officials, or parents, must try to enhance the possibil-
ities for student growth and development in keeping with the unique pur-
pose of schooling. The state police power, which is used to provide for
the health, safety, and welfare of all people, can only be used legiti-
mately in the educational context to promote the emotional, social, and
intellectual growth of the students as individuals and as citizens.
This chapter is concerned with situations where students, and others
on their behalf, have asserted the right to speak and not to speak, to
know and not to know in the post-Tinker period. Cases where speech is
not protected because it is intertwined with disruptive action will be
contrasted with cases where speech is protected. The right to know will
be examined with regard to access to books, outside speakers, and
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specialized courses. The right not to speak will be illustrated pri-
marily by the flag salute cases. And finally, the right not to know or
to privacy will be illustrated by cases which have sought to protect
the emotional development of students. The purpose will be to see if
these rights have been protected and how they are accommodated to other
rights and interests.
Student Speech: Protected and Not Protected
The Supreme Court, in the Tinker case, affirmed that students re-
tain their constitutional rights while in school, but it also held that
these rights cannot be absolute in school any more than they can be ab-
solute in the public forum and that expressive conduct will not be pro-
tected in school situations where because of time, place, or type of
behavior the conduct ’’materially disrupts classwork or involves sub-
stantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."^ Even conduct
which is clearly expressive but which is intertwined with materially
disruptive conduct will not be protected. Thus where black berets were
"used by the plaintiffs as a symbol of their power to disrupt the con-
duct of the school,” and where the plaintiffs had walked in the school
halls shouting ’’Qiicano power” and had blocked hallways, the students
2
were held properly suspended for their disruptive conduct. The Tinker
case was distinguished on the issue of material and substantial inter-
ference. Another case where Tinker has been distinguished on this issue
involved a walkout where students left campus and attempted to persuade
others to join them when a grievance had not been successfully resolved.
The court held that students did not have the right to assemble at just
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any time and place.
Although shouting, blocking hallways, and walkouts will not often
be protected in a place devoted to teaching and learning, what is lack-
ing in these cases and in some of the ones which follow is an explicit
finding that this behavior has created a material interference. The
issue of degree should always be considered--even in the most obvious
cases. What is required by Tinker is a material interference, not just
any interference or disruption. The definition of what constitutes a
material interference will be developed from a consideration of the
cases
.
At times, criminal penalties have been imposed on students who have
engaged in non-protected conduct in violation of legitimate, official
directives. In one case where students refused either to go to class or
leave the school grounds after a three hour protest demonstration, the
4
students were held properly convicted of unlawful trespass. This case
illustrates the type of conduct which, although intended to express the
message of student displeasure with eight previous student suspensions,
is not protected by the First Amendment. The students cheered, shouted,
and sang; successfully urged others who were in classes to join them;
and raided the school cafeteria removing chairs and a desk to the pro-
test site. As the demonstration got noisier it became difficult or im-
possible for teachers who were engaged in classes to be heard. In this
case a finding was made that the protest demonstration was "unduly dis-
ruptive" of the educational process.
In another criminal case, five high school students were convicted
of disorderly conduct for their actions in attempting to organize a
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student walk-out. Although here the conduct involved only five stu-
dents and in the prior case it involved twenty- five to thirty, and the
only misconduct mentioned was singing and shouting on the playing field
which caused some students to come to the windows, the court held that
the Tinker case was not applicable because the issue was physical dis-
order and not speech. The court here seems confident that it can dis-
tinguish speech from action. The more speech-protective approach would
be to first recognize that much action is intended and perceived as
expression, and then to determine whether or not it is protected speech
by applying the appropriate test. It might be argued that this approach
is especially necessary when criminal penalties are likely to be imposed
rather than in-school remedies.
Other ways that speech which is arguably protectable is being dealt
with by the courts are illustrated by the following cases. One Federal
District Court held that a school regulation requiring an automatic sus-
pension for engaging in boycotts, sit-ins, stand-ins, and walkouts was
overbroad because it was not limited to those activities which created a
6
substantial interference rather than a mere distraction. However, the
case was reversed on appeal, the implication being that all sit-ins,
7
etc., are per se not protected by the First Amendment. This same re-
sult can be reached by applying school rules which prohibit "willful
disobedience," "intentional disruption," and "immoral or vicious prac-
g
tices," to uphold punishment of students for walkouts and boycotts.
The court can merely apply a gloss that such rules are intended to
regulate behavior which is not expressive and therefore avoid address-
ing the issue of whether or not such regulations are so vague as to
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Protected First Amendment sneech activities.
By presenting the above illustrations, I do not mean to suggest
that such expressive behavior in public schools should necessarily go
unregulated. What I do believe, however, is that when such cases are
critically examined it can be seen that illusory speech/action distinc-
tions are being maintained in derrogation of possibly protected First
Amendment speech activity and that the degree of disruption necessary
to lawfully prohibit expressive conduct in schools is often assumed
rather than specifically found as judicial fact. The cases which
follow, in contrast to the previous ones, are more speech-protective.
They concern student speech which has been protected by the courts and
some of the methods that have been employed to effectuate that protection.
It is interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit, which includes
Texas and most of the southern states, has, at times, been a leader in
protecting the free speech rights of students in public schools.
Burnside v. Byars
,
from which the material and substantial interference
9
test of Tinker was taken, is a Fifth Circuit case; and the two cases
which follow originated in Texas. Butts v. Dallas Independent School
District arises out of incidents surrounding the Vietnam moratorium of
October 15, 1969, which the court said "may end up as a footnote to
history but. . . was tremendous in anticipation."^^ Shortly after
students in the Dallas district decided to wear black armbands to pro-
test the war. Dr. Estes, the district Superintendent of Schools, de-
cided that such action would be disiuptive. Pursuant to a policy, im-
provised for the occasion, students were prohibited from wearing arm-
bands in school on the appointed day as well as thereafter. Relying
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heavily on Tinker, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted an in-
jtmction in favor of the students. The court said that ’’even in the
school environment.
. . something more is required to establish [a]
disruption than the ex cathedra pronouncement of the superintendent.
.
.
.
[T]here must be some inquiry, and establishment of substantial
fact, to buttress the determination.'*^^ Even though the school offic-
ials rightly concluded that there would be disruption on October 15th,
according to the court they needed to show evidence that the black
armbands would be the cause and that to prohibit them would eliminate
or meliorate the disruption. The court added that even when school
officials are confronted with the possibility of disruptive activity,
"the Supreme Court has declared a constitutional right which school
authorities must nurture and protect, not extinguish, unless they find
12
the circumstances allow them no practical alternative."
This case represents anything but the old deferential approach to
decisions made by school administrators. It is more consonant with the
recognition that students have important constitutional rights which,
perhaps because they are a captive audience, school officials have a
special duty to ’’nurture and protect." Speech can be suppressed,
according to this case, only when there is a reasonable apprehension
of a material disruption based on fact, and there is no practical alter-
native to the suppression.
The other Texas case concerns five Mexican-American students who
sought an injunction against a school rule prohibiting "apparel decor-
ation that is disruptive, distracting, or provocative" which was
prom-
ulgated one day after the plaintiffs first wore brown armbands
to
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school. The students intended to express their support for the criti-
cisms of certain educational policies and practices that had been put
forth by a community group called ’’Concerned Mexican American Parents.”
Citing the Tinker case as controlling, the court issued an injunction
saying: ’’There has been no showing that the wearing of the armbands. . .
would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline or be disruptive of normal educcational func-
14
tions.” And this result was reached despite the fact that there had
been isolated incidents of unrest and apprehension, including one in-
stance of several girls trying to force another girl to wear an armband
and one instance where a father kept his children out of school because
he was afraid there might be trouble. The court also rejected the opin-
ion of school officials that wearing armbands in violation of school
policy was a disruption per se.
A case which illustrates another way that courts have protected stu-
dent expression involves students who were suspended for picketing and
using loudspeakers outside school. There was a school rule which pro-
hibited participation in pickets on school grounds ”if they affect the
institutional order,” and using loud speakers outside school ”if the
institutional order is affected.” Although these particular students
might have been properly punished if the rule were constitutionally
drawn, in order to prevent a chilling effect on the speech of others,
the court held the rule void on its face for vagueness and overbreadth.
The rule is vague because the meaning of ’’affect the institutional
order”
is unclear. People of ordinary intelligence would have to guess
at its
meaning. And it is overbroad because time, place, and manner
of pickets
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and loudspeakers can only be regulated according to the special needs of
an educational institution. A total ban would overreach constitutional
limitations by taking in protected speech, i.e., speech which did not
create a material and substantial interference with school discipline.
The overbreadth issue in this case was decided by reference to the
standards announced in Tinker .
The Tinker case has also been used as precedent on both sides of
the issue in cases which arise when a racial majority asserts its
right to freedom of expression in a way that is personally offensive to
a minority group. In cases of this type freedom of speech of the major-
ity has been protected unless it violates the Tinker disruption limita-
tion or unless it is exercised by a state authority in such a way as to
violate the rights of others to equal protection of the laws. In an in-
tegrated Florida school where eight per cent of the students were black,
a Federal Dsstrict Court enjoined both the officially sanctioned and the
private use of symbols of the Confederacy.^^ The court found that these
symbols, which included the Confederate Flag for example, were a "signi-
ficant contributing cause" of violence, disruption, and continued racial
tension which impeded the development of a unitary system. Since the
school officials were under a desegregation order they could be enjoined
from using these symbols in order to foster a unitary system. White
students who asserted their personal First Amendment right to continue
to use the symbols were enjoined based on the Tinker test of a material
and substantial interference with school discipline. Some students had
used the symbols provocatively and there had been four massive inter-
racial confrontations at the school.
I
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Two years later when school officials and some white students used the
liiiker case as precedent to appeal for relief from the permanent injunc-
tion, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to see if the injunction was
still necessary in view of the free speech rights of the majority of
students. While the Tinker test had been used to support prohibition
prohibition of speech in the past, based on a material interference; it
was now being used to support the majority's claim to freedom of expres-
sion-even if that expression was distasteful to others. The issues
involved in these cases are especially difficult. Two rights of funda-
mental importance come into potential conflict—the majority's right to
freedom of speech and the minority's right to equal protection of the
laws or perhaps to the right not to hear.
In Banks v. Muncie Community Schools
,
a Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals took a relatively wooden approach to this problem. Although
the lower court had recommended the elimination of symbols which were
personally offensive to a significant number of students, the appeals
court held that the use of the term "Rebels" for a school name, South-
ern Aires" for the glee club, and "Southern Belle" for the homecoming
queen were protected by the First Amendment. These symbols had been
adopted by student vote several years earlier. While it is probably
true that the black students' right of free speech was not violated, as
the court held; it is at least arguable that their right to equal pro-
tection was being violated even though there was no affirmative, offi-
cial, physical blocking of access to school facilities and programs.
The result in the Banks case might be explained by the fact that it
arose in an Indiana school system where there had been no court finding
SI
of a denial of equal protection. A Louisiana case can be profitably com-
pared. In Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Board
, plaintiffs, who were
minority students
,
moved for a modification of a desegregation order to
enjoin the use of the Confederate Flag and other indicia of racism. The
suit was motivated, in part, by the fact that the principal of Covington
High School displayed the battle flag in his office next to the American
flag and the flag of Louisiana. The court barred symbols of racism from
official use by the school board and its employees. Since these symbols
signified resistance to integration, their official use could be banned
in order to foster a unitary school system by ending official discrimina-
tion. At the same time, the court held that individual students could
use these symbols, presumably based on their right to freedom of expres-
sion.
The most troubling issue of relevance to free speech arises in the
first two of these school symbol cases, particularly in the Florica case
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on appeal. It would be hard to argue that individual students should
be denied the right to speak freely, even if offensively, absent a mater-
ial and substantial interference that could not be controlled in some
other way. But the suggestion by the Court of Appeals in the Florida
case that the students should be allowed to exercise their right to
freedom of expression by choosing racially inflammatory school symbols
for at least semi-official school use is difficult to understand. In
that case there had definitely been a material interference with school
discipline in the past— four massive interracial confrontations. But
even assuming that the threat of material physical disruption was no
longer an issue, it could be argued that these officially sanctioned
S2
symbols interfered with the rights of other students to equal education-
al opportunity in a material and substantial way. It is at least argua-
ble that judicial decisionmaking need not be so wooden that interference
with the social and emotional development of minority students who are
forced by law to attend school cannot be prohibited. The notion of a
material and substantial interference need only be expanded to include
more than mere physical violence, as has been done in several cases to
be considered later. The Tinker test would allow consideration of the
emotional and social needs of the students as well as their intellec-
tual and physical needs. These minority students may even have a First
Amendment speech right not to hear, an issue to be considered later.
The right to freedom of speech should not be lightly overcome.
Even the American Nazi Party and the Ku Klux Klan retain their right
to a type of speech which is extraordinarily offensive to many people.
The Tinker test provides a way to balance these competing rights, along
with the interest in a quality education, in a school setting where rel-
atively less mature individuals are required to attend for educational
purposes. In some of these school symbol cases the affirmative right to
speak may have to yield.
The following group of cases is representative of situations where
student free speech rights were not protected by the courts but where
they arguably should have been. In the first case the court simply
failed to see any First Amendment issue. In the next three cases the
reasonable forecast of a material and substantial interference is in-
ferred from a generalized tense situation in other places, from the
fact
of integration itself, or from the fact that the student body
consisted
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of students from military and non-military families. In the last three
eases the evidentiary facts as they are presented in the opinion appear
to be less than sufficient to support a conclusion of material and sub-
stantial interference as required by Tinker
, and the necessary degree
of disorder is generally not considered.
In a Pennsylvania case, a group of high school students wore arm-
bands to graduation reading "Humanize Education. Subsequent to
graduation school officials decided that letters would be written in-
forming the colleges to which plaintiffs had applied for admission that
they had worn armbands to commencement "even though they had been re-
quested not to wear any insignia which deviated from the formal gradu-
22
ation attire." The students sought an injunction against this action.
Although the court recognized that wearing armbands to express opinions
was protected by Tinker
,
it held that here there was no question of
official interference with freedom of speech because school officials
were merely conveying factual information to the colleges. Of course
college admission officials might recognize that the students had en-
gaged in expressive activity protected by the First Amendment, but these
students should not have been forced to wager their future education
that the uncooperative implication of the letter would be rejected. An
additional and perhaps more disconcerting effect of such a non-protect-
ive attitude is the chilling effect on the future speech of younger stu-
dents. The following case, in contrast to this one, shows school
officials making at least a good faith effort to protect the students’
right to freedom of expression.
In 1970, during a time when there had been strong public reaction
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to the involvement of troops in Cambodia and just after four Kent
State University students had been killed, the principal of a Pennsyl-
vania high school disallowed the wearing of armbands with "strike,"
rally." or "stop the killing" on them.^^ In an attempt to abide by
the Tinjcer decision, the principal did allow colored armbands to be
worn. Other armbands which "could have caused disruption of the edu-
cational processes in the senior high school" were prohibited because
of the tense and uneasy situation, and students who wore them were sus-
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pended. The degree of feared disruption was never mentioned by the
court, and no evidence was reported of disruption in the particular
school or in nearby schools. The court concluded, citing the Tinker
case:
The restriction was related to the potentially disruptive
situation at the school at the time. ... We feel that
the limited restrictions imposed upon the students were
reasonable and necessary. The refusal of a student to
obey the reasonable requests in this case was insubordinate
and unprotected activity. 25
This case is a good illustration of an unusually deferential atti-
tude toward the judgments of school administrators combined with a too
ready acceptance of what is arguably undifferentiated fear. The citation
of the Tinker case in support of the judge’s conclusion is enigmatic.
This action is precisely the type of "xmdifferentiated fear of apprehen-
sion of disturbance" which the Tinker court said was insufficient "to
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overcome the right to freedom of expression." Citing the Supreme
Court decision of Terminiello v. Chicago
,
the Tinker court says that we
must take the risk of trouble, fear argument, and disturbance in order
27
to protect freedom of expression.
S5
In a similar case a student was denied permission to distribute
literature and suspended for wearing a button reading "April 5 Chicago;
Gl-Civilian Anti-War Demonstration; Student Mobilization Committee.
The recently integrated school’s no-button rule was upheld in a patern-
alistic and protective opinion where the majority reads Tinker as imply-
ing that when a no-button rule is consistently enforced and where there
may be "potential racial collision," there is no need to justify contin-
uation of the rule based on a material and substantial interference.
There may, indeed, have been sufficiently good factual support for up-
holding the relatively repressive and absolute no-button rule in a case
where the school had recently become integrated. The problem is that
the court does not critically examine the evidence. The case has been
criticized by commentators for its uncritical assumption that the fact
of integration per se can be used to support a reasonable forecast of
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substantial interference.
Much can be learned about the process of judicial decisionmaking
and about underlying judicial motivations and philosophies in this case
by noting how students' rights are sardonically mocked:
We will not attempt extensive review of the many great
decisions which have forbidden abridgment of free speech.
We have been thrilled by their beautiful and impassioned
language. They are part of our American heritage. None
of these masterpieces, however, were composed or uttered to
support the wearing of buttons in high school classrooms.
The opinion continues by expressing doubt as to the propriety of pro-
tecting the "colorful use of free speech" of which Justice Douglas spoke
in Terminiello v. Chicago in school situations. Douglas had written
that one function of free speech was to induce unrest, to create
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dissatisfaction with the status quo, and to stir people to anger.
Again, this was precisely the case upon which the Tinker court relied
in demanding more than an undifferentiated fear to bar student speech.
It is worth remembering that here a student merely wore a button
announcing a demonstration, which prompted a few students to ask what
the button said. The case seems to illustrate the triumph of a rela-
tively authoritarian and repressive philosophy out of keeping with the
more progressive approach taken by the Supreme Court in the earlier
Tinker case.
In Hill V. Lewis
,
where a "tense” situation had developed, school
administrators ordered that all students with armbands be removed from
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classes. This action was precipitated by the fear of further polar-
ization of opinion in a school where 40% of the students were from mili-
tary families. The only disturbance reported in the opinion was the
disruption of one class which occurred, ironically, on the day that
school authorities summarily ordered all students with armbands barred
from classes. There had been no prior announcement of this decision and
there was no prior rule against the wearing of armbands. The court
upheld the action because the no-armband order extended to all armbands
and symbols equally and because the demographic situation allowed school
officials to base their action on something more than undifferentiated
fear of disturbance. This case again illustrates the erroneous assump-
tion that Tinker held total bans justifiable per se, and it also fails
to provide evidence that would show satisfaction of the Tinker disrup-
tion limitation.
It seems reasonable to conclude that something more than
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or apprehension of disturbance was meant to require
more than a conclusory opinion based on a generally tense situation, or
on the possibility of factional discord inferred from racial integration
or differing political views. If the fear was, in fact, legitimately
differentiated, these opinions do not provide the kind of information
that would be useful in allowing for such differentiation in the future.
The last three cases where student speech was not protected involve
somewhat different issues. In one case an eighth grade student was sus-
pended for the remainder of the term for wearing a pantsuit in violation
of the rule that girls could not wear "any type of trouser garment" and
for demonstrating against the dress code in violation of the policy
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against disruption. The court held that even if wearing a pantsiiit
was intended as communication it was not protected because it violated a
school rule. The court here seems to miss the point that if wearing
pantsuits is communication (as in this particular instance of passive
demonstration against the dress code it seems especially calculated to
be)
,
then the mere assertion that it violates a school rule is insuffi-
cient to say that it is not protected. Courts have generally ruled that
not just any rule that interferes with free speech directly or indirectly
is permissible. If it interferes directly it must be justified by some
compelling state interest; if indirectly, by some reasonable state
interest
.
An alternative explanation for the result in the pantsuit case
might be that the plaintiff's participation in a walkout demonstration
was sufficient in and of itself to legitimate the punishment. Although
there is some indication that the walkout did minimally interfere with
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the classwork of the participants, the court did not find a material
and substantial interference. It used the Tinker precedent only to the
effect that acts which interrupt the "pedagogical regime" or are "dis-
ruptive of the educational process" or are "calculated to undermine the
social routine" are not protected. Although it is very likely that
most such walkout demonstrations would indeed amount to a material and
substantial interference; it seems that perhaps here, for example, where
there was a limited and generally non-disruptive demonstration, the
spirit of Tinker would call for affirmative efforts to accommodate the
students' attempt to convey a message.
The same might be said of the next case where a high school student
who had distributed and carried signs was suspended when he refused to
give up a sign protesting the non-renewal of a teacher's contract.
The student asserted his free speech right to have the sign. The opin-
ion indicates that there had been some physical disruption—chanting,
pushing, and shoving. But this activity occurred only after Steven
Karp, the leader of the demonstration, had been suspended.
Here there seems to have been no effort to accommodate the stu-
dent's desire to indicate his displeasure with having lost a favorite
instructor. But while justificatory facts do not appear in the opinion,
the coiiTt at least makes a good faith effort to consider the principles
derived from the Tinker case. After noting the difficulty in applying
Tinker, the court says that there is no need to wait until actual dis-
ruption occurs. What is needed according to the court are "facts which
might reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial disrup-
tion."^^ The court realizes that the degree of disruption is relevant.
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but indicates that the level of disturbance required is lower in a
school situation than it might be in a public park, for example. That
seems to be a correct interpretation of the Tinker principle that
speech must be accommodated to the "special characteristics of the
school environment." The only thing missing in this opinion is a de-
tailed examination of the evidence upon which the forecast of a sub-
stantial disruption was made. Barring that, the reader cannot know if
such evidence was available or if the court simply accepted the judgment
of school administrators.
The last case in this group concerns a school rule that rallies not
38be permitted in the central quad. The rule was based upon the fact
that there had been four rallies in the last three years resulting in
"disgraceful episodes" which caused disruption and one recent rally
which had caused "disorder." It is not clear from the opinion how many
rallies there had been all together in the last three years. The court
held that where other "official" facilities for speaking were provided
and where previous unauthorized rallies had resulted in disorder, the
students need not be permitted to hold rallies in the central quad.
There are two possible problems with the court’s opinion, the first
being the familiar complaint that there was no finding of a reasonable
forecast of a material interference with appropriate discipline. The
court seems to conclude that mere disorder is sufficient. The second
problem is that if this is considered an indirect restraint on speech,
even neutral time, place, and manner restrictions must be reasonable.
It is at least arguable in this case that where discussion was limited
to "official" school clubs which met at a predetermined time, the
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limitation was not reasonable.
As a footnote to these student speech cases
,
a few cases regarding
student freedom of association might be considered to illustrate how
this implied First Amendment freedom interacts with and supports the
right to freedom of expression. In two of these cases the court held
school regulations unconstitutional because they did not limit their
regulation of associational activities to those activities that were
materially and substantially disruptive. The rules in these cases
prohibited recruiting members for political and religious groups and
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a prohibition of the formation of controversial groups. Associational
activities of students cannot be limited to coincide with the social or
political tastes of school officials, and controversial speech is no
less protected than other speech.
In another case illustrating these principles, the court held that
the denial of recognition to a club, with the consequent loss of bene-
fits including the right to distribute literature and to hang posters,
presented a constitutional issue as substantial as that presented in the
Tinker case.^® The denial was based upon the prohibition of groups which
express a partisan point of view—the group was to be called the "Redford
Student Mobilization Committee." Although this case illustrates the
proposition that school officials cannot prefer student organizations
which express favored views, the following case shows that the propo-
sition is more difficult to implement in situations where the
First
Amendment values of speech and religion come into conflict.
In a California case, a voluntary student Bible study
club which
wanted to "prayerfully" study the Bible was prohibited
from meeting on
1
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school groxmds during the school day in order to protect school officals
from the charge of an unconstitutional establishment of religion/^ As
the dissent points out, citing Tinker
,
there may bery well be no state
action involving establishment of religion when religious expression is
simply treated like other expression. The major problem might be the
possibility of unconstitutional state entanglement with religious act-
ivities. The ease with which the result was reached in this case can
perhaps be explained because of the undervaluing by the court of the
plaintiffs' right to freedom of expression and association and the fear
that merely allowing a student club to function would lead to the charge
of religious establishment. The issues are not easy to reconcile— all
First Amendment rights, whether concerning religion or speech, have been
held to be fundamental—but it is at least arguable that this case ill-
ustrates the judicial predilection to undervalue the importance of ex-
pressional rights when there is even a possibility that they might con-
flict with religious rights. By doing this, the court misses the oppor-
tunity to discuss the special importance of religious speech, and why it
might be necessary to assure absolute separation in order to prevent
state entanglement with religion. In the section which follows, the
student's right to know will be introduced through cases dealing with
access to library books.
1.
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The Library as a Marketplace of Ideas: The Student's Right to Know
When school board members remove books from public school libraries
because they disagree with the social or political views expressed there-
in, the question arises as to whether any constitutional right is in-
fringed. The cases considering this issue, which have arisen between
1972 and 1979, can be looked at in terms of whether they offer more or
less protection to speech. The leading case for the less protective
line of decisions is from the Federal Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit
,
Presidents Council Community School District y^. Community
43School Board
,
decided in 1972. This court holds that by removing
books from a high school library the "intrusion of the Board. . . upon
any first amendment constitutional right of any category of plaintiffs
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is not only not 'sharp* or 'direct,' it is miniscule." The case was
used as precedent and its reasoning closely followed by two cases from
Federal District Courts in the Second Circuit which are now on appeal.
These cases will also be considered.
The more speech protective branch of the library cases is typified
by the leading case of Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District ,
decided in 1976, by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals."*^ This was the
first case to declare that students have a First Amendment right to know,
and to view the library as instrumental in this endeavor. "A library is
a mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas. It is specially
dedicated to broad dissemination of ideas. It is a forum for silent
speech. The case has been followed by two influential cases from
Federal District Courts in the First Circuit.
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The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the precise issues that have
arisen in this line of cases, but if the Second Circuit continues to
view these cases as lacking an appreciable constitutional issue, the
problem might be considered by the Supreme Court. IVhen various circuits
are split on an issue of some importance, the Court will often agree to
resolve the conflict. A closer look at these cases will begin to show
their importance for intellectual freedom in the public schools.
The earliest case is Presidents Council
,
where the school board in
Queens, New York, acting on a parent complaint, removed Down These Mean
47Streets from all junior high school libraries. The book is a highly
acclaimed autobiography of a Puerto Rican youth growing up in East Har-
lem, which contains sexually explicit passages that were offensive to
some board members. When a conflict arose, the court held that because
the book could be loaned to parents and because discussion of the book
was not precluded, ’’there is. . .no problem of freedom of speech or the
expression of opinions on the part of parents , teachers , students or
librarians . Books do not acquire tenure on the shelf, and the shel-
ving and unshelving of books, according to the court, does not present a
constitutional issue.
The administration of any library, whether it be a uni-
versity or particularly a public junior high school, involves
a constant process of selection and winnowing based not only
on educational needs but financial and architectural realities.
To suggest that the shelving or unshelving of books presents
a constitutional issue, particularly where there is no showing
of a curtailment of freedom of speech or thought, is a propo-
sition we cannot accept.
The next Second Circuit case was Pico v_. Board of Education, which
also originated in New York.^° In that case nine books were
removed
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from junior and senior high school libraries because they were irrele-
vant, immoral, vulgar and in bad taste, according to the school board.
Concluding that it is the duty of the board to transmit primarily those
values which are consistent with the basic values of the local commun-
ity—the indoctrination or transmission theory of education—the court
held that no First Amendment issue was involved.
A little later in the same year, 1979, the case of Bicknell v.
Vergennes Union High School Board of Directors was decided in Vermont.
In this case the book The Wanderers
,
by Richard Price, was removed from
the high school library because it was considered "obscene and vulgar."
Dog Day Afternoon
,
by Patrick Mann, was removed to a special restricted
shelf. Although the court said that a "library is a vital institution
in the continuing American struggle to create a society rich in freedom
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and variety of thought," it dismissed the complaint as presenting only
an "intramural strife" where basic constitutional rights had not been
directly or sharply infringed.
Presidents Council and its progeny is in direct conflict with a
second group of school library cases and arguably with an important line
of First Amendment precedent left largely unconsidered by those cases.
In the Minarcini case, an Ohio school board ordered Cat * s Cradle by Kurt
Vonnegut, Jr. and Catch 22 by Joseph Heller removed from a high school
library. In this case, which was decided four years after Presidents
Council
,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that students have a
First Amendment right to know—a right to receive information and ideas,
Once having created a library, the school board does not have the
power
to censor its contents based only on the social and political
tastes of
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its members. The right to know imposes constitutional constraints on
the board’s discretion with regard to censorship. Removal of books
should be limited, according to the court, by fiscal restraints and
proper educational considerations, e.g., providing a balanced pres-
entation.
This case was followed by a District Court judge in Massachusetts
in what is perhaps the strongest expression of constitutional protection
against censorship in public school libraries. In Right to Read Defense
Committee v. School Committee
,
a book of poems by yoiong people called
Male and Female Under 18 was removed from a high school library because
board members felt that a poem it contained, "The City to a Young Girl,"
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was "filthy" and "offensive." The poem was written by a fifteen year
old Brooklyn girl, expressing her feelings about being subjected to the
lustful behavior of men while walking on New York City streets. The
first few lines will illustrate why the poem might have been contro-
versial.
The city is
One million homey lip-smacking men
Screaming for my body. 55
The court in this case did not read Presidents Council as requiring
that school boards have complete discretion in removing books from school
libraries. While Judge Tauro agreed that not every removal has consti-
tutional implications, he suggested that if the motivation of those who
remove is to censor because of their own social and political tastes,
the action implicates First Amendment values. The court did not
find
that the book Male and Female Under 18 was obsolete, irrelevant,
ob-
scene, or improperly selected in any way. There was also
no limitation
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of financial resources. Citing the Tinker case, the court said that to
justify removal of a book, there must be some "substantial and legiti-
mate government interest. Although the interest need not concern
school discipline, some important and comparable interest must be at
stake. Since there was no evidence that the book would have a harmful
effect on students, and no other reason was given for legitimate removal;
the court held that the censorship in this case violated the First
Amendment right of students and teachers to read and to "be exposed to
controversial thoughts and language.
Just as Right to Read Defense Committee relied heavily on the
leading Minarcini case, another case from the First Circuit relied on
both Minarcini and Right to Read . Where a New Hampshire school board
voted to remove magazine from the school library because of ads for
contraceptives and materials dealing with lesbianism and gay rights, the
court held that First Amendment values were implicated, thus requiring
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a substantial and legitimate governmental interest for removal. It is
interesting to note that the board later voted to return two issues of
the magazine with the advertisements excised. In this case, Salvail v.
Nashua Board of Education , the court noted that objective criteria such
as obsolescence, architectural necessity, and legitimate educational
considerations were not the motivating factors in removal. Since the
political tastes of the board could not be constitutionally controlling,
the court ordered the board to resubscribe to the magazine and to
restore the back issues to the library shelf.
It is -hard to imagine two more diametrically opposed positions than
those followed by the Presidents Council line of cases and the Minarcini
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line of cases. Part of the divergence may be accoxinted for by the fact
that Minarcini and the cases which follow it pay particular attention to
important lines of First Amendment precedent that have developed outside
the school situation. Although it is certainly true, as Charles Alan
Wright has persuasively argued, that free speech precedent from other
areas of life cannot be transferred indiscriminately to educational
settings; it is also true that they cannot be ignored. There is a
whole line of cases beginning in 1943 that protects the right to dis-
tribute and receive handbills in door-to-door solicitation, the right
not to have prisoner mail censored because of the two-way nature of the
communication, the right of radio listeners to have access to the social,
political, and aesthetic ideas of others, and the right to receive infor-
mation and ideas in one's own home.^^
The first case to create a right to know on behalf of recipient
plaintiffs was decided by the Supreme Court in 1965—well before the
Presidents Council case. The Court held that it was an unconstitutional
infringement on the First Amendment rights of addressees to have the
"affirmative obligation" to request the receipt of foreign political
mail that had been addressed to them.^^ Since it is clear that those
who sent the mail (foreign nationals living abroad) had no independent
constitutional right to speak, the case protects recipients--those wish-
ing to receive information. As Justice Brennan explains, in a con-
curring opinion:
It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific
guarantee of access to publications. However, the protection
of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to
protect. . . those equally fundamental personal rights nec-
essary to make the express guarantees fully meaningful.
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(citations omitted) I think the right to receive publication
IS such a fundamental right. ... It would be a barren market-
place of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers. 62
The reasoning of the above line of cases was summarized by the
Supreme Court in an important case decided in 1976—just after Presi-
Council
. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Virginia Citizens
Council
,
the Court again held that the right to know was a protected
right. In holding that consumers had a right to receive information
through pharmaceutical advertisements, the fact that communication
involves reciprocal rights was emphasized. ”[W]here a speaker exists. .
. the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to
its recipients both.'’^^
The Presidents Council court may perhaps be forgiven for ignoring
this line of precedent since the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy case
had not yet been decided. But when the District Court in Bicknell
(decided after the Virginia case) argued that students have no right to
receive information because there is no speaker— authors have no right
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to speak— it had clearly gone too far. The emphasis in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy was clearly on the right of the consumers of prescrip-
tion drugs to receive information. Lawrence Tribe in his seminal work
on constitutional law says that the right to know is a more generalized
right than the right to speak, but that it is not necessary that a cor-
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relative right exist in any particular source to communicate. That
the court in Bicknell could have misinterpreted the Virginia case so
badly can only be explained by its lack of attention to a whole line of
precedent beginning more than thirty- five years earlier.
It may be possible for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to
1
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reconcile these two divergent lines of cases when it reviews Pico and
Bicknell. Deselection, it is true, does not always present a constitu-
tional issue— sometimes science books become obsolete, for example. And
it is certainly correct, as the court in the Pico case concluded, that
the selection/deselection process cannot be content blind. The Minarcini
line of cases, however, would not require content blindness. It would
require only neutrality in the sense that decisionmaking based on con-
tent be made with regard to legitimate educational interests and not
become a process devoted to sanitization of the library to suit the
social and political tastes of successive school boards.
It is probably only a matter of time until Justice Douglas, who
dissented in the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the Presidents
Council case, is vindicated. There surely is a right to hear, to learn,
and to know, which cannot be defeated in the school library.
The First Amendment is a preferred right and is of great
importance in the schools. . . . Are we sending children to
school to be educated by the norms of the School Board or are
we educating our youth to shed the prejudices of the past, to
explore all forms of thought, and to find solutions to our
world's problems ?66
Although the rights of teacher/ librarians are to be considered in
Chapter V, it can at least be suggested at this point that, from an ed-
ucational point of view, these professionals have an important part to
play in the selection/deselection process. Selection and deselection
must differ to the extent that less is known about books before they
have found their way to the school library shelves; but however the pro-
cess is accomplished, it must be done in a way that preserves the impor-
tant and fundamental right of the students to know.
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Non-School Speakers and the Student's Right to Know
This group of cases concerns a wide variety of speakers who in one
way or another either seek to speak on or near the school campus or
are sought out by students and teachers to present their views as part
of the regular school program. The leading case dealing with expressive
activity occurring off the school campus is the Supreme Court case of
Grayned v. Rockford . In that case students, former students, parents
of students and concerned citizens were convicted of violating an anti-
noise ordinance which prohibited the willful making of noise adjacent
to school buildings during the school day. Picketing by the defendants,
which lasted for about half an hour, was on behalf of more involvement
of balcks in school affairs. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance
was neither impermissibly vague nor overbroad but that it was a reason-
able "time, place, and manner" regulation that was necessary to further
a significant governmental interest. The court relied on the Tinker
case in allowing that public sidewalks could not be declared off limits
entirely for the purpose of expressive activity. But activity which
materially disrupts classwork or invades the rights of others can be pro-
hibited adjacent to schools as well as on school grounds.
An application of the Grayned case can be illustrated by an Arizona
case where members of a religious group attempted to broadcast their mes-
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sage by loudspeaker on the sidewalk across from the school at mid-day.
They were arrested and held guilty of willful disturbance of a public
school. The Tinker case was cited for the proposition that expressive
activity may be prohibited if it "materially interferes with or substan-
tially disrupts, the normal operation of schools, school activities,
or
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the rights of other persons.
Although there are extreme cases which hold that a total exclusion
of those outside speakers wishing to speak on school grounds by distri-
buting literature, talking to passersby, etc., is a proper exercise of
the state police power, ^ many cases allow such activity within limits.
The limits can be illustrated by the following cases.
^Vhere citizens sought to erect a "tent- like structure" on a uni-
versity library lawn to protest the plight of the Farm Workers, the
court held that such activity was not the type of symbolic speech contem-
plated by the Tinker case and was therefore not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection.
A
Supreme Court case was quoted by the court to the
effect that the right to expressive social protest does not extend to
• . . 72Street meetings in Times Square or to red light violations. The court
did allow leafletting and talking to passersby, however, saying that such
activity was protected by First Amendment speech provisions. A similar
case affirmed defendants' trespass convictions for the activity of set-
ting up a card table on school property in order to distribute leaflets,
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books, and buttons to promote an antiwar demonstration. The First
Amendment claim of the defendants was summarily dismissed and the Tinker
case was held not applicable to the factual situation.
It appears that here again facile distinctions between speech and
action are being made in situations where the "action" is inextricably
intertwined with the peaceful, non-disruptive expressive activities of
citizens. Perhaps it is possible to speak and to leaflet without tents
and tables; but if these activities are first recognized as having speech
implications of importance to speakers and hearers as well, then courts
I
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will have to look for a material and substantial interference rather
than summarily dismissing the First Amendment claims.
A more speech-protective approach was taken by a California court
which overturned criminal vagrancy convictions against adults who peace-
fully distributed leaflets criticizing the Selective Service System,
racism in America, and the Vietnam War on high school camnuses.^^ The
Tinker case was relied on extensively by the court. It recognized that
constitutional rights were generally available in schools and that chan-
nels of communication should be kept open in a place which, although de-
dicated to a special purpose, was a public place. The court was parti-
cularly attentive to the rights of students, noting that the right to
communicate included the right to hear and to receive information and
ideas. It is interesting to note that this case, although perhaps dis-
tinguishable from those above as involving pure speech that was not even
arguably disruptive, was decided in 1969—well before the others. It is
also the only case which makes use of the Tinker dictum that school is
a "public place" where people entitled to be there may exercise consti-
tutional rights in a way that would not be permissible on purely private
property. In Tinker the Supreme Court was probably referring to students
and teachers as those entitled to be there. If the court here is sug-
gesting that adult citizens may have a limited right to be on school
grounds, it would seem consistent with the reciprocity necessary to pro-
mote the students' right to be informed, to hear, and to know. Intellec-
tual freedom is promoted when students are exposed to a wide variety of
views—when they are protected as hearers as well as speakers even
though they are at school. There is no reason consistent with the
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Tinker case for an absolute ban on citizen speech on school grounds.
In fact quite the contrary, for the Tinker court said that schools
should not be considered "enclaves of totalitarianism" with students
the "closed-circuit recipients" of official state dogma.
The next three cases from Federal District Courts in Nebraska,
New Hampshire, and Oregon concern school regulations which are not con-
cerned with the time, place, or manner of speech, but which attempt to
regulate the type of expression that can be promoted on school grounds
or in classrooms. In the first case the Gazette Publishing Cooperative
sought the right to enter on school grounds and distribute copies of
their publication, the Lincoln Gazette
,
on a "free-or-donation" basis.
A school rule against commercialism and solicitation was invoked to bar
agents of the publishers from distribution at school. The court held
that the ban was an invalid prior restraint in violation of the First
Amendment in the absence of any indication of a material and substantial
interference with school work or discipline. Apart from the fact that
the court found that commercialism and solicitation in the Gazette sit-
uation were incidental, it believed that in order for a ban to be con-
stitutionally applied on that basis it would have to meet the Tinker
test of posing a material and substantial interference. The court was
of the opinion that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
were permissible, but a total ban without a compelling reason was not.
In another publications case, students challenged a school board
regulation prohibiting distribution of all non-school sponsored written
76
materials in school and for two hundred feet from the school grounds.
The court held that a blanket prohibition of all non-school sponsored
€
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publications was overbroad because it included materials which would not
pose a substantial interference with school activities.
The last case involved a blanket prohibition on another type of
speech--political speech. Here, students and a teacher sought relief
from a school board order banning all political speakers from high
school. The ban arose when the political science teacher tried to in-
vite a Communist speaker to class after having received official
approval for speakers representing the Democratic Party, the Republican
Party, and the John Birch Society. The court held that the speaker
ban unconstitutionally infringed on the students' right to hear and on
the teacher's freedom of expression by interfering with the choice of
teaching method. The court also suggested that outside speakers might
have a constitutional right not to be denied equal protection with re-
gard to speaking in school and that the teacher could raise the right of
these third parties. So that while they might or might not have an
independent speech right to address student audiences, outside speakers
at least have the right not to be unfairly discriminated against. This
would seem to be consistent with the reciprocal interest of facilitating
student learning, hearing, and knowing by providing presentations de-
signed to be balanced in terms of differing points of view.-
Because the Supreme Court has ruled with regard to the limits
which are appropriately applied to speech off school grounds, those
issues seem relatively well resolved. With regard to speech on campus,
however, two divergent positions seem to be presented. The first would
allow total bans on outside speakers, based on the conclusion that no
constitutional issues are involved in such a decision. It represents
75
an approach that is unduly protective and paternalistic, and is arguably
an unconstitutional infringement on the type of intellectual freedom
that is necessary in the school environment as well. If the students
truly have a right to know, as the second line of cases would suggest,
then to deny them that right would require that the speech be of the
type that is not constitutionally protected—obscenity
,
defamation, or
fighting words—or that the prohibition comport with the Tinker limit-
ations. As the judge who protected political speakers in the last case
wrote:
I am firmly convinced that a course designed to teach students
that a free and democratic society is superior to those in
which freedoms are sharply curtailed will fail entirely if it
fails to teach one important lesson: that the power of the
state is never so great that it can silence a man or woman
simply because there are those who disagree.
Curricular Challenges and the Student's Right to Know
In addition to challenges to library materials, to particular text-
books, and to other specific curricular materials, there is a growing
group of cases where parents, for the most part, have mounted more gen-
eral challenges to the curriculum based upon their objections to the
values they feel are being transmitted to their children. It seems that
these conflicts are more likely to arise to the extent that schools see
themselves in the business of transmission or indoctrination of a par-
ticular set of values rather than as promoters of a tradition of intel-
lectual freedom. It is unfortunate that the transmission theory as a
primary justification of education has been promoted in the legal liter-
ature, especially, out of proportion to its appropriate place in the
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educational theory of a democratic society. Where intellectual free-
dom is emphasized, a spectrum of values representative of the diversity
of our culture can be considered along with the transmission of basic
values to which we are committed as a nation. There is less reason to
want to indoctrinate students with a particular point of view if one
truly believes that no one else is trying to do the same. While it is
rare that the courts in the cases which follow actually consider the
student's right to know and to receive information and ideas in any
explicit way, the cases nevertheless have implications for the develop-
ing right of students in a captive audience to be exposed to a wide
spectrum of facts, ideas, and beliefs.
There have been several recent challenges by parents to the
attempted implementation by state or local school boards of curricular
80programs in family life and sex education. These challenges generally
take the approach that the teaching of matters related to human sexual-
ity in public schools violates the parents' and/or the students' right
to free exercise of religion and their right to privacy. The results
have not been uniform, some cases reasoning that the parents have no
exclusive constitutional right to teach their children about sexual
matters, and others implying that there might be such a right by ex-
plicit court approval of excusal systems. There is support, however,
for the proposition that if courses are taught within constitutional
limits and deemed necessary by state or local boards of education, their
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controversial nature should not be sufficient grounds for excusal.
At the present time, the fact that the student may have rights that
are different from those of the parent is recognized in only a minority
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of cases. The students' right to know should arguably be considered
along with the parents' right to free exercise and to privacy in the
upbringing of their children. Education is not a purely private con-
cern. The fact that state law makes education compulsory is testimony
to the importance that the entire community places on education. It is
for this reason that the rights and interests of all must be considered.
One case which recognizes that children have a right to receive an
education and that this right may conflict with the rights and interests
of the children's parents is Davis v. Page
,
a 1974 case. The father
of two children brought an action against the school system to require
that his children be excused from all audio-visual programs, from a
health course, and from music classes. The requested excusal was based
on values and beliefs derived from the family's Apostolic Lutheran
faith. While the case poses somewhat of an extreme example, it is
nevertheless a good one to illustrate the types of objections that are
posed by parents to various curricular materials and methods.
Plaintiffs have introduced evidence that the dogma of their
faith makes it sinful for them to: watch movies, watch
television, view audio-visual projections, listen to the
radio, engage in play acting, sing or dance to worldly music,
study evolution, study "humanist" philosophy, partake in
sexually oriented teaching programs, openly discuss personal
and family matters, and receive the advice of secular guidance
counselors.
In holding for the children, the court balanced the father's right to
free exercise of his religious beliefs with the state's interest in
providing an education and the children's right to receive that edu-
cation. The court, citing the Tinker case, recognized that children
have constitutionally protected rights that may come into conflict with
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those of their parents. Though the rights of parents to control the
upbringing of their children must be considered, the court was of the
opinion that parents do not have the right to make martyrs of their
children in the name of religion or privacy.
This case is exceptional
,
more for its reasoning than for its
result. While there are other cases which reach similar conclusions on
similar factual situations they have not stressed the independent
rights that children possess. This is the fact that gives the Davis
case special relevance for the issue of intellectual freedom in public
schools, especially for the right of the student to know--to receive an
education. In recognizing students' rights, it shows itself to be, in
spirit, the true progeny of Tinker . The following sections concern the
right not to speak and the right to privacy—the right not to know.
The Student's Right Not to Speak
The student's right not to speak was declared as long ago as 1943
in the leading case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
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nette . In an eloquent opinion by Justice Jackson that has stood as a
monument to student rights in general for more than forty years, the
freedom to express intellectual and spiritual individualism by declining
to engage in the compulsory flag salute was protected by the Supreme
Court.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
In subsequent cases students have refused to stand for the pledge
I
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or have declined to leave the classroom when the pledge has been said.
Some students have political motives—they believe that there is no
liberty and justice for all, or they prefer to sit quietly as a protest
against black repression. Some have religious motives. And for some
their only motivation is to avoid punishment for their preference not to
participate.
The rights of these students have been consistently upheld. One
court rejected the notion that sitting down was itself a material and
substantial interference or invasion of the rights of others. It said
"[A] silent, non-disruptive expression of belief by sitting down" is
87protected by the First Amendment. Another court held that standing
was an "integral portion of [the] pledge ceremony" and could not be
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compelled consistent with the First Amendment. Citing Tinker
,
another
case held that a student is free to choose his own form of expression as
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long as there is no material infringement of the rights of others. It
is clear that this right not to speak, which is a corollary of the right
to speak, will protect students from compulsory affirmations of belief
and will allow for a certain amount of intellectual non-conformity.
Whether or not these flag salute cases will be invoked to support other
instances of the student's right not to speak remains to be seen; but
the right not to speak, like the right to speak, is limited by the
Tinker disruption standard. Indeed, Justice Jackson presaged that
notion himself in the Barnette case when he observed that remaining
passive during the pledge was not alleged to have created a clear and
present danger that would permit the limitation of expression.
)
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The Student's Right to Privacy
Apart from the protections of mind and personhood derived from
the flag salute cases, the right to privacy as it has manifested itself
to date in the school situation protects the inward- looking dimensions
of privacy—the student's right to be let alone. It has done this in
two distinct ways. First, it protects the student from being forced to
give information that is unduly personal
--it gives sanctuary by protect-
ing the right not to speak. Secondly, it protects the student from
being forced as a member of a captive audience to hear and be confront-
ed with information that might be injurious— it gives repose by pro-
tecting the right not to know. Although this area of case law is
still developing, two cases from the federal courts can be given to show
the types of interests that are involved and the ways that courts have
begun to resolve them in the public school setting.
In Merriken v. Cressman
,
a Federal District Court barred the use of
an unduly extensive questionnaire designed to identify potential drug
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users. The questionnaire was administered by school officials and
participation in the survey was not voluntary. It sought information
about the student questioned and about others of his acquaintance. The
court held that students retain their constitutional rights while in
school and that one of these rights is the right to privacy implicit in
the penumbras of the Bill of Rights. It showed sensitivity to the re-
lationship between the students' captivity and the preservation of pri-
vacy in holding that the questionnaire violated the students' right to
privacy and interfered with the parents' privileges with regard to
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upbringing and discipline.
In protecting the student from being forced to reveal information,
the student's right to privacy is being balanced against the generalized
police power of the state. Since the right to privacy had been held to
be fundamental, it is likely that where doubt exists the right of the
student will be upheld.
The opposite aspect of the student's right to privacy--the right
not to know, has somewhat more troubling implications. Most obviously,
this right is in direct conflict with the very same student's right to
receive information and ideas. It is here that the rights of intell-
ectual freedom, broadly considered, and the privacy and personhood
rights must be very carefully considered. It is because of the rela-
tive immaturity of students and because of their captivity that their
right to be left alone must be protected by school officials. But it
is because of this same immaturity and captivity that the student's
right to intellectual freedom and to the development of mind must be
encouraged by a free flow of information and ideas.
A case from the university setting may help to dramatize why it
may be necessary to protect public school students from speech, ex-
pression, or ideas that, while not physically injurious, would never-
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theless seriously interfere with social or emotional growth. The
case concerns the display by an artis of several paintings emphasizing
genitalia in a public corridor of the university. The court upheld the
university's action in removing the exhibit well before it was scheduled
for dismantling. The court reasoned that in this case the right to
privacy of a captive university audience was entitled to greater
protection than the lesser constitutional interest of the artist in
connminicating his message.
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Charles Alan Wright and Thomas Emerson have argued that expression
of the sort sought to be conveyed by the artist in the above case will
not necessarily be constitutionally protected even though it falls
short of meeting constitutional standards of obscenity in a given con-
94
text. The thrust of their argument appears to be that the shock
effect created by speech that dramatically exceeds the norms of public
acceptability is tantamount to an assault on hearers or viewers. Wright
and Emerson would argue that this assault carries the force of action,
i.e., is not primarily expressive, and therefore not protected. Of
course, it is no answer to Wright and Emerson that the purpose of art
that is explicitly sexual is precisely to convey a message that may be
shocking. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Supreme Court, has more
recently said that the Constitution protects the "emotive function" of
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communication as much as it protects is "cognitive content."
But even allowing that the case of the artist might have been
wrongly decided when considered in the university setting, it is by
no means so clear that it would have been wrongly decided had the same
factual situation arisen in a public high school. The problem is that
the assault reasoning employed by Emerson and Wright relies on the same
distinction between speech and action that has historically been so
difficult to make. If we want schools to be successful in promoting
an optimal education for students who are still maleable and vulnerable
intellectually and socially, better reasoning will have to be discovered
upon which to base the protective measures needed to support the
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student's right to repose and to privacy while at the same time protect-
ing other valuable rights. A suggestion for accomplishing this purpose
will be made after a case where these issues have arisen in lower edu-
cation is presented.
In Tractman Anker high school students were denied the right to
conduct a voluntary, anonymous survey of student attitudes about human
sexuality, contraception, and abortion for tabulation and publication in
the student newspaper. Although the evidence presented at trial by
experts on both sides of the issue was conflicting, the court held that
"the record established a substantial basis for defendants' belief that
distribution of the questionnaire would result in significant emotional
harm to a number of students. ..." The majority opinion relies on
the Tinker case, extending its rationale to cover situations where the
potential disruption is psychological in nature rather than physical.
But the court waffles in the standard that it applies to the case, at
times putting the burden of proof on school officials to demonstrate
that there was "reasonable cause to believe the distribution of the
questionnaire would have caused significant psychological harm to some
. . . students;" and at times requiring only that school authorities
"have reason to believe that harmful consequences might result to
99
students."
One concurring opinion concludes that "a blow to the psyche may
do more permanent damage than a blow to the chin" and that invasion of
the rights of others is not protected by the Tinker case.^^^ This judge
also believes that the act of solicitation of opinion is somewhat more
intrusive than simple dissemination of opinion might be. But while
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these considerations are relevant and important ones, it is not diffi-
cult to sympathize with the long dissent of Judge Mansfield, who ex-
pressed the fear that if the limitation on invasion of the rights of
others were extended to prevent ’’psychological harm,” it would pose a
dangerous potential for unjustifiable restriction of constitutional
rights based on a standard that is inordinately ’’vague” and ’’nebu-
lous.” It is arguable that this case presents just such an example
of unwarranted and paternalistic intrusion on the constitutional rights
of students. Judge Mansfield felt that the record lacked a ’’substantial
basis” in evidentiary fact to prove that ’’significant psychological
harm" would result to an ’’appreciable number of students.” He also felt
that the defendants’ understanding of high school students living in a
media-oriented, urban environment was so ’’unreal and out of touch with
contemporary facts of life as to lead one to wonder whether there has
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been a communications breakdown between them and the next generation.”
But while the danger of abuse must be fully appreciated, standards
do need to be developed by which to balance rights in extraordinary
cases. What needs to be remembered in such cases is that standards and
tests are merely tools which must always be applied with due considera-
tion given to both constitutional principle and contextual circumstances.
What could be more vague than the test of material and substantial inter-
ference considered out of context? But given the fact that schools must
not only provide an environment suitably free from physical disturbance
but that the developmental level of the students themselves must also
be considered, there may be no better standard than a material and sub-
stantial interference test extended to protect the emotional, social.
D
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and intellectual growth of the students. The problem with the majority
opinion in the Tractman case is that the judge is not quite sure whether
interests of sufficient import are involved to warrant close scrutiny of
official action.
The interests involved on both sides of the case in Tractman appear
to be fundamental ones—the right of students to gather and to print in-
formation and the right of other students either to receive the question-
naire or to be let alone. With fundamental rights so heavily implicated,
minimal scrutiny of administrator judgment and action simply will not do.
Conclusion
The right of the student to speak and to receive information and
ideas while in school is a fundamental right deserving of encouragement
and protection. While speech-protective student rights cases like the
Tinker case have brought a generally heightened awareness of these
rights, occasionally brilliantly defended by a lower court judge, there
is still an all too evident tendency to overcontrol the school environ-
ment and to overprotect the individual student. In general, adminis-
trative judgments based on the unique characteristics of the school sit-
uation are given far too much deference by courts eager to avoid in-
volvement in school concerns.
Student rights while in school are often denigrated by a distinction
between speech and action which denies the existence of First Amendment
issues. When the speech issue is recognized and considered by the court,
the factual situation should be publically explicated in the opinion so
that all will know that decisions have been based on specific facts
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rather than on generalized inference. Where the prohibition of speech
is based upon the Tinker disruption limitation, an explicit finding of a
material and substantial interference should be made by the court. The
use of the Tinker test as applied in various factual contexts should be
made a part of the written opinion both for justificatory reasons and as
an aid to future action and decision-making.
Of the many unresolved problems and issues that arise in the present
chapter, a few are particularly important: whether total bans on speech
are per se legitimate in the school context; whether constitutional
rights of students are implicated when school officials select and elim-
inate materials from the school library; and how the student rights to
equal protection and to privacy are to be balanced with the fundamental
right to speak and to know.
Some of these issues will reappear in the next chapter, which deals
with the student's right to compose and distribute literature, leaflets,
newspapers, and other written materials in public schools. The legal
and educational issues surrounding prior restraint will assume special
importance, but the general issue of how best to promote and protect
intellectual freedom in schools will continue to be emphasized.
CHAPTER IV
THE REGULATION OF WRITTEN MATERIALS:
THE STUDENT PRESS, LEAFLETS, AND PETITIONS
The ’’Awakening” contains, absolutely no material that could
remotely be considered libelous, obscene, or inflammatory.
. . . As so-called ’’underground” newspapers go, this is
probably one of the most vanilla- flavored ever to reach a
federal court.
Circuit Judge Goldberg
Shanley v . Northeast Independent
S^chool District (Fifth Circuit, 1972)
Introduction
The First Amendment right to freedom of speech and press includes
the right to produce and to distribute a wide variety of written mater-
ials. It is axiomatic that if students retain their constitutional
rights while in school, they also retain their right to engage in the
production and distribution of newspapers, literary magazines, flyers,
petitions, and leaflets. The extent to which this right may be regu-
lated or limited to conform to the special requirements of a learning
environment devoted to elementary and secondary education is the sub-
ject of this chapter. It begins with a general review of the historical
ban on prior restraint of The press, relates that issue to the student
press, and then continues with a development of the scope and limita-
tions on the distribution of a number of other written materials in
public schools.
Prior Restraint of the Student Press
The issue of prior restraint is one of the most complex and
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ambiguous areas of First Amendment law. Constitutional law scholar,
Thomas I. Emerson, called the concept ’’curiously confused and unformed,"
despite an "ancient and celebrated history."^ Because of the existen-
tial nature of ideas when reduced to written form as opposed to the
nonmateriality of thoughts, the possibility of censorship or of review
by others prior to any general dissemination of ideas arises. The
classic prohibition against prior restraint is understood as an absolute
bar to the general regulation or review prior to dissemination of writ-
ten materials, films, etc., even though they may contain speech, such
as obscene speech, which is currently not protected. The term prior
restraint is also used by courts to refer to blanket prohibitions, such
as those banning the distribution of all political materials in school,
for example. In this chapter, the term prior review will often be used
to refer to general systems of prior restraint. The prior restraint
terminology will be used for blanket prohibitions and as a general term
covering both prior review and blanket prohibitions.
The issues involved in prior restraint were first considered by
the Supreme Court in the leading case of Near v. Minnesota
,
decided in
1931. The Minnesota legislature had provided for the issuance of per-
manent injunctions against the publication of written materials that
were "malicious, scandalous and defamatory." In declaring the statute to
be an infringement of the liberty of the press, the Court discussed the
history of the First Amendment guarantee. It concluded that the major
purpose of the constitutional free press provision had been to promote
freedom by prohibiting any prior censorship such as that which had been
allowed by the English systems of licensing. The appropriate remedy for
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the abuse of this freedom to publish, according to the Court, was sub-
sequent punishment. At the same time, however, the Court in Near de-
parted somewhat from this historical view. While the decision did not
expressly allow for general systems of prior review, it did conclude
that government could prohibit speech in exceptional cases. These cases
would arise, according to the Court, where the recruiting service was
actually obstructed, where speech was obscene, where it would have the
effect of force, or where it was an incitement to violence.^
The 1961 Supreme Court case of Times Film Corporation v. City of
Chicago represents another assault on the historical ban against prior
restraint.^ In this case a Chicago ordinance requiring the prior review
of films was challenged. In a five to four opinion recognizing Chica-
go’s ’’duty to protect its people” from obscenity, the majority rejected
the claim of absolute privilege against prior review that had been
asserted by the Times Film Corporation. The dissenting opinion of four
justices, written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, lamented the rejection
of what it called ”an inherent aind basic principle of freedom of speech
and the press.
Now the Court strays from that principle; it strikes down that
tenet without requiring any demonstration that this is an
’’exceptional case,” whatever that might be, and without any
indication that Chicago has sustained the ’’heavy burden”
which was supposed to have been placed upon it. Clearly, this
is neither an exceptional case nor has Chicago sustained any
burden .
^
Thomas I. Emerson, in his book T]^ System of Freedom of Expression ,
says that although the dissenters in the Times case finally explicated
the importance of the traditional ban on prior restraint, it was too
late. ”At least as far as movie censorship was concerned, the
doctrine
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in Its original form was abandoned.’* Emerson’s general review of prior
restraint cases arising in various social contexts leads him to conclude
that much of the protective force of the original notion of prior re-
straint has been dissipated and now ’’merely signifies a type of restric-
tion that the courts will scrutinize with special care.”^
From a general overview of the cases which have arisen in school
contexts, it appears that here also the doctrine which historically pro-
hibited systems of prior review has been almost completely abandoned.
While it is not so difficult, by comparison with many of the speech cases
presented in the previous chapter, to accept the notion that some speech
is unprotected and thus can be stopped in a particular instance, it is
not so easy to accept the idea that all written materials can be proper-
ly subjected to systematic review before dissemination. The question
becomes, isn't this precisely the type of prior restraint that the
framers of the First Amendment intended to prohibit? We might well ask,
along with Chief Justice Warren, what makes prior review in the school
press cases exceptionally necessary. Not surprisingly, these complex
issues and questions have led to some difference of opinion by courts
which have considered the issue of prior restraint with regard to the
student press.
Before beginning a general review of the cases dealing with prior
restraint in the school, it might be advisable to emphasize that even if
schools do not have a general system of prior review, the dissemination
of certain speech can be prevented. This would include obscenity, de-
famation, fighting words and speech which would case a material and
sub-
stantial interference with school discipline.^® It should be kept
in
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mind, however, that the advocacy of illegal or uncooperative action in
inaterials will not, without more, be held substantially disrup-
tive and therefore subject to prohibition.^^ But whatever the nuances
that separate protected from nonprotected speech, it is sufficient to
note here that administrators are not legally prevented from stopping
the dissemination of prohibitable speech, once it is discovered, or from
punishing the disseminators pursuant to a valid school rule,^^ simply
because they have not established a general system of prior review.
Although it has often been repeated that any system of prior res-
13traint bears ’’a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,"
there is only one important case which abides by the classic prohibition
against prior restraint with regard to the student press
—
Fujishima v .
14
Board of Education . The view presented by this case is definitely
a minority view. Although it has never been directly overruled, there
is evidence that the reasonging and philosophy of the case have been
substantially rejected even in cases arising in the same jurisdiction.^^
In Fujishima
,
three male high school students were suspended for
the in-school distribution of an underground newspaper. The Cosmic Frog ,
a petition, and leaflets about the war in Vietnam, because they did not
first secure the approval of the superintendent as was required by a
Chicago rule. Citing the Stpreme Court decisions in Near and Tinker , the
Seventh Circuit held that the rule was unconstitutional on its face as
imposing a prior restraint on the First Amendment rights of students to
freedom of the press. Although the court said it would allow appropri-
ate rules regulating the time, place, and manner of speech to prevent,
for example, distribution during a fire drill; it would not allow a
92
general system of prior review. The court felt that those cases from
other circuits which had interpreted the Tinker case as allowing for sys-
tems of advance review were plainly.. wrong.
in no way suggests that students may be required to
announce their intentions of engaging in certain conduct before
hand so school authorities may decide whether to prohibit the
conduct. Such a concept of prior restraint is even more offen-
sive when applied to the long-protected area of publication. 16
The court expressed its belief that the appropriate way to interprete
the Tinker forecast rule was as *’a formula for determining when the re-
quirements of school discipline justify punishment.
. . That is,
if a reasonable forecast of prohibited behavior amounting to a substan-
tial disruption could have been made, then the students are properly
18held responsible.
Although there is very little support in the case law for the ex-
ceptionally speech-protective approach taken by the court in Fuj ishima
,
Leon Letwin has persuasively argued against the double standard which
exists with regard to the student press and the press of general cir-
culation.^^ After examining several cases from the Fourth Circuit,
where prior review is permitted, he argues that even if prior review
were necessary it would not be feasible to provide constitutionally valid
substantive standards and procedures. Substantive standards must be
defined narrowly and with exacting precision, and the notion of a prompt
procedural review process inherently conflicts with the student's due
process right to have time to defend a prohibited dissemination. Taken
together, the criteria and procedures lead to undue self-censorship,
well-meaning btit impermissible censorship by school officials, self-
interested censorship of criticism by school authorities, and to the
93
type of delay that is tantamount to a denial of speech. Letwin conclud-
es that "the prudent course is to reject ex parte restraints by school
authorities and to reject the "double standard in respect to the press
rights of students" as not feasible and unnecessary in the school con-
text.
The appropriate accommodation of first amendment rights and
school disciplinary needs is to reject that constitutionally
abhorrent form of governmental power, affirm the vitality of
the first amendment in the educational system, and rely on
traditionally favored remedies to deal with any serious abuses
that may arise. 22
The minority view, presented by the Fujishima case and by Letwin,
can easily be contrasted with the majority view, which would not deny,
at least in theory, that a valid system of prior review can be develop-
ed and implemented in cases involving the distribution of written mat-
erials in school. Although courts seldom attempt to justify general
systems of review as necessitated by exceptional circiimstances as Near
had required, a few cases may be pointed to from which such a justifica-
tion could conceivably be created.
One Federal District Court case, Frasca v. Andrews , can be used to
to illustrate why general systems of prior review might arguably be con-
sidered necessary and justified as exceptional cases in the context of
public schools. Here, the former Ebitor-in-Chief and the present
Assistant Editor of an official high school newspaper sought an injunc-
tion against the principal's seizure of the final issue of the school
paper. The principal seized the paper, in part, because of a letter to
the editor which criticized the conduct of a particular student. In
addition to accusing him of having been a "total failure" in his
duties
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as Vice President of the student government (an opinion which is arguab-
ly protected)
,
it said that he had used a computer to falsify his report
card grades, and that he did not maintain a high academic average. The
court held that because the principal’s investigation showed that the
letter was "substantially false," he had a "rational and substantial ba-
sis" for preventing its publication based on the fact that libel is not
protected speech. Even if the libeled student could collect money dam-
ages from the person who spoke falsely, it might be asked if that remedy
would be sufficient from an educational point of view where emotionally
less mature and captive students are involved.
In the same case, the court held that another letter to the editor
and a response to it were unprotected because there was reason to beli-
eve that its publication "would create a substantial risk of disruption. .
.
."24 The court does not consider whether or not the degree of dis-
ruption would have been substantial. The letters, which admittedly
contain offensive langauge, follow:
Sports editor.
We, the Lacrosse players. . . would like to know why you
do not have any sports articles in the Chieftain. We would
like a formal apology in public or else we will kick your
greasy ass.
/signed/ |igs|d e|f„sse Team
We would like to reply by saying that the articles were
stolen. We would also like to say that you hotheaded, egotis-
tical, "pissed Off" jocks. . . do not deserve an apology for
anything. ... ,.25
/signed/ The Editors
I
9S
The evidence showed "concern" over the "possibility" of disruption and
"inharmonious" relationships; and while there well might have been evi-
dence that the letters would have created a material interference with
school work or discipline, it does not appear in the written opinion.
The point here, however, is primarily to illustrate the types of writ-
ten materials, which when considered in context, might be used in an
attempt to justify prior restraint in public schools as an exceptional
case.
A Federal District Court in Texas made an attempt to justify the
implementation of a general system of prior review in the school context
based upon the fact that students are a captive and relatively immature
audience, and upon the fact that the educational process required that a
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certain kind of environmental situation be maintained. It is certainly
arguable that school authorities have the right and the duty to protect
students from material and substantial disruptions as well as from the
harms that might flow from allowing the free distribution of unprotected
forms of speech. But even when courts do not attempt this sort of ex-
plicit justification, they almost universally allow for the possibility of
the constitutional implementation of general systems of prior review of
written materials in schools. A major limitation, however, is that the
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distribution must be a substantial one. The criteria and procedures
that have been developed for prior review in schools will be considered
in the cases which follow.
In the leading case of Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education , the
Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the lower court's conclusion that
29
prior review would be unconstitutional in all circumstances.
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A public school is undoubtedly a ’’marketplace of ideas.”
Early involvement in social comment and debate is a good
method for future generations of adults to learn intelligent
involvement. But we cannot deny that Connecticut has author-
ity to minimize or eliminate influences that would dilute or
disrupt the effectiveness of the educational process as the
state conceives it. 30
The Eisner court, unlike the court in the Fuj ishima case, interprets
Tinker as allowing for considerable administrator discretion to both
control the educational process and to ’’restrain the distribution of dis-
ruptive matter. The court in Eisner looked at several cases to devel-
op a relatively comprehensive list of the substantive criteria by which
school officials could legitimately bar literature from the school. Ob-
• .
. 32
scenity, libel, and insulting or fighting words are not protected.
Words which have the effect of force, in addition to fighting words, are
33
not protected. And words which would create a material and substantial
34interfersnce with school activities would not be protected. But while
school officials may censor the content of written materials, another
court gives this warning: ”[T]he school board's burden of demonstrating
reasonableness becomes geometrically heavier as its decision begins to
focus upon the content of materials that are not obscene, libelous, or
35
inflammatory.”
While the Eisner case shows that it is theoretically possible to
establish criteria for prior review that will withstand constitutional
challenges of vagueness or overbreadth, in practice this has been very
difficult for schools to accomplish. In one case where a prior submis-
sion rule prohibited materials that were ’’libelous" and "obscene,” the
rule was held invalid because it was vague. Vagueness was said to be
"intolerable" in a prior restraint context. The regulation needed.
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according to the court, "narrow, objective, and reasonable standards by
which the material will be judged. Another case held that a rule was
vague which provided that student publications must meet the "journalis-
tic standards of accuracy, taste, and decency" of newspapers in the gen-
•to
eral community and not be obscene, libelous, or incite to crime. In
another case a regulation prohibiting material that would incite dis-
ruption was held to be both overbroad and vague. It was overbroad be-
cause it did not limit itself to proscribing what would incite a "mater-
ial disruption, and it was vague because disruption was not precisely
defined. Another policy was held overbroad for including protected com-
40
mercial speech within its prohibition. And in a final case, the prior
submission rule was invalidated because it did not detail the criteria
"by which an administrator might reasonably predict" the occurrence of a
substantial disruption or a material interference with school activiti-
41
es. The court in this case held that the discretion which could pro-
perly be exercised by school officials was limited by the First Amend-
ment rights of the students. Many more examples of vagueness and over-
breadth could be given, but these few will serve to illustrate both how
the courts have protected student press activities and the difficulty of
narrowly defining general terms and terms with precise legal significance.
In addition to defining suppressable materials with particularity,
courts which permit prior review have demanded that various procedural
safeguards be instituted in order to limit the adverse effects of prior
restraint. The idea of procedural limitations on the power of censorial
review was developed in the Supreme Court case of Freedman v. Marylanci
A ^
which concerned a film censorship system. The court required that
the
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burden be placed on the censor, that a judicial determination be had
before final restraint, and that the period of time for review be
brief. The importance of judicial review of relevant facts where free
speech issues are involved was emphasired by the Court. Freedman v .
Maryland was followed to a great extent by the court in Eisner
, the first
case to discuss the necessary procedures for prior submission by stu-
dents of written materials in schools. Although the Eisner court did not
require school authorities to seek judicial review, it did reaffirm that
the burden was on school officials to justify censorship and that the
procedure should specify ”to whom and how material may be submitted for
clearance" and should contain a "definite brief period within which re-
view of submitted material will be completed.
Later cases from the same circuit which decided the Eisner case ex-
panded the necessary procedural requirements, adding that the procedures
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must specify the effect of failure to give prompt review; that an ade-
45
quate and prompt appeal procedure must be provided; and that students
46
must be guaranteed the right to defend their position. Other cases
47
have confirmed that contingency plans may be necessary; and that an
appeal procedure should be provided.
The most colorful speech-protective language to be found in the
student press cases comes from the Fifth Circuit case of Shanley v.
Northeast Independent School District . In upholding the right of five
seniors to print and distribute an underground newspaper adjacent to the
high school, the court referred to the case as a "judicial believe-it-or
not" where the school board "failed to recognize even the bare existence
of the First Amendment" when it drafted a policy regarding the production
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and distribution of printed materials.^® The two controversial subjects
contained in the suppressed underground newspaper, The Awakening
, advo-
cated a review of the marijuana laws, and told where information about
birth control could be obtained. The court characterized the content of
the paper as so benign that ”it could easily surface, flower- like, from
its 'underground’ abode." In addition to being declared vague and
overbroad, the prior review policy in Shanley was held constitutionally
deficient because of its inddequate review procedures. In addition to
the initial review, the court required that the policy state "a reason-
able appellate mechanism and its methodology" and give "a brief and
reasonable time during which the appeal must be decided." The educa-
tional purpose underlying strict procedural protections for First Amend-
ment speech activity was eloquently stated by the court.
[T]he purpose of education is to spread, not to stifle, ideas
and views. Ideas in their pure and pristine form, touching
only the minds and hearts of school children, must be freed
from despotic dispensation. ... It is most important that
our young become convinced that our Constitution is a living
reality, not parchment preserved under glass. 53
There are obvious reasons why almost all systems of prior review
that have been considered by the courts have been held to be constitu-
titionally vague, overbroad, or lacking in appropriate procedures that
will minimize the adverse effects of prior restraint. At the present
time, however, schools wishing to establish systems of prior review of
student press activities, must make a good faith effort to precisely
define the criteria to be applied and to institute procedures for re-
view and for appeal. The exception to the general rule would be for
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schools in the states comprising the Seventh Circuit—Wisconsin,
Illinois, and Indiana--where prior review has not been permitted. If
school officials should decide that the legal requirements are too
onerous or that a general policy of prior review of written materials
is not necessary, they might begin to consider what alternative means
could serve the legitimate goals of review without providing the oppor-
tunity for illegal censorship of opinion. The Seventh Circuit stands
alone in recommending subsequent punishment as a viable alternative to
prior review. Letwin suggests, in addition to the punishment of stu-
dents engaged in proscribed and licentious speech activities, that the
school call upon its police powers to silence those creating any dis-
ruption or disturbance, or that it seek an injunction to prevent illegal
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speech in an exceptional case. In addition, educational alternatives
providing for a voluntary or mandatory advisory system might obviate the
necessity for any of these more extreme procedures.
The general history of First Amendment law teaches that prior re-
straint should not be taken lightly. Whether the review of the student
press can be justified as a general policy or whether it represents an
unconstitutional and paternalistic double standard is yet to be com-
pletely resolved by authoritative court decision. And despite the im-
portant educational interests at stake, or possibly because of these
interests, the restrictions allowed by the explicit or implicit approval
of prior restraint may yet be eliminated by constitutional design or by
default.
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Written Speech: Protected and Not Protected
A problem tangentially related to student freedom to distribute
written materials in and near school involves situations where, in
addition to potentially protected speech activities, the students en-
gage in a "pattern of open and flagrant defiance of school discip-
line,"^^ or are accused of "gross disobedience."^^ The three cases
that will be used to illustrate this problem involve three underground
newspapers
,
The High School Free Press
,
Space City
,
and Plain Brown
58Watermelon
.
In all three of the above cases the students who sought to distrib-
ute the newspapers in school were told not to do so, either because the
59prior review policy had been ignored; or, in one case, because the
previous issue had "four letter words, filthy references, abusive and
disgusting language, and nihilistic propaganda. Taken together, the
cases contain examples of the following behavior that was held to be
independently unprotected in the school context; defiance of school
prior submission policies, refusal to surrender newspapers upon request,
trying to get others to refuse to surrender papers, using profanity
in confrontations with school officials, and defying suspension policies.
Even though the speech-related activities of these students probably
would have been otherwise protected, the cases uniformly held that the
students involved could be reprimanded or disciplined for gross dis-
obedience, or for a pattern of defiant behavior.
Students should not be permitted to ignore. . . legally enacted
regulations of the school board. Even if such regulations im-
pinge in the most flagrant manner upon the constitutional rights
of a student, his remedy is to challenge the rules through
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lawful means.
Furthermore, since the students were being disciplined for their behav-
ior and not for their speech activities, there was no need to find that
there had been a material and substantial interference with school dis-
cipline as would otherwise be required by Tinker.
The overwhelming message in these cases is that even though student
constitutional rights are being infringed by unconstitutional prior re-
view policies or by unconstitutional ad hoc suppression, the students
have very little choice but to respectfully seek to challenge the actions
or procedures through established educational or legal channels. The
legal system requires all who seek their aid to come into court with
"clean hands.
The one exception to the clean hands policy would be if students
sought to challenge a prior review policy as unconstitutional on its
face and were successful. Even though the behavior of the particular
students could have been punished under a properly drawn policy, the
courts will enjoin their punishment because of the law’s potentially
64 . ....
unconstitutional application to others. This type of adjudication in
the First Amendment free speech area is an exception to the rule that
plaintiffs cannot ordinarily litigate the rights of third parties.^^
It is necessary because regulations which are vague and overbroad, and
therefore invalid on their face, will often serve to chill speech through
self-censorship. As a practical matter, therefore, those who have vio-
lated the policy are often in the best position to challenge it.
The following group of cases represents ways in which courts have
protected speech where school officials have sought to regulate written
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materials by blanket suppression, by interference even though there was
no material and substantial disruption, by regulation of the content
of protected speech, or by reaching beyond the authority of their police
powers into the community.
The instance of blanket suppression is illustrated by a regulation
which prohibited "circulating propaganda" which is "alien to school pur-
poses," including all political, religious, or commercial literature;
and the recruiting of members for political and religious groups. Not
surprisingly, the court held the attempted regulation both vague and
overbroad. The court did not allow the attempted prohibition of dis-
tributional and recruiting activities because they were not limited to
those activities that would materially disrupt school discipline or
that would interfere with the rights of others. In a similar case, the
court held the rule against the distribution of all non-school sponsored
written materials in school and for two hundred feet beyond school prop-
erty to be overbroad because it was not limited to that type of distri-
bution that would pose a material and substantial interference.^^
Another case which illustrates that courts do not look favorably on the
blanket suppression of non-school related ideas appearing in written
materials concerns students who wished to publish an advertisement
opposing the war in Vietnam in the school paper. Relying on the
rationale of the Tinker case, the court held that students could not be
limited to expressing only "matters pertaining to the high school and
its activities" in the school paper. The court was of the opinion
that the First Amendment gave a right of access to students premised on
the fact that the paper was a "forum" for the expression of diverse
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Student opinion.
Even where there is no attempt at blanket suppression, courts have
sometimes looked carefully in making their independent determination to
see if there was a reasonable forecast of a material and substantial
. In one case two student editors were suspended from
school and removed from extra-curricular activities for their part in
the production of a literary journal that was critical of school
policies and school authorities.^^ The punishment was accomplished
pursuant to a state statute which proscribed "gross disobedience or
misconduct." The misconduct consisted of the distribution of written
materials containing the opinion that the dean had a "sick mind," as
well as the statement that "oral sex may prevent tooth decay." The
journal further urged students and faculty to refuse to accept or to
destroy "propaganda" given them by school officials.
Reversing a former opinion on rehearing, the Court of Appeals
invalidated the student suspensions because the criticism was not a
material and substantial interference per se and there had been no
evidentiary hearing on the issue of a reasonable forecast of a material
and substantial interference. There had been a storm of protest in
legal circles over the original opinion, which had ruled for the school
board even though no evidence was taken on whether the Tinker forecast
rule had been reasonably applied by school officials. The decision
contains no evidence that the student punishment was based on anything
but the objectionable content.
In a similar case, one student editor and one student who wished to
receive a banned copy of the Farmingdale High School newspaper, which
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included a sex information supplement, brought their challenge to fed-
72
eral court. The court held that the confiscation by the principal was
not reasonably necessary to avoid a material and substantial interfer-
ence with school work and discipline and therefore violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the students. More generally, this
case illustrates the proposition that school officials cannot ban the
distribution of literature because of a desire to suppress the content.
Another case which dealt with birth control information concerned
an article, "Sexually Active Students Fail to Use Contraception," which
appeared in a student paper called The Farm News . Although the school
board argued that the paper was created as part of the curriculum and
that students were a captive audience that needed protection, the court
rejected these arguments. In the opinion of the court, the paper had
been established as a "public forum" and not as an "official publica-
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tion" that was a part of the curriculum. For this reason the general
power of the board to regulate the curriculum would not apply to allow
them to ban the portions of the school paper which were found objec-
tionable. The lower court had observed that in this case the students
were actually less captive than they had been in Tinker , because to
receive the communication required the affirmative act of reading the
75
newspaper.
The banning of purportedly obscene materials is another area of
frequent litigation. In one case a student literary magazine, Streams
of Consciousness, was impounded by the principal because it contained
four-letter words, a description of a movie scene where the couple "fell
into bed," and was generally "obscene.
A
Federal District Court
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directed the return of the magazine noting that it was not obscene based
on the standard which is applicable to minors. There was "no extended
narrative tending to incite sexual desires or appealing to the "prurient
interest" of minors. Based on the obscenity standard in Miller v.
(with the addition of the variable obscenity idea from
Ginsberg >/. New York which defines obscenity relative to age) a work
would be obscene for minors if, taken as a whole, it "appeals to the
prurient interest" of minors, describes sexual conduct in a "patently
offensive way," and "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
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scientific value,"
Another area in which problems often arise, as was pointed out in
the previous chapter, involves cases where the First Amendment protec-
tions for speech and religion might conceivably come into conflict. In
a case where parents challenged the school's guidelines for the distri-
bution of religious literature, arguing that to allow distribution would
create an establishment of religion, the court held in a nine to five
opinion that the distribution of religious literature should be treated
like the distribution of other literature and not banned based upon con-
siderations of content. A judge whose opinion was eventually adopted
by the majority argued that to disallow religious literature in school
would be a "wooden, nonconstitutional formulation of a wall of separa-
tion. It would be to "single out religion for especial and hostile
treatment and to stand the First Amendment on its head." "[L]et all
be heard, the Jew, the Catholic, the Protestant, the Buddhist, the
Atheist--all who care enough to come forward to advance or defend their
82
views.
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The general lesson of this latter group of cases is that the courts
will look for narrow and specific policies that impose any type of prior
restraint and for actual evidence of a material and substantial inter-
ference before accepting administrator action in derrogation of the free
speech rights of students. They will also look to see if the content of
written materials is being impermissibly scrutinized. Apart from con-
tent which is obscene, libelous, inflammatory, or which in some other way
creates a material and substantial interference or interferes with the
rights of others, it is probable that no other prohibitions can be con-
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stitutionally imposed.
The next two cases to be considered in this section show that
courts will generally allow schools to regulate the distribution of
written materials, within limits, even though that distribution takes
84place off the school campus. It stands to reason that to provide
talismanic immunity to distribution beyond the geographical boundary
of school property would not serve to aid the implementation of several
important educational policies. What is relevant is whether the mater-
ials distributed will affect the school, not where they are distributed.
Two Federal Courts of Appeals cases have set limits on the school's
authority with regard to the distribution of written materials off
school grounds. The earlier case upheld the right of five seniors to
print and distribute an underground newspaper on property adjacent to
the high school.®^ In reaching its decision, consideration was given
to the fact that there had been no material and substantial disruption
either actual or foreseeable. Recognizing that the justification for
regulation pertains to the effect on schooling itself, the court gave
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the opinion that the authority to punish off-campus activity could not
exceed the authority to punish on-campus behavior. The later case con-
cerned the five day suspension of a high school student who distributed
an allegedly obscene magazine off school grounds.®^ The court felt that
the publication, Hard Times
,
was "aptly described by the banner across
its cover as 'uncensored, vulgar, immoral. Noting that there was
no evidence of any activity or any effect within the school, the court
held that "the First Amendment forbids public school administrators
and teachers from regulating the material to which a child is exposed
after he leaves school each afternoon." Absent an in-school effect,
the students have the First Amendment right to produce and distribute
the magazine off school grounds, subject to the right of parental dis-
cipline.
Of course, school boundaries are not irrelevant. The closer the
distribution is to the school grounds the more likely its effect will be
felt in the school building itself. But the authority to regulate out-
of-school activities will have to be found in the general police power
of state officials and exercised in a manner that will allow the broad-
est protection of intellectual freedom.
The last group of cases in this section involves situations where
the written speech activities of students have not been protected. The
inquiry focuses on the propriety of the various rationales for the
suppression of intellectual freedom in cases where the type of speech
objected to has been either religious speech or speech which was con-
sidered to be either indecent or vulgar.
Unlike the Fifth Circuit case considered earlier where the
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distribution of religious literature in schools was treated like the
distribution of all other literature, a Federal District Court in Neb-
raska held that the distribution of religious literature in school was
not religiously neutral and therefore violated the First Amendment pro-
hibition against religious establishment.^^ The court felt that to per-
mit the distribution of religious literature in school would be more
than an accommodation of religion. It would be interpreted by students
and parents alike as having been approved by the board of education.
IVhile there may very well be good reasons for disallowing the distribu-
tion of religious literature in school, the court does not fully develop
them. It does not consider the existence of a possibly conflicting First
Amendment speech issue, and it does not adequately distinguish religious
from political literature.
In a New York case where students at a public college attacked re-
ligion in a student publication, the court held that such activity was a
violation of the government neutrality toward religion required by the
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First and Fourteenth Amendments. "The students. . . are perfectly free
to hold views against religions, to voice these views and to publish
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them. They may not, however, utilize public facilities to do so."
The Tinker case was cited for the proposition that speech may be regula-
ted when there is a constitutionally valid reason to do so and when there
is an interference with the rights of others. Again, the rationale is
not really clear. Why is it that religious speech is distinguishable
from other speech? What is the specific constitutional rationale for
such separation?
The general issue presented by these cases seems to be whether
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state school officials promote or establish religion by simply allowing
or granting the privilege to distribute, discuss, or publish religious
views? Is financial aid, either direct or indirect, which is given on a
content neutral basis, sufficient to implicate the state in the views
espoused? Is a complete separation between school activities and the
activities of religious groups necessary to prevent an entanglement be-
tween church and state? At least with regard to student newspapers,
there is growing support for the idea that they are not to be viewed as
agencies of the state, but as semi-public forums where students have con-
siderable freedom in presenting their views on a wide variety of topics,
92perhaps including religious ones. It is at least arguable that the
two cases which did not allow the distribution and publication of reli-
gious materials illustrate the proposition that when freedom of speech
potentially conflicts with freedom of religion, the free speech provi-
sion of the First Amendment is undervalued. If this is not the case,
fuller explication should be given in written court opinions so that the
public may see how these important values, both of which are encompassed
by the notion of intellectual freedom have been reconciled.
With regard to the issue of whether or not school officials may con-
stitutionally prohibit speech which is indecent and vulgar, though not
obscene, there is one case which holds that "First Amendment rights to
free speech do not require suspension of decency in the expression of . .
. views and ideas. The court found Tinker irrelevant because in that
case vulgarity had not been involved. The case concerned the suspension
of the senior class president and the president of the student body, for
distributing an underground newspaper. Oink , which contained four-
letter
Ill
words, a drawing of then- President Nixon making an obscene gesture, two
drawings of nude women, and two erotic poems. In concluding that there
was no need to show disruption (obscenity was not mentioned)
,
the court
showed considerable solicitude for what it considered to be the proper
moral standards for a learning environment. A concurring opinion in a
recent case supports the conclusion that school authorities can properly
regulate indecent language and that such regulation does not necessitate
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a finding of disruption or obscenity.
School authorities can regulate indecent language because
its circulation on school grounds undermines their responsibility
to try to promote standards of decency and civility among school
children. . . . With its captive audience of children, many of
whom, along with their parents, legitimately expect reasonable
regulation, a school need not capitulate to a student's preference
for vulgar expression. 9S
While it may be true that indecent speech which is not obscene will
not be constitutionally protected in the public school environment, there
has not been an authoritative opinion in the school law area which either
defines indecent speech or gives a supporting rationale for its suppres-
sion based on anything more than vague notions of decency, civility, and
morality. To assume that FCC v. Pacifica Foundation , which involved the
banning of indecent speech from prime time radio programs, is directly
applicable is to forget that broadcasting has always received the most
limitfed First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court, in a divided
opinion, considered that words referring to excretory or sexual activi-
ties or organs from comedian George Carlin's satiric monologue "Filthy
Words," when broadcast in the afternoon, were a nuisance, not unlike a
pig in a parlous. Justice Brennan, in dissent, says that the Court s
result is "patently wrong," "dangerous," and "lamentalbe." He also
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finds it disturbing that some members of the Supreme Court have
a depressing inability to appreciate that in our land of
cultural pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk
differently from the Members of this Court, and who do not
share their fragile sensibilities. It is only an acute
ethnocentric myopia that enables the Court to approve the
censorship of communications solely because of the words
they contain. 97
It is apparent that if objectionable speech which is not legally obscene
for minors is to be held unprotected, a good constitutional rationale
needs to be developed. Until then, it can be argued that such speech
should be protected in order to avoid an undue chilling effect on free-
dom of communication.
Despite the obscenity rules developed by the Supreme Court in
Miller v. California
,
which makes a finding of obscenity somewhat eas-
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ier to achieve than it had been previously, it is probably true that
the so-called variable obscenity standard still retains considerable
vitality. This standard, which was first enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Ginsberg v. New York , would allow the determination of obscen-
ity to be made relative to the age and level of maturity of the audi-
ence. That is, what is obscene for minors would be decided by con-
sidering the average minor, not the average adult. The purpose of this
variable standard is to support the rights of the parent with regard to
child-rearing and to protect the state's interest in child welfare. But
to admit the continued vitality of the variable obscenity standard is
not to permit the implementation of policies which would prohibit
offensive materials that meet some lesser standard. There is consider-
able support for the proposition that the only constitutionally
valid
reasons for limiting student speech are the traditional
ones suggested
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by the Supreme Court cases of Tinker and Chaplinsky
. Speech that is
obscene, libelous, or consists of fighting words, or which would create
a material and substantial interference would be prohibitable. An
explicit finding of obscenity is just as necessary in school situations
as It IS in the public forum. Of course this does not mean that
speech which offends but which is not constitutionally obscene might
not be prohibitable on some other grounds. The issue of the student's
right not to know and not to hear, made especially important because the
student is part of a captive audience, also needs to be considered. But
whatever the reason for repressing or censoring speech, the major point
remains that it must be one that meets constitutional standards so that
intellectual freedom in schools can be protected and promoted consistent
with other rights.
Commercialism and Solicitation
Attempts by schools to ban commercial and promotional activities
are generally motivated by a desire to maintain the kind of school en-
vironment which is conducive to educational endeavors and to protect
students, who are less mature and captive, from being subjected to the
pressures which would inevitably accompany monetary solicitations. The
desire has not been to interfere with the distribution of written ma-
terials per se, but to preserve institutional order and to protect im-
mature and naive students from undue pressure. Because these rules do
not aim at suppression of the content of speech but at the non-communi-
cative impact of speech, the question becomes whether or not
the regu-
lation unduly constricts the flow of communicative activity.
m
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order to answer this question in cases which arise in public schools,
it is necessary to briefly review an important concept that has devel-
oped in First Amendment adjudication over the last forty years or so
the concept of the public forum.
The idea behind the concept of a public forum is that there are
certain places, such as streets and parks, which have historically been
used by people wishing to communicate. This use has been so continuous
and pervasive that these places have taken on a special meaning and a
special status, and speech-related activities in such places cannot be
regulated unless such regulation is necessary to serve a "significant
governmental interest. The type of restrictions which are generally
considered appropriate are limited to those controlling the time, place,
and manner of speech. Several commentators have suggested that schools,
which have a special interest in promoting intellectual freedom, are
public or semi-public forums, where speech-related activities can be
regulated only to the extent necessary to maintain the activities assoc-
iated with their central purpose.
The first two cases to be considered in this section represent the
minority and less speech-protective view regarding commercialism and
solicitation in public schools. The first case presents a challenge to
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a forty-seven year old school rule against "soliciting funds." The
four plaintiffs in the case had distributed a leaflet called "Join the
Conspiracy" in an attempt to solicit defense money for eight Illinois
defendants. Apparently asking merely whether the rule against solici-
tation was rational, the court held that there was a "sufficiently high
probability of harm" from multiple solicitations to uphold the ban.
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The rule, according to the court, was ’’reasonable and proper” and had
a ’’rational relation to the orderly operation of the school system.
The court did not ask whether such a comprehensive ban had an unduly
restrictive effect on speech or whether it was necessary to maintain
the central educational purpose of the school; and the degree and type
of harm was not made explicit. Even though the rule might be considered
reasonable, the fact that it had been in effect for forty-seven years
does not alone prove its necessity.
In another case upholding a rule against selling or soliciting in
school, an eleven year old student was suspended for three days for
selling a newspaper, Protean/Radish . Here, the court failed to note
that enforcement of the policy would limit the free exchange of ideas,
at least indirectly; and held that there was no First Amendment issue
involved. It reasoned that since free distribution was not prohibited,
the case raised no constitutional issue. Despite the conclusion reached
here and in the previous case, it is arguable that flat bans against
sale and solicitation do unduly restrict the flow of ideas in a public
forum dedicated to teaching and learning. Such regulation, which goes
beyond the reasonable control of time, place, and manner, is probably
unnecessary as well as unconstitutional , in most cases.
Although the concept of school as a public forum has yet to be
widely relied on explicitly, there are four cases which have invalidated
school rules against advertising and promotional activities, the collec-
tion of funds, the distribution of materials ’’commercial in nature, and
commercialism and solicitation respectively. The first court used
reasoning similar to that found in the prior restraint cases,
holding
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that the rule was vague and overbroad and did "not reflect any effort
to minimize the adverse effect of prior restraint." The second court
held that a blanket ban on the sale of papers was an unconstitutional
regulation of time, place, and manner which violated the First Amendment
per the Supreme Court decision in Tinker . In the last two cases, al-
though the defendants suggested that the bans were necessary to avoid a
substantial and material interference with the educational program, both
courts held that the outright prohibition of commercialism and solici-
tation was inconsistent with the First Amendment speech provision. The
courts seemed to look beyond the allegations of interference made by the
defendants and found that the regulations were unduly restrictive and
not necessary. Both courts said that such bans, to be constitutional,
would have to be justified by a reasonable forecast of a material and
substantial interference.
The above cases recognize, either implicitly or explicitly, that
there is something unique about a school. ^Vhile it may not have the
venerable public forum history of a public street or a public park, it
is especially dedicated to promoting an exchange of ideas incident to
the educational process-- something not true of streets and parks. It
is perhaps because the students in these public forums are a captive
audience that it is especially important to insure that the state not
make them the "closed-circuit recipients" of a limited number of ideas.
A public school is more than a marketplace, it is a marketplace
of
ideas—a public forum with a special interest in promoting
the intell-
ectual freedom of its citizens. This idea is well expressed
by the
District Court judge in one of the previous cases.
U7
A public school is a market place of ideas and early invole-
ment in debate and comment and free exchange is essential to
the development of the democratic spirit necessary to the
proper functioning of our government . 1 1
3
Although a school is only semi-public in the sense that it is dedicated
to a particular, specialized, and limited purpose, it is perhaps because
of the importance of this purpose to the individual and to society that
it deserves at least as much reverence as we give to the great public
forums of the street and the park.
Conclusion
The device of prior review, which has unique application to written
materials and which has been applied with frequency to the student press,
is an extraordinary device. It has a long history of particular dis-
favor in the legal tradition. Because of the type of environment that
is conducive to the educational process and because of the relative
immaturity of the students involved, the argument that the student press
represents an exceptional case with regard to the issue of prior review
is understandable. But this same justification, the promotion of learn-
ing among a captive and immature group of individuals , could also be
used to argue that prior review is inappropriately repressive. Even if
prior review is determined to be desirable, it must be remembered that
most attempts to establish criteria and procedures able to pass consti-
tutional muster have failed. A better educational alternative might
well be to institute review procedures that serve an advisory function
rather than a censorial function. Traditional legal remedies along
with an advisory system may have a better chance of protecting and
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promoting intellectual freedom, along with other important values,
than the potentially more repressive systems of prior review.
%
Just as the motivation for prior review of the student press is
arguably excessively protective, the same argument could be made against
blanket prohibitions and ad hoc attempts to regulate student morality
by controlling exposure to materials found offensive by school officials.
Blanket prohibitions on non-school literature, commercial literature,
and the sale of literature, even if well-motivated, represent a philo-
sophical approach to schooling which misunderstands the special public
forum function of education in our society. The attempt to impose
rigid standards of propriety with regard to the type of speech which is
allowable in written materials is probably unnecessary, unwise, and
unconstitutional. While obscenity is clearly not protected, the cases
show much confusion as to how the judgment of obscenity is to be made.
A description of a movie scene where a couple ’’fell into bed*’ is clearly
not obscene; and while distasteful, neither is most profanity and vulgar-
ity. A review of the cases suggests that until a rationale can be de-
veloped by which indecent speech can be constitutionally prohibited,
expression will be subject to regulation for traditional reasons only.
Two other issues arising in this chapter concern attempts to reg-
ulate the distribution of written materials off-campus and attempts to
prohibit the distribution of religious literature in school. The first
issue is relatively well settled. While school officials have no great-
er authority beyond the school boundary, they can regulate those activ-
ities which have a substantially deleterious effect on the school's
learning environment. The religious establishment issue remains as
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unsettled as it was in those similar cases presented in the previous
chapter. While the one case which gave thorough consideration to both
the religion and speech issues held that religious literature should be
treated like all other literature, the cases which emphasized the free-
dom of religion issue ruled against freedom of speech having a relig-
ious content. In a sense, intellectual freedom concerns both freedom
of belief as well as freedom of speech. Additional authoritative
treatments of cases where these two fundamental values come into con-
flict may help to clarify their appropriate interaction and to develop
the basis for an appreciation of their importance in the promotion of
intellectual growth.
The next chapter will deal with intellectual freedom in the class-
room—with how teacher freedom or lack of freedom with regard to the
curriculum promotes or hinders the learning process. In a sense the
focus will shift from the student to the teacher, but in another sense,
the focus remains on the student for it is he or she who is always the
principal subject of public education.
CHAPTER V
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendant value to all of us. . . .
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom. . . . The classroom is
peculiarly the ’’marketplace of ideas.”
Justice William J. Brennan
Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967)
Introduction
The subject of this chapter is freedom of speech for teachers. Its
focus is limited to those speech activities taking place in the class-
room or in the school which directly relate to curricular and extra-
curricular activities in which students are involved. Hence, it will
concern teacher freedom with regard to the selection of curricular mat-
erials, topics for discussion, and teaching methods; the limits to that
freedom; and due process protections for teacher speech. Except in un-
usual cases it will not concern the teacher's speech or associational
activities outside of school even though they may relate to educational
issues. In order to maintain the intellectual freedom focus, this chap-
ter will be limited to those speech and speech-related activities by
teachers which most directly affect their interactions with students in
educational settings. The chapter is based on the assumption that teach-
ers play a key role in developing and maintaining a climate of intellec-
tual freedom in schools, a climate that directly affects the quality of
student learning.
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The Limits of Teacher Freedom
A case which dramatically illustrates unduly permissive teacher be-
havior with regard to student speech over which they had control con-
cerns the dismissal of two teachers for their part in permitting a ra-
cially inflammatory school program by the school's Black Student Alli-
ance.^ It presents the issue of the extent to which teachers have an
obligation to control certain kinds of student speech. One skit, "Okla-
homa Shootout," portrayed the mistreatment of blacks by whites and in-
cluded the use of the terms "racist pig" and "mother fucker." Ih a
courtroom skit a white judge was referred to as a "racist pig." And in
a classroom skit, a white teacher was physically dragged from the room
after making derogatory remarks toward black students. The program re-
sulted in considerable disorder. There was a fire, property was damaged,
two lunchroom workers were injured, a teacher was hospitalized for smoke
inhalation, and the school was forced to close for ten days.
Although the court merely held that a review of the record showed
substantial evidence to sustain the dismissals, one concurring judge re-
cognized that freedom of expression was an implicit issue in the case.
Where teachers are involved in approving speech which they should forsee
will create a material and substantial interference and where they could
have prevented such speech, teacher dismissals may be entirely warranted.
However, the court's reasoning should not ignore the free speech issue.
The court should give explicit reasons for the non-protected nature of
the speech and should examine the teacher's behavior in that context.
Conclusory opinions such as the one in this case are less
valuable as
122
precedent and will seem unjust in less extreme cases. Although the
speech here was arguably licentious, for any number of reasons; those
reasons were not detailed. If it is not shown that teachers are able to
predict a material and substantial interference, their dismissals will
seem unfair and will unduly chill freedom of expression.
In addition to inflammatory speech which either amounts to ’’fight-
ing words” or which would otherwise create a material and substantial
interference, teacher speech which urges non-cooperation with the dir-
ectives or wishes of school authorities is generally not protected. This
proposition can be illustrated by a case where a teacher was not rehired
for directing a journalism class to cease publication of the school
2paper, the B-Liner
,
rather than have it subjected to prior review. The
principal had asked to see the paper prior to distribution because of a
rumor that it would be a "hot" issue containing an article about mariju-
ana. Noting that no constitutional issue was involved, the court affirm-
ed the school board's action. The teacher's speech-related activities
were not protected because they were insubordinate. In addition, they
allowed the court to avoid the constitutional issue of prior review.
Although teacher due process will be considered later, for the present
it is sufficient to note that a refusal to rehire can be based on almost
amy reason or no reason--unless the teacher's fundamental rights are
involved--because a teacher without a continuing contract has no consti-
tutionally guaranteed property right.
In a similar case, a tenured teacher made statements to four hun-
dred students who had gathered in the school gymnasium which implicitly
contradicted directives of the principal and the superintendent that
the
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students return to classes.^ Citing Tinker
,
the court held that such
speech was not protected by the First Amendment because it interfered
with the regular operation of the schools. Although the degree of
interference was not stressed, the teacher in this case was held prop-
erly dismissed for advocating a course of action opposed to that ad-
vocated by school officials. And this was true despite the fact that
the student disquiet and disruption of normal school activities was
apparently induced by the summary dismissal of two popular student
teachers who had attended an anti-war rally at Kent State University.
The dismissals were based on the fact that they had failed to get
official permission to absent themselves from school although they had
the permission of their supervising teachers. The decision of the court
was apparently not easily reached. ’’There are disquieting overtones to
this case. The atmosphere of Southeast High School appears frightening-
ly oppressive and the board appears excessively authoritarian and vin-
dictive."^ But regardless of the extent of repression, the implication
of this case is that teachers must support the reasonable directives of
their superiors, at least in particularly tense situations.
The next case moves from advocacy of non-cooperation to advocacy
of violent action. It involves a teacher, Beauregard Birdwell, who was
dismissed because of an anti-military class discussion conducted on a
day when military personnel were recruiting. The teacher implicitly
and explicitly suggested to his students that they use physical force
to induce the recruiters to leave campus. According to the court,
the
comments were "infused with the spirit of violent action" and not
constitutionally protected.
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One important question suggested by the situation in the Birdwell
case is whether or not speech which is calculated to cause a material
and substantial interference with school activities is unprotected even
though it appears totally unlikely that such speech could have its in-
tended effect. The court in this case clearly stated that it regarded
Mr. Birdwell 's speech in the class a disruption per se, apparently be-
cause the speech interfered with the prescribed course content. Again
there is no explicit finding that the speech created a material and sub-
stantial interference as would be required by analogy to the Tinker case.
But by focusing on the fact that the extraneous discussion interfered
with the learning of algebra and by vague references to "potentially
disruptive conduct," the court misses the real point. A teacher's ad-
vocacy of violence arguably need not create disruption or interference,
in any physical sense, to be constitutionally unprotected. Although it
makes good sense to hold teacher advocacy of violence unprotected in
elementary and secondary schools, a better rationale will have to be
developed by the courts.
The advocacy of noncooperation and violence can be compared with
the advocacy of techniques of direct action such as boycotts and dem-
onstrations. In a borderline case, a teacher was not rehired for ad-
vising students to demonstrate against a dress code by wearing slacks
or blue jeans. ^ The advocacy was held insubordinate and unprotected
because it advised disobedience. The case is probably more analogous
to the cases where teachers have urged non-cooperation. Another case
is more troubling.
Where a teacher was removed from his position as coach of the
I
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swim team for growing a beard, another teacher. Miss Robbins, devoted
a total of fifty-five minutes on two days to a student- initiated dis-
cussion of the situation.^ Miss Robbins suggested that the students
could demonstrate their displeasure by engaging in a boycott of swim-
ming events. Although the teacher was apparently not rehired for
several different reasons, the court was of the opinion that the sug-
gestion of a student boycott of school events would be unprotected
speech. The case is not like the earlier case where the teacher sug-
gested that four hundred students not return to the classes from which
they were absent without permission. The difference is that here the
teacher merely suggested that students might engage in otherwise per-
missible and protected activity. In other words, if the suggested
action is legal, violates no school rules, and does not interfere in
a material way with schoolwork, then the advocacy of such action should
be protected. Teacher speech, like student speech, should be protected
unless it goes beyond the explicit or implicit limitations of Tinker .
Human Sexuality and the Issue of Obscenity
While the subjects of human sexuality and obscenity are only tan-
gentially related from a legal point of view, they are similar to the
extent that both involve sex—a subject which is widely considered taboo
by adults concerned with the education of elementary and secondary school
students. The cases in which these issues arise illustrate some of the
most remarkable repression of intellectual freedom to be found in ju-
dicial documentation. At times, school officials assume almost
unlim-
ited authority to ban the teaching and even discussion of
sex-related
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issues, to fire homosexual teachers, and to dismiss those teachers who
have used materials or engaged in class discussions where controversial
speech is involved. While some courts have given due consideration to
freedom of speech, others are paternalistic, unduly deferential, and
even prudish. Freedom of speech is very often less than enthusiastic-
ally protected where sex-related issues are concerned. ’’No cases have
been cited, nor is this court prepared to say, that disapproval of a
teacher’s sexual references in a high school class, . .
. ,
is a vio-
lation of the right of free speech.”^
In a Florida case involving the mid-year dismissal of a teacher
for incompetency and immorality, the teacher had made remarks to a
group of "mixed boys and girls relating to sex and virginity and pre-
g
marital sex relations." While it is conceivable that such comments
could be sufficiently immoral to justify mid-year dismissal, the opinion
of the court belies this conclusion.
[A]s to the immorality charge, there was evidence of unbecom-
ing and unnecessary risque remarks. . . in a class of mixed
teenage boys and girls which we agree with the School Board
were of an immoral nature. It may be that topless waitresses
and entertainers are in vogue in certain areas of our country
and our federal courts may try to enjoin our state courts
from stopping the sale of lewd and obscene literature and the
showing of obscene films, but we are still of the opinion that
instructors in our schools should not be permitted to so
risquely discuss sex problems in our teenage mixed classes as
to cause embarrassment to the children or to invoke in them
other feelings not incident to the courses of study being
pursued.
9
The court in this case can hardly disguise its irritation with what it
considers to be the undue permissiveness of the federal courts. There
was no indication that the teacher in this case discussed topless
waitresses or embarrassed any student. The court’s solicitousness for
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the possible '’embarrassment'’ of the students as well as its fear of the
possible invocation of ’’other feelings” suggest that the court's major
concern was something other than protecting the constitutional rights
of students and teachers. The less obvious but more important result of
a case such as the present one is the extent to which the dismissal, if
not completely warranted, would tend to chill the speech of other
teachers
.
In another case a high school biology teacher was denied a contin-
uing contract for the discussion of ’’illegitimate" subjects.^® Those
subjects included prostitution, masturbation, homosexuality, and gon-
orrhea. But since the illegitimate topics also included criticism of
the School Board and the Superintendent, there is no way to tell whether
the issues related to human sexuality would have been considered suff-
icient standing alone. The teacher was offered an annual contract for
the fourth year if he would agree to discuss nothing but biology on
school grounds. Although it is generally held that state employment
cannot be conditioned upon giving up constitutional rights, the court
here held that there was no violation of the teacher's First Amendment
right to free speech. While it is probable that the major concern in
this case was with biased criticism detracting from the teaching of
biology, it is certainly arguable that the limited discussion of sex-
related topics was not prima facie illegitimate in a high school biology
course.
A similar case occurred at the college level, where a teacher
"overemphasized sex" in a health survey course. The court held that
there was no right to override superiors on the proper content of a
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college course. After the general right of curricular control is con-
ceded, the question becomes how nnich emphasis is overemphasis and how
much speech is unduly chilled by post hoc determinations such as the
one made here.
A case raising several important issues involved the constitution-
ality of a state statute prohibiting giving instruction, advice, or in-
12formation about birth control to students. Discussion of the topic
was completely barred. In addition to allowing for comprehensive school
board control of the curriculum, a topic to be pursued later, the court
held that the statute was not overly broad. That is, the court appar-
ently felt that the topic of birth control could be completely banned
from discxission without violating the First Amendment. No justifica-
tion was offered.
Another case concerned a teacher who was directed by the Super-
13
intendent not to conduct a debate on the subject of abortion. The
court held that the teacher's union could not submit the dispute to
arbitration because to the extent that the contract made teachers re-
sponsible for the general course of study, the contract was illegal.
This type of reasoning, which equates general curricular control with
curricular decisionmaking power in specific situations, could be used
to silence speech on innumerable controversial topics. It is not
necessarily inconsistent to say that while the school board retains
comprehensive control of the curriculum, the teachers also retain some
right to academic freedom. At this point, however, it is sufficient
to
recognize that this case illustrates yet another way to silence
contro-
versial sex-related speech. Arguably legitimate speech is
suppressed
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by the mere assertion of generalized school board authority. The im-
portance of intellectual freedom is not considered.
There are occasional cases which do recognize the right of public
employees to First Amendment freedom of speech where sex-related issues
are involved. Two Federal Courts of Appeals have reversed teacher dis-
missals where one teacher gave a homework assignment to eleventh and
twelfth grade English students on the subject of teen-age attitudes
toward premarital sex,^^ and where the other discussed homosexuality
with boys in an eighth grade spelling and math class. Perhaps the
discussion in the latter case was considered appropriate because the
class was not mixed. Or perhaps the fact that the teacher was a woman
was relevant. There is no question that there has been extensive har-
assment of teachers known to be homosexual, despite one leading case to
the contrary.
Views about homosexuality presented by homosexual teachers them-
selves are effectively precluded by school boards and courts adept at
justifying the transfer or dismissal of most known homosexuals. In a
case where the male plaintiff had been a high school English teacher,
advisor to the school newspaper, and the play director, the school
board adopted a resolution requiring a psychological examination when
he became president of the New Jersey Gay Activist Alliance. The
court emphasized that ’’the reasons do ^ include a single instance of
any undue conduct or actions in the classroom or out of the classroom
with respect to a particular student. It nevertheless held that the
directive was fair and reasonable and did not violate the teacher's free
speech rights. The court cited Tinker for the proposition that the
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First Amendment guarantees are dependent on the circumstances of each
particular case.
The board does not question the right of the teacher to say
or to do any of the things which are mentioned .... It
simply contentds that . . .[the teacher's] actions display
evidence of deviation from normal mental health which may
affect his ability to teach, discipline and associate with
the students. 19
It appears that neither the school board nor the court looked at the
actual behavior of this teacher or at its effect on classroom activities
for evidence of mental illness. The actions referred to are the assoc-
iational and speech activities themselves.
In another case, a homosexual teacher who had made several public
statements about homosexuality was transferred to a non-teaching posi-
tion. The teacher had appeared with his parents on a Public Broad-
casting System program designed to help homosexual children and their
parents cope with the special problems associated with homosexuality.
Although the court held, citing Tinker
,
that the teacher's speech was
protected because there was no substantial interference with teaching
or any reasonable forecast of such, it denied relief. Because the
teacher had intentionally omitted his college membership in the
"Homophiles of Penn State" from the portion of the teaching application
asking for extracurricular activities , his constitutional attack was
precluded. The court held to this position despite the fact that school
officials admitted that if the teacher had listed the membership, he
would not have been employed.
One can only imagine the severity of the punishment if a homosexual
teacher attempted to speak of homosexuality in the classroom. These
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CEses hEve deElt only wi'th situations where homosexual teachers have
merely been involved in associational and speech activities intended to
educate the general public. And yet these teachers, if they allow their
homosexuality to be known, are almost universally denied the right to
practice their chosen profession. If there are good reasons for barring
homosexual teachers from the classroom, they should be tested by consti-
tutional standards and not evaded by disingenuous charges of intent to
deceive. With very few exceptions, the present situation with regard to
homosexual teachers allows only two alternatives: the permanent and
complete chilling of speech related to homosexuality by homosexual
teachers both inside and outside the classroom, and the abandonment of
teaching as a profession.
The next several cases are variations on a theme. They all in-
volve, in the words of one court, '*a four letter word, beginning with
the letter "F,” being an extremely vulgar word meaning sexual inter-
course.*’^^ These cases do not involve the teaching of subjects related
to human sexuality nor are they directly related to the legal issue of
obscenity. They nevertheless are related to the earlier and later cases
in this section because they involve a sex-related word.
In the first case a teacher was fired in mid-year for requiring two
fifth graders to write a vulgar word a thousand times as punishment for
using it.^^ The court held that the situation presented ample evidence
of incompetency, and that the teacher had no academic freedom right
to
the use of vulgar words which had no purpose. Even if the teacher's
poor judgment is conceded, the court's level of scrutiny can still be
questioned. The court held that the school board's action
had a
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rational basis that was supported by substantial evidence. Where a
teacher's property and liberty rights and the right to academic freedom
may be involved, courts should arguably look for more than mere ration-
ality.
A more sophisticated educational lesson was attempted by a fifth
grade teacher who, upon finding a note circulating among her students,
explained that the "vulgar colloquialisms" it contained were not nec-
essarily offensive in all circumstances. The teacher was held prop-
erly demoted pursuant to a state statute which prohibited "neglect of
duty" and required that teachers maintain discipline and encourage
morality. While the court did note that the application of the statute
would vary with the context, age, and maturity of the students, no con-
sideration was given to the possible free speech issues involved and no
substantial degree of harm was required. In the words of one concurring
judge, "our dockets cannot afford the time and effort to grind such
. .
.
. ,,24petty grist."
By way of contrast, the action of a teacher who explained the
meaning of "taboo" to his eleventh grade English class by writing the
word "fuck" on the board was protected. In holding that the teacher
was not guilty of "conduct unbecoming a teacher," the court said that it
saw no alternative for "a case-by-case inquiry into whether the legiti-
mate interests of the authorities are demonstrably sufficient to circum-
scribe a teacher's speech. In making this determination the court
considered the relevance, purpose, and effect of the word’s use; and the
age, maturity, and sophistication of the students. Although the court
recognized that "free speech does not grant teachers a license to say
L
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or write in class whatever they may feel like,” it also said that dis-
charge of teachers could not be predicated on mere disapproval of
speech-related activities by school authorities.^^
Of course it is well-settled that the use of speech which is
legally obscene in the public school context would not be protected.^®
The Supreme Court has consistently held that obscenity is not protected
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speech in any context. The problem is how to define obscenity. It
will not do to repeat the simple assertion of Justice Stewart—”! know
it when I see it.”^®
In the leading case of Keafe v. Geanakos
,
the First Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the offensive word—”a vulgar term for an incest-
uous son”—was used in an article which was ”in no sense pornographic;”
that the word was "important to the development of the thesis;” and not
"unknown to many students in the last year of high school. In
Parducci v. Rutland
,
the short story assigned by the teacher to her
class of high school juniors contained "several vulgar terras and a ref-
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erence to an involuntary act of sexual intercourse.” In holding that
the story was not obscene, the court said that ”[t]he slang words are
contained in two short rhymes which are less ribald than those found in
many of Shakespeare's plays. The reference in the story to an act of
sexual intercourse is no more descriptive than the rape scene in Pope's
'Rape of the Lock."'^^
Since the mere appearance in curricular materials of words widely
considered to be vulgar will not make the materials legally obscene,
the question of what constitutes obscenity is still not resolved. Most
of what has been considered by school boards as obscene has been
held
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not to meet that legal definition. In addition to the above cases, for
example, MS magazine was held not obscene. And federal court judges
are divided on the question, as can be illustrated by the case of Bru-
TC
baker Board of Education .
In this case three teachers were fired for distributing a ’’Wood-
stock” brochure to eighth grade students. The mid-term discharge was
accomplished by a board who felt the brochure was ’’obscene and improper”
reading for eighth graders. Some of the objectionable sections, taken
out of context, are as follows: ’’Woodstock felt like home. A place to
take acid. A place to make love, . . . Bodies naked into the water,
touching each other. . . moving together we're a big fucking wave. . . .
Old world crumbling, new world being bom.”^^ Although a determination
of obscenity must be made by considering the work as a whole, this was
apparently not the procedure followed here. To the teachers' objection
that the board should have reached its conclusion of impropriety with
the benefit of expert opinion in the fields of literature, obscenity,
and drugs, the court responded; "Experts should not be needed to sup-
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port a conclusion that is obvious.”
At least one person who did not consider the conclusion obvious
was a dissenting judge. He stated that the brochure was not obscene in
the legal sense.
The use of profanity does not transform the controversial into
the obscene. . . . Even assuming the continuing validity of
the variable obscenity doctrine, and making the widest allow-
ances for the age of plaintiffs' students, neither the bro-
chure as a whole nor the poem "Getting Together” begin to
satisfy the Miller criteria. 38
In sharp contrast to the immediately preceding case, a California
13S
court protected a teacher from a mid-year dismissal for her actions in
allowing a group of eighth graders "to write directly on a ditto sheet"
that would later be duplicated for class discussion. The students,
who were in a special class for poor readers, apparently took great
pleasure in writing stories containing references to male and female
sex organs and to the sex act.'^^ A dissenting judge felt that the
stories were legally obscene unless that word is "a semantic fiction,
wholly unrelated to any reality,.
.
The decision of the court can perhaps best be understood by con-
sidering the concurring opinion of one judge who considered the partic-
ular situation in great detail. The students were poor readers, thirteen
to fourteen years old, largely from impoverished neighborhoods in a rel-
atively large city, and they used vulgarity in their everyday interac-
tions .
We should also consider that in this world there are many
cultures and many concepts of what is acceptable sexual con-
duct, and of what sexual conduct may be the subject of free
and open discussion or publication in folklore or literature.
It may be impossible to impose one strict moral code on all
of society, and we may have to acquaint ourselves with, and
accept, without puritanical prudery, as natural to them, the
standars of others. ^2
Although the majority opinion made no explicit finding on the obscenity
issue (which was probably a close one) , it held that because there was
no disruption or impairment of discipline and no significant danger of
harm to the students, the teacher did not demonstrate "evident unfitness
for service."
This case represents an exceptionally protective approach to the
preservation of academic freedom. It suggests, indirectly, that there
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is more to be considered than the offensiveness of the language and that
what is obscene in one classroom may not be obscene in another. It per-
haps also suggests that even if the materials are obscene, they repre-
sent, at most, one instance of poor judgment. Imagine the dilemma faced
by this teacher, who had promised in advance to distribute student writ-
ing, only later discovering that it was offensive. This is how the act-
ual teacher described the situation.
I could either say ’’This is vulgar language, it's dirty
writing, it's bad, you are bad, your writing is no good, I am
going to throw it out and I never want to see anything like
that again." I could say that and I think that would be the
ordinary teacher's response. . .
.
[B]ut I was in a class-
room day after day after day and fighting a fight that I was
losing and caring that I was losing it, and so I felt, "Well
I have to do something. I have to somehow reach these kids.
..." And so I said, "I am willing to take a risk. I am
going to say to these kids "What you did is not evil. You
are not evil. The stuff you wrote is not evil, ..." I
felt for one day I had a classroom of kids that were reading
and writing as hard as they could and as fast as they
could. . . .^3
The California case considered above is exceptional because it con-
sidered the teacher's motivation. In addition, it considered the ad-
verse effect on the students, the degree of such adversity, the exten-
uating or aggravating circumstances, the likelihood of a recurrence of
the questioned conduct, and the impact of the discipline on the consti-
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tutional rights of the teacher involved and on other teachers. These
are the kinds of considerations that are necessary if intellectual free-
dome is to be promoted in public schools.
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The Question of Academic Freedom
Academic freedom for elementary and secondary school teachers is
confined to the generalized free speech right to teach, to speak freely,
and to independently select at least some materials and methods for
classroom use.^^ The minority opinion appears to be that school boards
have complete authority to control not only the general content of every
course offered in school, but the selection of every piece of writing to
be read and every topic to be discussed. Thus one court held that be-
cause the school board was responsible for courses of study, a teacher
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could not conduct a debate on the subject of abortion. In another
case, where a teacher challenged a state statute prohibiting instruction
or discussion of birth control, the court held that the teacher’s First
Amendment rights were not violated by the prohibition because the
47
teacher had no independent right to select subjects for instruction.
In addition, the teacher was prevented from raising the right of the
students to hear and to know by the judicial policy which denies stand-
ing to third party challengers. Some important Supreme Court cases have
recently been decided on the question of standing, which would now allow
the argument to be made that teachers should be permitted to raise the
constitutional rights of students. Students will often lack the re-
sources and the motivation for a court challenge. And by refusing to
discuss birth control in response to a student question, for example,
the teacher is arguably being forced to deny the student's right to
know
as well as his or her own right to speak.
The almost absolute denial of independent academic freedom
rights
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to teachers has been followed in the less speech protective line of
library cases as well. Where librarians have joined students, parents,
and others to protest the removal of books from libraries
,
courts which
have considered the issue have generally held that librarians have no
independent First Amendment right to control the collection of the
library under the "rubric of academic freedom. This dichotomous
approach, which grants authority to one group and denies authority to
another, can be sharply contrasted with a growing number of cases since
1969 which contributes to the developing consensus that teachers have
some measure of academic freedom.
In the earliest case Keefe v. Geanakos
,
the First Circuit held that
the conduct of the plaintiff teacher in assigning a controversial art-
icle from the Atlantic Monthly to his senior English class was protected
as a matter of academic freedom. Although the article contained a
"vulgar terra for an incestuous son," the court found it to be a "valu-
able discussion of dissent, protest, radicalism and revolt. It was
not pornographic, obscene, or shocking, and the objectionable words were
not used gratuitously. Although some parents may have been offended,
the court admonished the school board that the sensibilities of parents
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were "not the full measure of what is proper education."
The next important federal court case to base its holding on the
academic freedom of a teacher was Parducci v. Rutland . The case sub-
stantively clarified the meaning of the term "academic freedom.
’’Although academic freedom is not one of the enumerated rights of the
First Amendment, the Supreme Court has on numerous occasions emphasized
that the right to teach, to inquire, to evaluate and to study is
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fundamental to a democratic society. The court continues by giving
the quote from Keyishian with which the chapter opened. "Our nation is
deeply committed to safe-guarding academic freedom, which is of trans-
cendant value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment,
which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom. In affirming the right of a teacher who had assigned
Kurt Vonnegut's story, "Welcome to the Monkey House," to her eleventh
grade English classes, the court said that "the safeguards of the First
Amendment, will quickly be brought into play to protect the right of
academic freedom because any unwarranted invasion of this right will
tend to have a chilling effect on the exercise of the right by other
teachers. The court used the material and substantial interference
test as a guideline in determining the extent of the teacher's right.
It found that there was no interference with the orderly atmosphere of
the school setting and no invasion of the rights of other students. In
addition, the court determined that the story would not interfere with
the emotional development of the students because it was neither in-
appropriate nor obscene. The story presented no social danger because
nothing illegal was advocated. And there was no danger to intellectual
development because no attempt had been made to propagandize. The dis-
missal was held to violate the First Amendment rights of the teacher.
Academic freedom has also been used by courts to protect a high
school drama coach from dismissal for allowing the production of a play
with drinking scenes and vulgarity; to protect a student teacher
who
made "unorthodox" statements saying that he was agnostic and
approved
b 1
140
58the Darwinian theory; to prohibit the dismissal of a Catholic priest
who read an autobiographical story recounting the funeral of a student
who died of a heroin overdose and which contained a "slang expression
59for an incestuous son;" and prevented school officials from attempting
to restrict a teacher's use of Catcher in the Rye .^^
Some courts prefer the more traditional language of freedom of
speech or expression, but regardless of the language used, a teacher's
right to teach has often been protected. Thus, a teacher was permitted
to invite additional speakers to a political science class to represent
diverse views. And a high school civics instructor was protected
when, in response to student questions, he said that he did not oppose
62interracial marriages. This teacher believed that it was not possible
to teach seniors about current events without discussing controversial
issues such as repression of anti-war dissent in the armed forces
,
and
race relations. The court balanced the rights of the teacher with
educational needs.
A teacher's methods are not without limits. Teachers
occupy a unique position of trust in our society, and they
must handle such trust and the instruction of young people
with great care. On the other hand, a teacher must not be
manacled with rigid regulations, which preclude full adap-
tion of the course to the times in which we live.®^
But academic freedom, even where recognized, will not protect all
teacher speech in the classroom, as is illustrated by the following
two cases.
In the case of Carey v. Board of Education , a United States Dis-
trict Court judge eloquently discussed the vital importance of academic
freedom.*'^ After arguing for the relative importance of the teacher 3^
L
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employee compared to employees in the private sector based upon the na-
ture of the product (e.g. automobiles versus well-educated students),
the judge ignored the importance of the distinction.
Thus
,
a teacher may bargain away the freedom to communicate in
her official role in the same manner as an editorial writer
who agrees to write the views of a publisher or an actor who
contracts to speak the author's script. One can for consider-
ation, agree to teach according to direction.
Judge Marsh viewed the prohibited use of certain books for eleventh and
twelfth grade elective courses as a simple contracts case. He held
that because of a collective bargaining agreement the teachers had bar-
gained away their right to participate in the selection of curricular
materials.
But for the bargained agreement, the plaintiffs would
prevail here. The selection of the subject books as material
for these elective courses in these grades is clearly within
the protected area recognized as academic freedom. . . .
Because of the bargained agreement the plaintiffs' claim
must be denied. Whatever may be the scope of the protection
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments for a freedom to
communicate with students directly in classroom speech or
indirectly through reading assignments, such protection does
not present a legal impediment to the freedom to contract.
This is an astonishing conclusion after several pages replete with dicta
about academic freedom and the beneficial effects of protecting intell-
ectual freedom in the schools. Even if freedom of communication is a
permissible subject for negotiation, the holding that it can be com-
pletely given up by either party is certainly subject to question. The
problem with allowing teachers to bargain away this right is that it
also interferes with the right of the students to know. First Amendment
free speech rights are of a reciprocal nature. It is arguably against
public policy to permit the waiver of another's rights in the
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circiimstances of this case.
In the other case where teacher rights were not protected although
academic freedom was recognized, a black high school teacher was dis-
missed after having taught for fifteen years. His dismissal was
based on the following statements:
Integration in churches and classrooms came recently, but in
bed for a long time because if a white man wanted a little
loving he would go across the tracks.
The black man has had the idea that only white women could
love adequately because of picture shows. Until recently
there were no black women in movies.
Black girls have more illegitimate children because they
can't afford to have anything done as white girls do.
68Obscenity and vulgarity are needed to motivate people.
One can readily admit that the teacher's right to academic freedom is
not absolute, and still question the summary dismissal of this teacher.
"We believe that the findings noted above are examples of acts which
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need no regulation to define their indecorum." The case suggests the
question of whether or not the right to academic freedom and freedom of
expression in the classroom can be overcome by the mere assertion that
speech was improper or indecorous. If this case were typical, free
speech would not long remain in the preferred position it has generally
been given.
There are, of course, legitimate limitations to the teacher's free
dom of expression in the classroom. "The teacher's liberty is not a
license, either as formalized authority or as an undisciplined freedom,
and limitations on the manner of its exercise are required to achieve
the purpose of academic freedom."
^ Teachers cannot falsely shout
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£ire in the classroon. They cannot interfere in any other way with
the physical safety of the students --they cannot advocate violence, for
example. And teachers also have the duty to promote the social and emo-
tional growth of the students
,
so that the advocacy of noncooperative
and illegal acts can generally be prohibited. In addition, since the
teachers have the primary duty to protect the process of intellectual
exchange itself, they must not do anything that would deny the students
the fundamental opportunity for intellectual growth. Some limitations
are necessary to achieve the primary purpose of academic freedom itself.
There are two major ways that the process of intellectual freedom
could be thwarted by the teacher. It could be thwarted passively by
simply not teaching the prescribed course content, or actively by pros-
elytizing or indoctrinating. Since propagandistic materials, if used
for indoctrination, would stifle free communication and be inimical to
the development of free intellect, they could properly be excluded.
A closely related concern is that teachers not use the classroom as a
springboard for their personal criticism. And whatever the subject
matter involved, several cases suggest that the materials should be rel-
evant to a legitimate educational objective and not inconsistent with
the general purpose of a course. These cases represent a concern that
there not be a substantial interference with the intellectual develop-
ment of the students. As it was colorfully stated by one court, the
teacher is not ’’invested by the Constitution with [a] right. . . 'to
,,,74
teach politics in a course in economics.
This does not mean, however, that a teacher can never discuss sub-
jects of general political or social concern.
\
Where teachers were
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prohibited from answering student questions regarding negotiations,
the court held that their First Amendment speech rights were being
violated absent a showing that a material and substantial interfer-
75
ence would result. Another court had a similar opinion.
[I]nvoluntary restrictions on the individual liberty of
teachers and students to communicate, directly or indirectly,
where such open expression is consistent with attained level
of educational development, are matters of constitutional
concern
.
Academic freedom, in the sense of the freedom to teach and to dis-
cuss a wide variety of issues with students, has been comprehensively
protected by many courts in flhe post-Tinker period. When freedom of
communication is not protected by school officials or courts, it often
appears to be because the desire for order or absence of controversy
has been allowed to obscure its vital role in the process of intellec-
tual development itself. To legitimately prohibit or interrupt speech
in elementary or secondary schools, a showing of substantial inter-
ference with the legitimate objectives of education in a democratic
society should be required.
Due Process for Teachers
Although several important cases have established that teachers
who have property rights (contract or tenure) or liberty rights (good
name or reputation) are entitled to a hearing before dismissal, this
is not the subject of this section. The issue here is whether or not
it is reasonable to deprive a teacher of liberty or property if the
teacher had no notice or reason to know that the activity he engaged
in
might legitimately be considered inappropriate. Several cases
from the
I
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early 1970 ’s evidence a concern that teacher speech be protected in
borderline cases where there have been no standards for guidance and
where the speech is not patently unprotected. Although the motivation
in these cases is partly to insure participation and accuracy in dis-
missal or demotion proceedings, the primary purpose of this due process
protection is to preserve the fundamental right of intellectual freedom.
This exclusively procedural protection is afforded to a
teacher not because he is a state employee, or because he is
a citizen, but because in his teaching capacity he is en-
gaged in the exercise of what may plausibly be considered
’’vital First Amendment rights." [citations omitted] 78
The earliest case to deal extensively with this issue was Parducci
V. Rutland
,
where the teacher's right to academic freedom was held to
justify her use of Kurt Vonnegut's "Welcome to the Monkey House," which
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had been considered by the principal to be "literary garbage." The
court was concerned about what it called a "total absence of standards"
by which a teacher could know what conduct was proscribed.
Our laws in this country have long recognized that no
person should be punished for conduct unless such conduct
has been proscribed in clear and precise terms. When the
conduct being punished involves First Amendment rights, as
is the case here, the standards for judging peraissible
vagueness will be even more strictly applied.
The court went on to observe that valid educational interests would not
be served by allowing school administrators "unfettered discretion to
decide how the First Amendment rights of teachers are to be exercised.
It emphasized the chilling effect on intellectual freedom in the class-
room that such unlimited discretion would have.
When a teacher is forced to speculate as to what conduct is
permissible and what conduct is proscribed, he is apt to be
overly cautious and reserved in the classroom. Such a re-
luctance on the part of the teacher to investigate and ex-
L
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periment with new and different ideas is anathema to the
entire concept of academic freedom. 82
The next important 'case on this issue, Mailloux v. Kiley
,
held that
because the teacher's conduct in explaining the concept of taboo by
writing a four- letter word on the board was ’’within standards respons-
ibly, although not universally recognized, and. . . he acted in good
faith and without notice,” his dismissal would be a violation of due
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process. The lesson of the Parducci and Mailloux cases has been
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heeded by several other courts. Because of the importance of academic
freedom to the process of education, where the teacher's speech activity
arguably falls within standards recognized as reasonable, it should be
protected unless there was notice to the contrary.
The above rule of law has two important corollaries. First, it is
not necessary to have a rule in all cases in order to give notice of the
unprotected nature of teacher speech activity . As the court said in
Keefe v. Geanakos
,
"It does not follow that a teacher may not be on
notice of impropriety from the circumstances of a case without the nec-
essity of a regulation. Although this is undoubtedly true, the Keefe
case does not say which speech activity is so obviously inappropriate
that prior notice would not be needed. It is probable that speech which
has been traditionally unprotected, such as obscenity, and speech
which
would create a material and substantial interference would not have
to
be proscribed by a specific rule.
The second corollary to the above rule is that any
regulations
which are promulgated to define protected and unprotected
teacher speech
must meet constitutional standards. If this is true,
one wonders, by
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analogy to the attempts to establish rules for prior review of the
student press, whether or not such regulation of teacher speech is
either possible or necessary. The point is that it may not be con-
stitutionally or practically possible to proscribe teacher speech other
than that which is unprotected by Chap 1 insky and Tinker . And that
speech which is unprotected by Chap 1 insky and Tinker is very likely just
the sort of speech for which written prohibition is unnecessary.
The effect of the line of cases requiring that teachers be put on
notice in borderline cases as a matter of due process certainly has the
potential to protect academic freedom. The problem, as always, is that
the use of precedent can be perverted. A case which illustrates this
especially well is the recently discussed case where the black teacher
with fifteen years teaching experience was fired for statements he made
to his high school class about interracial sex, illegitimacy among poor
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black girls, and the social need for profanity and vulgarity. The
court cited the Keefe case for the proposition that "a classroom teacher,
merely by the nature of that position, should be aware of the impropri-
ety of some practices. It then asserted the impropriety without
analysis. "We believe that the findings noted above are examples of
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acts which need no regulation to define their indecorum.
While it may very well be true that there was no need for a reg-
ulation in the above case, there certainly was a need for a consti-
tutional justification for dismissal. In an apparent attempt to just-
ify the summary nature of the conclusion regarding First
Amendment
rights, the court cited the Tinker case.
While the First Amendment rights in the schools are
of great
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importance, [citation^ omitted] the right of free speech is
not absolute, but is limited by state re^latory control
that is not unreasonable or irrational . ^0
But the Tinker case stands for the proposition that in order to reg-
ulate in the First Amendment area, where important intellectual freedom
rights are concerned, what is reasonable must meet a very high standard.
The due process cases considered in this section recognize the import-
ance of these rights.
The Teacher's Freedom of Speech: Protected and Not Protected
One of the most quoted passages of the Tinker decision is the asser-
tion that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
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the schoolhouse gate." But despite this dictum
,
a teacher was dis-
charged for his action in wearing a black armband to class to protest
the war in Vietnam. The dismissal was justified by the belief that
the expression of political views was not appropriate in a public school.
Perhaps not surprisingly, a federal court of appeals held that the First
Amendment protected the teacher's action.
Any limitation on the exercise of constitutional rights can be
justified only by a conclusion, based upon reasonable infer-
ences flowing from concrete facts and not abstractions, that
the interests of discipline or sound education are materially
and substantially jeopardized, whether the danger stems ini-
tially from the conduct of students or teachers.^
The court commented on the fact that there had been no proselytizing, no
deliterious effect on teaching, and no disruption. In addition, it
voiced the opinion that the discussion of controversial issues was
necessary to the educational process.
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Along with students, and despite some additional considerations,
teachers are also protected in their right not to speak. This is true
even though their actions may be controversial. Where a teacher was
discharged because of a refusal to participate in the pledge, a court
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ordered reinstatement. "[T]he right to remain silent in the face of
. . . 95illegitimate demand for silence. ...” Here again the court noted
that this was a passive action on the part of the teacher. There was
no attempt to proselytize, and tenth grade students would not be un-
duly influenced by the action. In addition, the court felt that con-
troversy was not to be dreaded in classroom situations. By protecting
controversy, these courts, like the Supreme Court in Tinker, recognize
that our national strength derives from our "relatively permissive,
often disputatious, society.
In another case where controversy was central, school authorities
had created a forum for the speech of teachers and others on a wide va-
riety of issues. Despite the invitation to open discussion, a teacher
was transferred for speaking on the dress and grooming code, the out-
side speaker policy, and the school paper. The punishment was effected
for the creation of "disharmony and friction." But this court, too,
protected controversial speech in the public school environment and
nullified the transfer.
Priorities place constitutional rights above unlimited admin-
istrative authority to act in their derrogation. Disharmony
and friction are the healthy but natural results of a society
which cherishes the right to speak freely on a subject and
these resultant by-products should never prevent ^
individual
from speaking or cause that individual to be penalized
for such
speech. Any attempt to do so abrogates the protections
that
the First Amendment affords to all.^^
ISO
Teachers are protected not only from discharge, but from any other
significant punishment, when they are exercising their constitutional
rights. And their constitutional rights do not end where controversy
begins
.
Where teachers themselves are not engaged in controversial speech
but are advising students engaged in press activities, for example,
they apparently get First Amendment protection derivatively. Where a
teacher encouraged an honors English class to publish a paper outside
of school even though the principal was ’’quite opposed" to underground
papers because they tend to "deteriorate," the teacher's contract was
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not renewed. The paper, called Catharsis
,
contained several short
articles on sexual equality, football, free press, and ecological
issues--hardly evidence of deterioration. But whether or not the paper
would "tend to degenerate," since it was a legitimate and constitution-
ally protected activity, the teacher's acts of assistance and associa-
tion were held permitted by the First Amendment.
The other side of this issue is that teachers can also be held
responsible for the press activities of students under their control.
Where a teacher was dismissed for allowing an article to appear which
criticized the disciplinary actions of certain teachers—the "Old.Meany
Master" article—the court held that the lack of censorship was evidence
of incompetence.^®^ The court considered the Tinker case, deciding that
personal attacks on members of the faculty were not permitted because
they would create a material and substantial interference
with discipline
and a collision with the rights of others. Because the
conclusion here
than "undifferentiated fear," it
was arguably based on nothing more
I ISl
illustrates that the derivative First Amendment protection is beneficial
only to the extent that courts are willing to place intellectual freedom
in a preferred position.
The final case in this section, one of the few to arise in the ele-
mentary school context, illustrates the extreme repression of student
and teacher speech by some school administrators. A second grade teach-
er with twenty- five years of experience was discharged for allowing a
student to write a letter to the school cafeteria requesting raw carrots;
for showing the principal student cartoons showing wilted flowers as a
protest against a broken water fountain; and for voicing concern about
an open incinerator in the middle of the playground. A Federal Dis-
trict Court in Arkansas held that the teacher had a First Amendment
right to engage in all of these activities.
Conclusion
Teacher freedom of speech in the classroom and the corresponding
rights of students to know have been given increased protection by the
growing recognition of a generalized right to academic freedom. Al-
though academic freedom for the teacher may not provide any additional
First Amendment rights, the new terminology has connotations of reci-
procity and interaction which are especially appropriate for encourag-
ing intellectual freedom in an educational context.
Teacher freedom, of course, is not absolute and may be limited
where it creates a material and substantial interference with
the learn-
ing environment. Beyond this, it can be argued that an
expanded
material and substantial interference test would help courts
to balance
(
152
freedom of speech for teachers with the state's interest in promoting
the emotional, social and intellectual development of students. For
example, non-disruptive teacher speech which advocates disobedience to
school rules or which involves indoctrination is ill-suited to prohib-
ition by the traditional Tinker disruption limitation. An expanded
material and substantial interference test might be useful in situations
such as these which do not look toward the protection of the learning
environment so much as toward the promotion of student growth.
An expanded test could also be helpful when dealing with the sensi-
tive issues of sex education, sex-related language, and sexual prefer-
ences of teachers. The question would be whether the speech activity
would have a material and substantial negative effect on the emotional
or social development of students. The issue of obscenity is separable
and clearly unprotected. While what is obscene for minors is difficult
to define apart from a contextual situation, it appears from the cases
that teacher speech which is legally obscene is almost non-existent.
The role of the collective bargaining process in promoting in-
tellectual freedom is an emerging issue. For the immediate future,
courts which interpret state legislation as granting complete curric-
ular control to school boards can be expected to view curricular issues
as impermissible subjects of bargaining. In states where these issues
are bargainable, courts will need to define constitutional limits which
\^ill assure the protection of the students' right to learn.
The last major post-Tinker development to affect intellectual free-
dom in the classroom is the emergence of an especially
speech-protective
for teachers. It is applicable where teachersnotion of due process
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have engaged in speech-related activities that, while not clearly pro-
tected, are not amenable to easy analysis and disapproval under the
Giaplinsky or Tinker doctrines. In these cases, in order for teachers
to be punished for engaging in speech-related activities, they must
have clear notice that their behavior has been validly proscribed. It
is the protection of academic freedom that has provided major impetus
for the judicially created notion of a special First Amendment due
process right. In borderline cases, fairness to the individual arguably
requires such a result as a matter of principle, and the protection of
academic freedom requires such a result as a matter of public policy.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We are free only if we know, and so in proportion to our
knowledge. There is no freedom without choice, and there
is no choice without knowledge,—or none that is not illusory.
Implicit, therefore, in the very notion of liberty is the
liberty of the mind to absorb and to beget.
Judge Benjamin Cardozo
Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928)
The humanitarian instincts of the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury led to much needed reform in the way our society dealt with child-
ren and other less competent or mature individuals. While it is un-
doubtedly true that children are especially needful of protection, it is
also important to remember that children grow more and more competent as
they mature socially, emotionally, and intellectually. The special
importance of Tinker v. Des Moines, more important than the holding or
the Tinker test, is that the majority recognized and reasserted a philo-
sophy toward children which respects their individuality and uniqueness
as people.^
Although a great many people throughout the first half of the cen-
tury believed that children were properly subject to almost complete
control by their parents and the state, the Tinker court denied that
assumption by asserting the personhood of children. ’’Students in school
as well as out of school are ’persons' under our Constitution. They are
,t2
possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect. . . .
The majority opinion of Tinker is a powerful reminder that neither the
state nor the parents of a child can exercise unfettered authority
with
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regard to the children under their control. Even though children are
less mature than most adults, they still deserve respect as human beings
and they still have fundamental constitutional rights.
The concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in the Tinker case re-
presents an alternative point of view. It illustrates a major philo-
sophical difference of opinion between him and the Tinker majority with
regard to student rights. Justice Stewart bemoans what he feels is the
"Court’s uncritical assumption that. . . the First Amendment rights of
children are co-extensive with those of adults.''^ He believes that
because children are not "possessed of that full capacity for individual
choice" their rights must necessarily be more limited. Of course, from
a practical point of view this is often true. Children can't vote and
they can't marry at any age they choose. But Justice Stewart would ap-
parently limit the rights of children in theory as well as in practice,
and this limitation would have profound consequences.
The Tinker majority began with the philosophical assumption that
children are persons who deserve the protection of fundamental constitu-
tional rights. This more libertarian philosophical assumption assures
that any limitation of the rights of children in particular situations
will require adequate justification. "In the absence of a specific show-
ing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students
4
are entitled to freedom of expression of their views." Even the case
of
Ginsberg v. New York , which influenced Justice Stewart, held only
that
the state had the power to define prohibited obscenity in context.
And
since the context in that case involved the dissemination to
minors, the
determination of obscenity was adjusted to meet the particular situation.
1S6
The point is that the principles remain the same. Even though the power
of the state to control the behavior of minors goes beyond its power to
control adults, that proposition is not a statement of principle and it
is not self-executing. Judgments have to be made based upon principled
assumptions. And the assiamption that is most congruent with our liberal,
democratic values as expressed in the Constitution is that children are
possessed of fundamental rights which must be respected. As their right
to speak, for example, is adjusted to accord with the special character-
istics and needs of the school environment. Justice Stewart's simple
assertion that children don't have the same rights as adults do will
not be adequate justification. Constitutionally sufficient reasons will
have to be given to validate the denial of a student's fundamental rights.
Contrary to implications that can be drawn from Justice Stewart's
opinion, the Tinker majority does not argue that students should be able
to exercise their speech rights in exactly the same way as adults gener-
ally may. The majority recognizes that the special needs of the school's
learning environment and the fact that students constitute a captive
audience will require the making of unique adjustments. But the basic
assiomption of the Tinker court is that all persons have fundamental
rights. And it is this assiomption rather than the one often derived from
Justice Stewart's opinion that best accords with the liberal belief in
human dignity and equality.
In addition to asserting that students are persons and that they
have rights, the Tinker majority reasserted the rights of teachers as
human beings and as citizens. Just as it had been assumed that students
had few if any rights while in school; it had long been assumed that
1S7
teachers, by virtue of their occupational status, had fewer rights as
well. In a statement that has been repeated in scores of teacher rights
cases the Court in Tinker declared: "It can hardly be argued that ei-
ther students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."^ Both students and teach-
ers have the right to speak out—to give their opinion—on a wide varie-
ty of controversial social and political issues. They may talk about
war, about abortion, and about evolution, as long as the expression does
not fall outside of the realm of protected speech and as long as there
is no substantial interference with the school's learning activities.
And this assertion of rights has been generalized to protect fundamental
teacher rights in addition to speech as well.
The students also have an emerging right to know, which supports and
enlarges the teacher's right to speak. And they have a right to privacy
which imposes special obligations on teachers and other school officials
to carefully weigh the various interests involved before engaging in
speech activities. This can be accomplished in the more typical situa-
tions by looking to speech which has been traditionally unprotected,
as defined by Chap 1insky (obscenity, defamation, and fighting words), or
by asking whether the speech is likely to create a material and substan-
tial interference with good order and discipline, as has been prohibited
by Tinker.^ But where speech which potentially threatens the emotional,
social, or intellectual development of students rather than the peace of
the learning environment is involved, it can be argued that the Tinker
test will have to be extended to allow proper consideration of competing
rights. Indeed, there is evidence that the courts are beginning to make
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these more inclusive applications.
The types of situations where an extended application of the Tinker
text would be most useful involve, for example, the distribution of an
anonymous survey on student attitudes toward sex and the use of short
stories with ’’sophisticated" language or themes. Although these sit-
uations will not threaten peace and good order, they may threaten or
appear to threaten the emotional development of students. It will not
be easy to resolve these issues. Non-material concerns are subject to
less exact measurement than material disruptions. And there is less
agreement among educators and psychological experts as to what would
amount to a substantial interference with the emotional or social de-
velopment of students. But the preservation of intellectual freedom
requires that flexible standards be developed and implemented. Even if
the Tinker test was not initially created for application to situations
other than those which threaten physical disruption, the general import
of the decision would require that all restrictions be accompanied by
substantial justification, not a mere assertion of reasonableness. And
because the protection of intellectual freedom in a public or semi-
public forum dedicated to teaching and learning is of special importance,
the general presumption must always favor freedom of expression and
intercommunication. There is even more at stake in these cases than
important individual rights. The interests protected by the First
Amendment speech provisions have both individual and social relevance.
We all benefit from an intellectually free and capable citizenry.
These dual interests for the protection of free communication have
been recognized and given special support by courts at all levels in
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about half of the well over a hundred cases considered in this paper.
This speech protectiveness does not appear to be the province of any
one state, or of any one district or circuit. It could plausibly be
suggested that the spirit of the Tinker case has permeated all sections
of the country, at least to the extent that half of the cases concerning
intellectual freedom in public schools seem to rely on its egalitarian
and speech-protective philosophical approach.
On the other hand, and by contrast to this relatively high level
of protectiveness, about a quarter of the cases considered show very
little inclination on the part of the courts to protect either speech
or individual rights. They show too little appreciation of speech
values, and excessive deference to the overly paternalistic and pro-
tective judgment of school officials. As has been noted previously
the facts of many cases suggest that school officials frequently over-
react in situations where controversial speech is concerned, evidencing
a desire to maintain perhaps unreasonably high levels of order and con-
trol. In addition, the existence of blanket prohibitions and prior re-
view policies, for example, tend to suggest possible undue paternalism.
When courts decline to intervene in these situations, they frequently
cite the following language from the Supreme Court case of Epperson v.
Arkansas: "Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of con-
flicts which arise in daily operation of school systems and which do
g
not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values." When
the courts show less judicial deference with regard to decisions of
public school officials, they cite this language from the same case:
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school
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system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and
restraint. Our courts, however, have not failed to apply
^he First Amendment's mandate in our educational system
where essential to safeguard the fundamental values of
freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief.
^
A lack of appreciation for the function and importance of freedom
of communication in public education is shown by the courts in various
ways. They often ignore or fail to appreciate that speech issues are
involved. They claim that a regulation of speech is reasonable with no
regard for the high level of preference given to the fundamental right
of free communication. Or they circumvent the spirit of the First Amend-
ment and the Tinker decision in other ways. While the large number of
cases which are relatively speech-protective may be encouraging, it
could be argued that the cases where student or teacher speech has been
protected involve unusually blatant violations of constitutional rights,
thereby artificially inflating the percentage of speech-protective cases.
On the other hand, these cases might never have come to court in the pre-
Tinker period. But while the effect of Tinker can be debated, the fact
that a quarter of the cases show almost total disregard for the funda-
mental rights of students and teachers indicates that there is a great
deal more to be done to encourage an optimal level of protection for
intercommunication in educational settings.
During the course of this investigation several issues have arisen
which seem worthy of extensive individual treatment in the future. Some
of them would involve quasi-empirical or historical research and some
would involve the construction of theoretical, constitutional arguments.
The possibilities for further study, therefore, are both theoretical and
applied; and while they all involve issues of law and education, some
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are more educational in nature and some more legal.
A major issue which suggests itself for consideration is how to
balance the rights of students inter se. This will involve deciding
which students are entitled to exercise their rights when they conflict
with the rights of other students; and it will involve determinations as
to whether or not a particular right will have to yield so that school
officials can promote either a conflicting right in the same individual
or the general welfare of another student or group of students. Once
fundamental legal rights of students have been authoritatively estab-
lished, the problem of judicial balancing in a particular case involves
educational and psychological issues in addition to primarily legal ones.
The case where students wanted to collect and publish information on
student views regarding human sexuality is a good example of the need
for this type of information in a situation where several rights were
in potential conflict. The student researchers had a right to gather
and disseminate information, and other students had a right either to
receive information or to be left alone. Since school officials have
a duty to promote the fundamental rights of students as well as to
promote their general welfare in other ways, it is they who must deter-
mine initially how to resolve these types of conflicts. Even though
fundamental constitutional rights such as those protected by the free
speech provisions are given preference, the decisions of school offic-
ials, and ultimately of courts, will have to reflect a consideration
of
various social issues in addition to legal principles when these
rights
conflict. Whether the questionnaire would provide a non-
threatening
opportunity for students to think about sexual concerns
and to exchange
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views, or whether it would provide the stimulus for emotional injury
can only be decided by considering educational and psychological evi-
dence. An important issue for educational and psychological research
is to determine how principles of learning theory and information about
child development can be used to effectuate an appropriate balance in
these types of situations. An important issue for legal consideration
is to determine the extent to which third parties, such as teachers
and administrators, will be given standing to assert the constitutional
rights of students.
A related problem involves the same educational and psychological
issues considered above. Because children are persons, a reasonable
justification must be provided when their intellectual freedom is cur-
tailed in a way that would be constitutionally impermissible for adults.
Legal issues are mixed with social issues. Why is it, for example, that
we do not permit the legal dissemination of obscenity in our culture?
Is it possible or reasonable to define what is obscene for minors in the
context of the subculture of the minors themselves? If so, can this
type of reasoning be used to build a constitutional justification for
limiting the exposure of children to indecent speech? How is indecent
to be defined? Should indecent speech be prohibited for children and
not for adults? For children in school only? What is the particular
justification?
It has been suggested previously that if the material and substan-
tial interference test of Tinker were extended to cover situations where
the emotional, social or intellectual growth of students appeared to be
threatened, it might usefully provide the necessary guidance for
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assessing whether nonna.lly protected speech should be held unprotected
in the school situation. In the public park, for example, citizens can
constitutionally be exposed to propagandistic and vulgar speech. There
it is the duty of the citizens to absent themselves if they desire to
avoid indecent speech or speech which advocates violence. It is because
students are not adult citizens and do not have the right to absent
themselves from public school that the educational situation is unique.
The major criticism that could be made of the proffered extension
of the Tinker test to cover these more difficult situations is that the
test is vague. What types of materials would be likely to create a ma-
terial and substantial interference with student emotional
,
social
,
or
intellectual development? But like all multi-purpose constitutional
tools, the vagueness is both necessary and purposeful. Educational and
psychological theory, applied within a principled legal framework, will
still be needed to resolve problems that arise in particular school
situations.
Another relatively general problem to be investigated is the issue
of intellectual freedom vs. indoctrination or whether the marketplace of
ideas model is to be preferred in public education to the values inculca-
tion approach. There is a strong strand in the legal literature that
views the function of schooling almost exclusively as that of trans-
mission of knowledge. In a Harvard Law Review article which is clearly
pre-Tinker in tone, the assertion is made that one function of education
is indoctrinative—the transmission of knowledge and values.
Because
children are not fully mature intellectually, the conclusion
is reached
that the free speech clause "is of questionable relevance
to speech in
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public elementary or secondary school classrooms. The article has
exerted a great deal of influence and continues to be extensively cited
in the post-Tinker period. Another commentator, for example, argues
that the marketplace of ideas model—or the analytic model as opposed to
the prescriptive model— is not constitutionally compelled and that the
"deliberate inculcation of the right societal values" is supported by
history. While it is true that one purpose of education is to trans-
mit societal knowledge of facts and values ; in a liberal , democratic
society this transmission is not properly authoritarian, prescriptive,
or doctrinaire. The transmission of values should arguably alternate
with an analytic approach if intellectual freedom is to be protected
and if the child’s capacity for independent, creative thinking is to
be fully developed.
The student's right to know will mean little if the underlying
educational theory accords inordinate weight to the prescriptive as
opposed to the analytic. It will also mean less to the extent that
the school’s learning environment is not made full and rich by the
views of outside speakers j by views expressed on buttons, bumper stick-
ers
,
and banners j and by views from the outside community brought into
the school by petitions, books, and leaflets. Educational and legal
arguments need to be elaborated which would deny school officials the
right to enact and enforce total bans except in unusual circmstances
and for limited periods. It can be argued that a long-term ban
on
buttons, rather than achieving an especially respected status,
should be
especially suspect. A captive audience, immature, to some extent
unable
to defend itself, forever precluded from an exchange
of particular ideas
or from making assertions by wearing ever-popular buttons, is a con-
stitutional anomoly.
165
Similar educational and legal principles should arguably limit
state or local school board authority with regard to curricular devel-
opment, the selection of textbooks, and the selection of library ma-
terials. That is, because the First and Fourteenth Amendments limit
all state action with regard to intellectual freedom, it must be true
that there is an outer limit to the scope of state control over the
intellectual life of the student. "In our system, students may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
12
chooses to communicate."
Some cases suggesting that the state could exert complete control
over the curriculum have involved teacher attempts to secure a voice in
curriculum development (or school board attempts to limit that involve-
ment) through provisions in collective bargaining agreements. Whether
or not the limited, bilateral model of collective bargaining is an
appropriate forum for resolving educational policy issues of such im-
portance is open to question. But even if academic freedom can be
promoted by the mutual agreement of school boards and teacher groups
without conflicting with state labor laws or with the U. S. Constitu-
tion, some additional mechanism may need to be developed to insure that
a variety of other groups are heard.
The problem of the limit to state authority with regard to public
education is primarily legal. The question will be whether or not per-
suasive constititutional arguments can be developed with which to
counter the following type of assertion. "[I]t should not be a matter
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Emendmen't concern if a school system were to determine that
it wanted to control, as far as possible, all inputs into a student's
learning process while he is in school. . . While it is certainly
true that state officials have comprehensive authority with regard to
the education of children, that authority must nevertheless be exercised
with due regard for the constitutional rights of the students. At a
minimum, the First Amendment prohibits the type of indoctrination in-
visioned here.
After fundamental constitutional rights have been guaranteed, the
limits of state action defined, and overbroad and standardless delegation
curtailed, the next task would be to develop the educational means for
broad-based participation in curricular development. This should argu-
ably be an on-going process which would involve teachers, librarians,
other professional educators, school board members, parents, and stu-
dents. Because the personal interest of individual students and par-
ents, while important and necessary, is relatively transient, school
boards should arguably rely on professional educators to provide con-
tinuity and much of the long-term planning. To deny a professionally
trained librarian, for example, the right to participate in the devel-
opment of a school library is probably unconstitutional and surely
educationally unwise. But each area of educational planning will be
unique. Different groups will be involved to a greater or lesser ex-
tent as the need for a broader, more general perspective is required
or as the need for greater professional expertise becomes necessary.
Good procedures for allowing optimal participation and cooperation
will
derive from experimentation. But the state cannot be the lone
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participant in the decisionmaking process. Better decisions will likely
be made to the extent that reasonable methods are developed which op-
timize the participation of various constituencies.
Another area which deserves in-depth investigation and treatment
concerns the issue of prior review of the student press. Where permit-
ted, model prior review policies need to be developed which would serve
the legitimate educational objectives of prior review while at the same
time preserving the free press rights of students. Studies should be
undertaken to determine whether prior review policies are more effective
than advisory systems in achieving an appropriate level of control of
the student press. At present there appears to be much confusion among
school officials, teachers, and students as to what is constitutionally
subject to suppression and what is protectable speech. This confusion
results in overreaction and an undue chilling of intellectual freedom.
A related issue involves the question of whether or not it is
especially important to protect individuals from defamation in the
school environment—whether or not defamation in school could be said
to have the potential for irreparable injury. If it is students who
perpetrate the defamation, they may not be financially able to pay
appropriate damages to the individuals defamed. If it is captive and
immature students who are defamed, they may be particularly vulnerable
to psychological injury. Whether or not prior review policies are nec-
essary to protect this and other legitimate interests will
only become
clear after further experience and investigation.
Another line of research which has been suggested by this
investi-
studies of the impact of the Tinker case on schoolgation would involve
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administrators and school board members. iVhether or not educators are
familiar with the decision and understand it, and whether or not their
behavior conforms to the holding could be examined in practical settings.
It has also become apparent that the propositions of the Tinker de-
cision itself have had a far-reaching effect on courts at all levels. A
variety of children's rights cases from child abuse and child custody
cases to delinquency cases have cited the Tinker decision. A detailed
examination of the impact of Tinker on children's rights in general
could also be undertaken.
And perhaps the most delicate problem for further investigation and
resolution concerns the appropriate balance when the First Amendment
rights of speech and religion conflict. The values promoted by all as-
pects of the First Amendment must be carefully considered in each case
to provide the kinds of solutions that will foster true freedom of com-
munication and belief.
Freedom of intelligence is perhaps the only freedom of enduring
individual and social importance in our society. To be intellectually
free is the means and the end of education in a democracy. Because the
public school is dedicated to teaching and learning, it is even more
important to the development and preservation of intellectual freedom
than the great public forums of the street, the sidewalk, and the park.
It is this special purpose which makes the public school the most
sacrosanct public forum of all.
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